A Critique of the Uniform Product Liability Law -- A Rush to Judgment by Twerski, Aaron & Weinstein, A. S.
Brooklyn Law School
BrooklynWorks
Faculty Scholarship
1978
A Critique of the Uniform Product Liability Law --
A Rush to Judgment
Aaron Twerski
Brooklyn Law School, aaron.twerski@brooklaw.edu
A. S. Weinstein
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
28 Drake L. Rev. 221 (1978)
DRAKE
LAW
REVIEW
Volume 28 1978-1979 Number 2
A CRITIQUE OF THE UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY
LAW-A RUSH TO JUDGMENT
Aaron D. Twerskit
Alvin S. Weinsteintt
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ...............................
THE BASIC STANDARDS OF LIABILITY ............
A. Construction D efects ..............................
B . D esign D efect ....................................
1. Risk-Foreseeability ............................
2. The Elimination of Utility Considerations ........
3. Abandoning the Consumer Expectation Test .......
C. Failure to W arn Cases ............................
1. The Cost of W arnings ..........................
2. The Causation Problem and Warnings ...........
D. State of the Art and Industry Custom ...............
222
223
225
226
227
228
230
233
234
235
237
t Professor of Law, Hofstra University Law School.
tt Professor of Mechanical Engineering and Public Affairs Carnegie-Mellon University.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of our colleagues to our thinking:
Professor Henry R. Piehler of Carnegie-Mellon University and Professor William A. Donaher
of Duquesne University School of Law. We have been involved in a National Science Foundation
Study Project entitled "Products Safety Developing Standards for Social Responsibility." Much
of the thinking in this paper is attributable to our joint efforts. We also gratefully acknowledge
the critique of Professor Sheila Birmbaum of New York University Law School and Professor
Lynda Champlin of Hofstra Law School to earlier drafts of this article.
Drake Law Review
E . Process Liability ................................. 240
F. Statutes of Lim itation ............................. 243
G. Plaintiff's Conduct ................................ 246
1. The Uniform Comparative Fault-Act-Causation . 247
2. Failure to Inspect and Failure to Discover Defect 249
3. Using a Product With a Known Defective Condition 250
4. M isuse of a Product ............................ 253
a. Foreseeable M isuse .......................... 253
b. Unforeseeable M isuse ........................ 254
H . M iscellany ....................................... 255
I. Some Jurisprudential Thoughts ..................... 256
III. CON CLUSION .... .................................... 257
IV . A PPEN DIX . ........................................... 258
I. INTRODUCTION
The Department of Commerce, through its Task Force on Product Lia-
bility and Accident Compensation, recently issued its Draft Uniform Product
Liability Law (UPLL).' Although the UPLL is a thought provoking piece of
work filled with interesting insights and observations about the inadequacies
of the present state of the law in products liability, it should not be promul-
gated as a model statute. In its attempt to balance the claims of indus-
try-which seek greater protection from unjustified litigation'-against those
of consumers who view product liability law as a significant weapon in the
arsenal of consumer protection, 3 the UPLL has managed to come down in a
totally unprincipled manner on both sides of almost every important ques-
tion. If it was thought that products liability law was difficult to predict and
administer in its common law form, it is suggested that this new statutory
creature will complicate the task even further. For all its faults, the common
law of products liability has a rational sense built on the foundation of centu-
ries of tort law.' What is presented to us in this proposed legislation is a set
1. DRAFT UNIFORM PRODUCT Lu nxry LAw (UPLL), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 2996 (1979).
This law is intended to serve as a model law for use by the states. See Introduction to the UPLL,
44 Fed. Reg. at 2996. This Act contains 21 sections (§§ 100-21). The complete text of the UPLL,
as well as the analysis of each section appears in the appendix to this Article.
2. Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L. Rav. 643
(1978); Henderson, Manufacturer's Liability for Defective Product Design: A Proposed Statutory
Reform, 56 N.C.L. Rv. 625 (1978); AMERICAN INSUaNCE ASS'N, PRODUCT LIASB'rv LEGISLATIVr
PACKAGE (1977); PRODUCTS LIABELITY LEGAL STUDY, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT
LIABnLry (Dep't. of Commerce), vol. M at 113-33 (NTIS 1977); THE ALLIANCE OF AM. INSURERS
PRODUCT LABuLTy TORT REFORM PROPOSAL (1976); DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, PRODUCT LIABIL-
rry POSITION PAPER (1976).
3. See Johnson, Products Liability "Reform": A Hazard to Consumers, 56 N.C.L. REv. 677
(1978); Testimony of Ralph Nader, Senate Select Committee of Small Business (December 8,
1976).
4. A. WEmNSTEN, A. TwERsIu, H. PwU. & W. DONAHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE
REASONABLY SAFE PRODUCT (1978); D. NOEL & J. PHuSps, PRODUCTS LIABILrv IN A NUTSHELL
(1974); Rheingold, The Expanding Liability of the Product Supplier: A Primer, 2 HoFSTRA L.
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of rules and their exceptions, presumptions and evidentiary gambits that
have no cohesive quality. Many of the ideas presented by the UPLL have
enormous potential for inclusion into the common law development of prod-
ucts liability over the next decade, but they will require the careful hand of
the courts to assure that such doctrines are developed through careful atten-
tion to the varying fact patterns which create the rich tapestry of products
liability law. It is much too early for legislation to pre-empt the creativity of
the common law in the continuing development of products liability law.
U1. THE BAsic STANDARDS OF LIABiLiTY
As its first major goal, the UPLL undertakes the establishment of the
basis of liability for a products liability action. It does so by rejecting the all-
purpose definition of strict liability found in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 402A, which provides:
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User
or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
or physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to
his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a prod-
uct, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer with-
out substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not brought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
The drafters of the UPLL, in their supplementary analysis (UPLL Anal-
ysis),5 take the position that the Restatement definition of "defect" was origi-
nally fashioned to cover manufacturing (construction) defects and did not
focus on design defects and failure to warn cases.' Rather than struggle with
REv. 521 (1974); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Wade-Mississir].
5. The DRurr UNIFORM PRODUCT LiAmLrrY LAw is accompanied by a lengthy and detailed
analysis which appears at 44 Fed. Reg. 3002-19 (1979).
6. UPLL analysis § 104, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 3004 (1979) (see Appendix). The problem
originally arose because the language of REsTATEmENT (SEcoN ) oF Ton'rs, § 402A predicated
liability on a product being "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer." The term "defect" was meaningful in the context of a production defect case since
the defect could be identified by comparing the questionable product with the manufacturer's
internal production standard. In a design defect or failure to warn case the term "defect" would
not identify the standard against which the product should be judged. The term "unreasonably
dangerous" was well suited for these cases since the concept of reasonbleness required a balanc-
ing of risk-utility considerations. Dean Wade in several influential articles identified those fac-
tors which should be evaluated in setting the "reasonableness" standard of product quality:
(1) the usefulness and desirability of the product, (2) the availability of other and safer
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formulating a single theoretical definition of defect, the UPLL eradicates the
doctrinal differences between negligence, strict liability and warranty theo-
ries.7 The method for accomplishing this goal is to treat the basis of liability
differently for each functional category. The UPLL thus creates different
subsections for construction defects, design defects and failure to warn cases.
In doing so, the UPLL drafters desired to impose strict liability for construc-
tion defects alone, and to enact an emasculated form of negligence for design
products to meet the same need, (3) the likelihood of injury and its probable serious-
ness, (4) the obviousness of the danger, (5) common knowledge and normal public
expectation of the danger (particularly for established products), (6) the avoidability
of injury by care in use of the product (including the effect of instructions or warnings),
and (7) the ability to eliminate the danger without seriously impairing the usefulness
of the product or making it unduly expensive.
Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 17 (1965). A slightly revised list of
factors was delineated in Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss.
L.J. 825, 837 (1973).
In what has come to be known as the Wade-Keeton test of strict liability the standard is
applied without reference to the scienter of the defendant. Professor Keeton has expressed the
following formulation of the rule:
[A] product ought to be regarded as "unreasonably dangerous" at the time of sale
if a reasonable man with knowledge of the product's condition, and an appreciation of
all the risks found to exist by the jury at the time of trial, would not now market the
product, or, if he did market it, would at least market it pursuant to a different set of
warnings and instructions as to its use. . . . Since the test is not one of negligence, it
is not based upon the risks and dangers that the maker should have, in the exercise of
ordinary care, known about. It is, rather, danger in fact, as that danger is found to be
at the time of the trial that controls.
Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of
Products, 20 Symcusz L. Rav. 559, 568 (1969) [hereinaftter cited as Keeton-SYRAcusE].
At the outset there was some confusion about the utilization of risk-utility analysis in design
defect legislation. Some courts believed that it merely re-introduced negligence into product
liability actions. See, e.g., Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 543 P.2d 209
(Alaska 1975); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1972); Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 304 A.2d 562 (1975).
This confusion was short lived. The overwhelming majority of courts have applied risk-
utility analysis in establishing design defect and failure to warn cases. See Dreisonstok v.
Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974); Borel v. Fireboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493
F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973); Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1973); Rogers
v. Unimac Co., 115 Ariz. 304, 565 P.2d 181 (1977); Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573
P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978); Rivera v. Rockford Mach. & Tool Co., 1 III. App. 3d 641,
274 N.E.2d 828 (1971); Moning v. Alfono, 400 Mich. 425, 254 N.W.2d 759 (1977); Johnson v.
Chrysler Corp., 74 Mich. App. 532, 254 N.W.2d 569 (1977); Blevins v. Cushman Motor, 551
S.W.2d 602 (Mo. 1977); Ferry v. Luther Mfg. Co., 56 A.D.2d 703, 392 N.Y.S.2d 521 (App. Div.
1977); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976); Phillips
v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974); Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519
S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974); Metal Window Prods. Co. v. Magnusen, 485 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App.
1972).
The significant outpouring of academic commentary aided the courts to recognize that risk-
utility theory must be utilized. Although there may be occasional decisions which demonstrate
confusion, see, e.g., Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., - Pa. _ 391 A.2d 1020 (1978), there is
considerable agreement as to the standard 'to be applied.
7. UPLL § 104, analysis § 104, reprinted in 44 Fed Reg. 2998, 3004-06 (1979).
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defects and failure to warn cases.' These sections, properly understood,
should please neither consumers nor industry. An investigation of each
subsection will demonstrate why the proposed standards of liability manage
to be unfair to everyone.
A. Construction Defects
The UPLL section dealing with construction defects reads as follows:
104(A) The Product Was Defective in Construction.
The harm was caused because the product was not made in accord-
ance with the product seller's own design or manufacturing standards. In
determining whether the product was defective, the trier of fact may con-
sider the product seller's specifications for the product, and any differ-
ences in the product from otherwise identical units of the same product
line.
There are several reasons why it is premature to mandate liability for
construction defects on the sole ground that the product failed to meet the
manufacturers own production standards. First, a standard Which judges a
manufacturer by his own rather than industry standards could penalize the
manufacturer who goes out of his way to build into his product a high safety
level not mandated or followed by the industry.' Consider, for example, a
manufacturer of a high quality car who utilizes the finest grade of steel for
shock absorbers. Assume that under very extreme conditions (e.g., hitting a
large pothole at high speed) a spring fails and the car goes out of control. If
the evidence were to disclose that the spring that failed did not meet the
manufacturer's own internal construction standards and therefore failed, lia-
bility would attach. If the manufacturer's standard far exceeds those of the
industry, it would seem particularly unfair to foist the manufacturer by his
own petard."0 Admittedly, in some cases an argument could be made that
an express warranty would exist in such a situation." But the greater proba-
bility is that the consumer would not be aware of the performance level of
the internal parts of an automobile. Why then should a manufacturer be held
liable for exceeding high safety standards merely because he failed to meet
his own very demanding specifications? The simple solution to this problem
would be to impose the "unreasonably dangerous" standard on all product
liability actions. This would mean that construction defect cases would be
8. See text accompanying footnotes 18-21 infra.
9. Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler and Donaher, Product Liability: An Interaction of Law and
Technology, 12 DUQ. L. REv. 425, 433-34 n.14 (1974).
10. The interplay between quality control and design must be carefully assessed. A manu-
facturer may choose a higher base level of product quality and thus reduce quality control since
even deviations from the norm will not bring the safety level into the danger zone. A legal
standard which penalizes deviations from quality control norms could thus influence a decision
in favor of greater quality control and against higher base level safety.
11. It is possible that an exprss representation could be made with regard to the quality of
the car such that a warranty would be established. See U.C.C. § 2-313.
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judged by the same risk-utility standards which control design defect cases.'
To be sure, such a solution would complicate the definition of defect, whereas
the UPLL seeks to delineate clear cut rules. In a society of steadily rising
safety standards, this problem deserves careful attention. We may ill afford
simple solutions to complex problems.
There is a second and more serious objection to the dichotomy raised
between construction defects and design defects. By imposing a strict liabil-
ity standard for production defects and a negligence standard for design
defects, the UPLL aggravates an already difficult situation. In the develop-
ment of product safety, there may be several ways to address a safety hazard.
One way may be to increase quality control to assure the integrity of a crucial
part. Another may be to design a back-up safety feature (a fail-safe compo-
nent). By deciding that construction defect cases are not defensible (in that
strict liability applies regardless of fault), and that design defect cases are
defensible (on negligence or risk-utility grounds), the UPLL has made a
conscious decision to favor the design alternative over quality control. This
may be a short-sighted approach. It is possible that increased safety can be
accomplished at a lower cost by raising quality control standards rather than
by designing a fail-safe system that could engender other risks.'" The diffi-
culty is that the litigation categories have been created by lawyers. Engineers
who must think in functional terms may find the framework totally unsatis-
factory.
In a very real sense, this problem already exists. Even those courts which
apply strict liability for design defects apply risk~utility theory and are un-
willing to impose liability without involving themselves in the trade-offs
which are indigenous to the balancing process." Nonetheless, courts have not
said that liability will automatically attach in a construction defect case if
the product fails to meet the manufacturers own standards. They have ap-
plied this standard as a "rule of thumb"-as a practical guide for establishing
defect. In the UPLL, this rule of thumb takes on the force of law.
B. Design Defect
Section 104(B) of the UPLL states:
12. If we were to subject a product which deviated from the manufacturer's especially high
norm to the "unreasonably dangerous" standard, the product might well survive such scrutiny.
Given the balance between risk and utility, the product might still be well above the danger
zone-hence the product would be decreed a "reasonably safe" or "socially acceptable" product.
See Donaher, Piehler, Twerski and Weinstein, The Technological Expert in Products Liability
Litigation, 52 Tax. L. Rzv. 1303, 1307 (1974) and Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485,
-, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1974) where the court says: "[Wihether the mismanufactured article
is dangerously defective because of the flaw is sometimes difficult to ascertain because not every
such flaw which causes injury makes the article dangerously defective."
13. In a sense this problem is the mirror-image of the one discussed earlier. In this instance
the decision in favor of design rather than quality control may result in a lower standard of safety
to society.
14. See cases cited in note 6 supra.
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104(B) The Product Was Defective in Design
The harm was caused because the product was defective in design.
In determining whether the product was defective, the trier of fact shall
consider whether an alternative design should have been utilized, in light
of:
(1) The likelihood at the time of manufacture that the product would
cause the harm suffered by the claimant;
(2) The seriousness of that harm;
(3) The technological feasibility of manufacturing a product designed
so as to have prevented claimant's harm;
(4) The relative costs of producing, distributing, and selling such an
alternative design; and
(5) The new or additional harms that may result from such an alter-
native design.
This subsection banishes strict liability as the governing standard for
design defect cases. It reintroduces foreseeability as an important factor for
consideration in products liability law by judging the manufacturer by what
he could have forseen at the time of manufacture. Under the UPLL, the
question is not whether the product is unreasonably dangerous, but whether
the defendant is negligent. In addition, the UPLL imposes liability only for
design alternatives which were technologically feasible at the time of
manufacture. The reasons for imposing the above constraints of negligence
law on design defects are rather clear. It is simply deemed unfair to impose
liability on a manufacturer for harms which he need not have foreseen and
for technological advances not yet born.
1. Risk-Foreseeability
The two issues of: (1) foreseeability of risk, and (2) technological feasibil-
ity of alternative designs raise very different kinds of questions. The first issue
focuses on the state of knowledge of the manufacturer and what he could have
known at the time of manufacture. The latter focuses on the "state of the art"
question. This problem was deemed of sufficient importance to warrant a
section of its own in the UPLL and will be discussed in turn. 5 It should be
recognized that one might remove scienter as a factor in predicting the hazard
in strict liability cases and yet include such a limitation on liability based
on state of the art. Hazard foreseeability and state of the art need not be
determined by the same legal standard. It is submitted that the UPLL was
decidedly wrong in choosing the negligence framework for both questions.
What could a manufacturer have known at the time of manufacture
about a product hazard if due diligence would have been applied? There is
perhaps no issue more difficult for a plaintiff to litigate than what the state
of knowledge should have been for a manufacturer with expertise in his field."
15. See text accompanying notes 40-42 infra.
16. Keeton-SYRAcusz, supra note 6, at 570; Keeton, Product Liability-Inadequacy of
Information, 48 Tx. L. Rzv. 398, 407-09 (1970) and Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning
of Defect, 5 ST. MARY's L. J. 30 (1973).
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Were the tell-tale hints of a possible hazard available and were they properly
considered? What testing as full and complete as it might have been? In the
rush to the marketplace, were factors overlooked that now loom large in
retrospect? These questions are inordinately difficult to prove. We have, as
yet, no mechanism in place to assure that negative test results will not be
secreted and destroyed by the wary manufacturer. The histories of some of
the drug cases indicate that scandalous liberties have been taken with test
results. 7 However, even putting such unethical practices aside, it is simply
unfair to burden the plaintiff with proving that a product hazard that did
become a reality was foreseeable at the time of manufacture. This issue
should be determined by the application of strict liability. However, if there
is belief that fundamental fairness demands that the manufacturer be given
the opportunity to establish that a hazard was scientifically unknowable at
the time of manufacture, then the defendant should be required to carry the
burden of proof on that issue. The state of scientific knowledge and the
adequacy of testing is within the control of the manufacturer who has exper-
tise in the field. Thus, it would appear to be a fair allocation of burdens of
proof to require the defendant to either convince the court that the risk that
inhered in the product was not capable of scientific detection at the time of
manufacture, or, in the alternative, to bear the burden of rebutting a pre-
sumption that such knowledge was attainable.
2. The Elimination of Utility Considerations
In reviewing the list of considerations included in the UPLL for the
determination of negligence, the authors were struck by the absence of any
mention of the utility of the product in its present state and how that utility
would be affected by the introduction of an alternative safety device. Risk-
utility considerations have been held to be an integral part of design defect
cases by almost every court and commentator that have considered the
issue. 5 The omission was not an oversight. In the Analysis, the drafters of the
UPLL confronted the issue squarely, stating:
17. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967); Toole v. Richard-
son-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967). See also Auto Safety Over-
sight Hearing-Corvair Heaters: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 136-51 (1972).
18. REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 292; Fisher, Products Liability-The Meaning of
Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv. 339 (1974); Keeton-SvaAcusE, supra note 6; Rheingold, supra note 4;
Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher and Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Product Liabil-
ity-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 495 (1976) (hereinafter cited
as Twerski, The Use and Abuse of Warnings] and cases cited in note 6 supra. It should be noted
that even under the regime of Cronin, when the California court had banished the use of the
"unreasonably dangerous" criterion, the California courts continued risk-utility analysis. See,
e.g., Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 367, 551 P.2d 398, 400, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78, 81
(1976); Self v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 6-8, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575, 116 Cal. Rptr.
575, - (1974). See also Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-81 (1976);
S. REP. No. 92-749, 92 Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1972).
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Two factors relied on by some courts in design cases were not included
in the Section 104(B) balancing process. First is the "utility" of the
product to the user or to society in general. Economic analysis suggests
that this element would render the balancing test totally subjective and
unworkable. Tested by its "utility," a whole-grain health food cereal con-
ceivably might be subject to a lower standard of responsibility than one
that was heavily sugar-coated (less "useful" to society as a whole). On the
other hand, if the trier of fact focused on the subjective "value to the
user," it might come to the opposite conclusion. The approach of Section
104(B) is to focus the trier of fact on how the product was made and what
its dangers are, rather than making macroeconomic judgments about its
value to society or to certain individuals."
It is virtually impossible to understand how a design defect case can be
evaluated without balancing risk and utility factors. Consider, for example,
the leading products liability case of Micallef v. The Miehle Co., in which
the New York Court of Appeals overruled the patent danger doctrine.2a In
Micallef, the plaintiff was employed as an operator on a huge photo-offset
printing press. One day while working on the press plaintiff discovered that
a foreign object had made its way into the plate of the unit. Such a substance,
known to the printing trade as a "hickie," causes a blemish or imperfection
on the printing page. In order to correct this situation plaintiff informed his
superior that it was his intention to "chase the hickie." The process of
"chasing hickies" consists of applying, very lightly, a piece of plastic about
eight inches wide to the printing place, which is wrapped around a circular
plate cylinder that spins at high speed. The revolving action of the plate
against the plastic removes the "hickie." While plaintiff was engaged in this
maneuver the plastic was drawn into the nip point, grabbing his hand be-
tween the plate cylinder and an ink-form roller. The photo-offset machine
had no safety guards to prevent such an occurrence and plaintiff was unable
to quickly stop the machine because the shut-off button was distant from the
point of operation of the machine.
The plaintiff in Micallef was fully aware of the danger of getting his hand
caught in the press while "chasing hickies." It was, however, the custom of
the industry to "chase hickies on the run," because once the machine was
stopped, it required at least three hours to resume printing. An expert witness
testified that good engineering practice would dictate that a safety guard be
placed near the rollers since the danger of human contact at the point of
operation was well known.
Let us assume for the sake of discussion that, in the above case, a safety
guard could have been installed on the high speed press at the point of
operation. Let us further assume that the safety guard could have been in-
stalled at a nominal cost in comparison to the total cost of the machine, and
that it would not engender new or additional risks to the user. Under the
formula set forth in Section 104(B) there would be no excuse for not equipping
19. UPLL analysis § 104(B), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 3005 (1979) (see Appendix).
20. 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976).
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the press with the safety device. What if, however, the result of installing such
a safety device at the point of operation would cut the effectiveness of the
machine drastically - instead of turning out 20,000 sheets per hour it would
slow the machine down to 15,000 sheets per hour. Would that operate as a
mitigating factor so that the machine would be declared non-defective? With
the elimination of the utility consideration from the evaluation of defective-
ness there appears to be no way in which to consider the true costs connected
with the installation of safety features.2' It is simply inconceivable that indus-
try would tolerate a legislative solution to the defect question which elimi-
nates utility from the evaluation process.
3. Abandoning the Consumer Expectation Test
In addition to eliminating the "utility" consideration from products lia-
bility law, the UPLL abandons the "consumer expectation" test as a thresh-
old standard for establishing a product defect. In the past several years,
courts 2 and commentators 3 have expressed considerable support for a
21. The only factor enumerated in § 104(B) of the UPLL that would be relevant is (4): "The
relative costs of producing, distributing and selling such an alternative design." It would appear
that in considering this factor we are to focus only on the cost of the alternative design and not
the general cost to society should the design alternative be mandated by law. It is difficult to
fathom the meaning of the somewhat Delphic statement in the Analysis which compares whole-
grain cereal with sugar-coated cereal. When the authors speak of subjecting one cereal to a "lower
standard of responsibility" as against the other they leave these writers puzzled as to what they
are talking about.
There is another possible interpretation of this section. It may be that dollar costs in terms
of the effectiveness of the machinery could be taken into account but that social utility would
not be considered. Consider for example a safety guard on identical machines that produce
hypodermic needles and spears for toy darts. In both instances the dollar cost in productivity if
a safety guard were installed would increase the cost per needle or per dart by $1 per unit. Under
this section we could consider the effect of cost per unit but not the detriment to society if we
diminished the production of hypodermic needles as against toy darts. The fallacy with this
analysis is that the only way to identify real costs is to measure the value of the loss of lives
(due to the unavailability of hypodermic needles) as compared to the danger to workers who may
suffer injury from the machine. Ultimately, we may have to decide whether we want safer
machines as against more hypodermic needles and high speed printing presses. This is a value
judgment that cannot be avoided.
However, the above interpretation of the statute assumes that there is some way of making
an internal (microeconomic) risk-utility analysis. It is difficult to see how this will work. Consider
the proposed safety guard on the high-speed printing press. Assume that utilizing a more protec-
tive safety guard we will reduce productivity on the machine by 3,000 sheets per hour but by
utilizing a less protective guard we would reduce productivity by only 1,000 sheets per hour. How
would we decide which was the safety guard which met the demands of the statute. Assume that
the cost of newspaper or handbills would rise by $.01 per unit if the less protective guard was
used and by $.03 per unit if the more expensive guard was used. How costly is too costly within
the meaning of the statute. It all depends on how important the final work product of that
machine is to society and whether we want the productivity of the machine more than the safety.
This brings us back to the utility question. We see no way of avoiding the problem.
22. Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp,, 481 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1973); Barker v. Lull
Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978); Henderson v. Ford Motor Co.,
519 S.W.2d 87, 92 (Tex. 1975).
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threshold test which does not require that the complexities of risk-utility
analysis be undertaken in every design defect case. The California Supreme
Court in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.24 stated the argument well:
[O]ur cases establish that a product may be found defective in de-
sign if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product failed to perform as
safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended
or reasonably foreseeable manner. This initial standard, somewhat analo-
gous to the Uniform Commercial Code's warranty of fitness and merchant-
ability. . ., reflects the warranty heritage upon which California product
liability doctrine in part rests. As we noted in Greenman, "implicit in [a
product's] presence on the market .. . [is] a representation that it
[will] safely do the jobs for which it was built." . . . When a product fails
to satisfy such ordinary consumer expectations as to safety in its intended
or reasonably foreseeable operation, a manufacturer is strictly liable for
resulting injuries. . . .Under this standard, an injured plaintiff will fre-
quently be able to demonstrate the defectiveness of a product by resort
to circumstantial evidence, even when the accident itself precludes identi-
fication of the specific defect at fault.2
The thrust of the consumer expectation test is that when the manufac-
turer leads consumers to believe that a product will perform at a certain level
and then disappoints those expectations, liability ought to follow. 2 6 The re-
buttal to this argument is provided in the following quotation from the UPLL
Analysis:
The second factor not included in the Section 104(B) balancing pro-
cess is a "consumer expectation" test. The reasons for this are rooted in
both economics and practicality. As Professor Wade, Reporter for the
"Restatement (Second) of Torts," has stated:
[Tihe consumer would not know what to expect, because he
would have no idea how safe the product could be made.
Wade, supra, 44 "Miss. L.J." at 829. Again, the notion of consumer expec-
tations suffers from an "overkill" of subjectivity. Each trier of fact is likely
to have a different understanding of abstract consumer expectations. Sec-
tion 104(B) leaves consumer expectations aside and focuses the trier of
fact on what design alternatives were possible as a practical matter.7
To the extent that the UPLL Analysis relies on the view of Professor
23. Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort
Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. Rav. 803, 845-46 (1976); Twerski, From Defect to
Cause to Comparative Fault - Rethinking Some Product Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. Rv.
297, 312-15 (1977). For the views of Professor Wade on this topic see the discussion in note 28
infra.
24. See note 22 supra.
25. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d at 429-30, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
26. The most vociferous advocate of consumer expectations as the crucial liability factor
in product liability law is Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine,
Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. Rzv. 1109 (1974).
27. UPLL analysis § 104(B), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 3005 (1979) (see Appendix).
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Wade, it is quite clear that they have misconceived his position. Professor
Wade has not taken the position that a consumer expectation test is impro-
per. He has argued that it cannot be utilized as the sole test for defect, but
must also be supplemented with a risk-utility analysis." As such, he is in
substantial agreement with the Barker court."
Turning to the merits of the consumer expectation argument, it cannot
be gainsaid that it may be difficult to develop an objective standard for
consumer expectations. However, such difficulty does not warrant abandon-
ing the test. If we can agree that plaintiff should not be burdened with
establishing the rigors of the risk-utility test (or design alternatives) in cases
where he has been injured as a result of a product not performing up to his
expectations, then it is worthwhile exploring solutions to the subjectivity
problem. The fear that almost any defective product claim will pass under
the ruberic of consumer expectations can be dealt with by requiring that such
expectations must be clearly and widely perceived to be attendant to the
normal use of the product."
28. In his article entitled On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products (appearing
in 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973)), Professor Wade argues that the consumer expectation test alone is
inadequate. The sentence quoted in the Analysis reads as follows: "f[ln many situations,
particularly involving design matters, the consumer would not know what to expect, because he
would have no idea how safe the product could be made." Id. at 829 (emphasis added). He then
goes on to argue for the utilizaiton of a risk-utility standard. In those instances where a product
clearly disappoints consumer expectations he would favor recovery on that ground alone. That
this is, in fact, Professor Wade's view is evident from his discussion of defect in a recent article
entitled A Conspectus of Manufacturer's Liability for Products (appearing in 10 Ind. L. Rev. 755
(1977)) where he states:
A clearer and more meaningful term is "unreasonably dangerous," a phrase that
can be applied to products that are mal-made, mal-designed, or lacking in instructions
or warnings. My personal preference is to say that a product is not duly safe. Two tests
are set out to determine whether a product is unreasonably dangerous. A test was
initially set forth in connection with breach of warranty cases for loss of bargain. In
that case, the courts said, what you look to is what the buyer expected to get. This
test will work in many cases, but sometimes the buyer does not know exactly what he
should have received; he is thinking only of what the product will do for him. In
addition, it seems to me that in a tort action it makes more sense to put the complaint
in terms of what the seller did rather than what the buyer expected. For these reasons
the test is better expressed in this way: Would the seller be negligent if he put the
product on the market knowing its dangerous condition? In other words, strict liability
eliminates the need to prove negligence on the part of the seller or the manufacturer
in letting the product get in a dangerous condition, in failing to discover that dangerous
condition, or in failing to do something about it. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 758.
29. Professor Wade's agreement with Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d
443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978), would go only to its two-tiered test for liability. There is no
evidence that Professor Wade would agree with the rules established in Barker for making out a
prima facie case and for the shifting of the burden of proof to the defendant once a prima facie
case has been established.
30. In an earlier article written in conjunction with my colleagues for a National Science
Foundation Study, we argued that there is a sensitive interplay between design and warning
(representational) parameters. Since the amount of information a consumer can carry as part of
his mental baggage is limited, it is necessary to decide which dangers are to be designed out of
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A note of blunt truthfulness is in order. What we fear with the consumer
expectation test is that the court will turn over to the jury borderline cases
that have little merit. Once these cases enter into the grist of jury decision-
making, there is a reluctance by appellate courts to reverse jury verdicts. This
problem lurks behind the establishment of the clear and convincing standard
of proof for several issues raised within the UPLL.3' If the purpose of the
UPLL is to tell the trial and appellate courts throughout this country that
they ought not to permit plaintiff's verdicts to stand when the supporting
evidence is marginal, then we ought to be spared the maze of rules and
exceptions that the UPLL sets forth. A simple rule that product liability cases
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence would suffice. The UPLL
Analysis would then read as follows:
We have strong suspicions that some awfully weak product laibility
cases are being sustained by trial and appellate courts. Given the serious
dislocation to the industrial community and the skyrocketing effect on
product costs, we believe that the time has come to assure ourselves that
only the clearest kinds of design defect and failure to warn cases should
be sustained. This Act empowers trial and appellate judges to do what
they should have been doing in the first place. Verdicts should be directed
unless you are convinced that a bona fide case of defect has been estab-
lished.
The suggestion set forth above is not made tongue in cheek. It addresses a
very real problem in an honest fashion. We would not support such a formula-
tion, but in all candor it is superior to eliminating the consumer expectation
test or the risk-utility test on the specious grounds of subjectivity.
C. Failure to Warn Cases
Section 104(C) of the UPLL states:
104(C) The Product was Defective Because Adequate Warnings or In-
structions Were Not Provided.
The harm was caused because the product seller failed to provide
the product and which are to be warned against. See Twerski, The Use and Abuse of Warnings,
supra note 18.
The present suggestion is that if a product fails to meet consumer expectations it will be
held to be defective. If our previous thesis was correct, then even warnings (representations) must
be judged in a risk-utility framework. However, we believe that, in order for the representation
theory to be workable and understandable by a jury, it must be presented at a fairly gross levei
if the product is to be declared defective because it disappoints consumer expectations. The fine
tuning of the representational theory, in which the jury is permitted to assess the subtleties of
the product, belongs in the overall visceral reaction which a jury brings to bear in its overall risk
analysis. I would thus limit the representational problem to clearly disappointed expectations
and deal with the design-warning interplay within the context of the unreasonable danger prob-
lem in which the jury is faced with design and warning alternatives. See also Green, Strict
Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54 TEx. L. REv. 1185 (1976).
31. UPLL §§ 106(d), 106(e), 107(b) & 109(B)(2), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 2999-3000 (1979)
(see Appendix).
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adequate warnings or instructions about the dangers and proper use of the
product.
(1) In determining whether adequate instructions or warnings were
provided, the trier of fact shall consider:
(a) The likelihood at the time of manufacture that the product would
cause the harm suffered by the claimant;
(b) The seriousness of that harm;
(c) The product seller's ability to anticipate at the time of manufac-
ture that the expected product user would be aware of the product risk,
and the nature of the potential harm; and
(d) The technological feasibility and cost of warnings and instruc-
tions.
(2) In claims based on Section 104(C), the claimant shall prove that
if adequate warnings or instructions had'been provided, a reasonably pru-
dent person would not have suffered the harm.
(3) A product seller may not be considered to have provided adequate
warnings or instructions unless they were devised to communicate with
the person(s) best able to take precautions against the potential harm.
Section 104(C) addresses itself to the third and perhaps most explosive
theory of product liability-failure to warn. It is the plaintiff's ultimate fall-
back theory, since even if a design defect is difficult to establish because
design alternatives may not be feasible, a warning can always be conjured up
that will cover the risk which eventuated.
1. The Cost of Warnings
Section 1(d) addresses the need to assess the technological feasibility and
cost of warnings and instructions as a factor in deciding whether a product
is defective. This is as it should be. What is troubling is the gloss placed on
the section in the UPLL Analysis, which provides:
Factor (d), the technological feasibility and cost of a warning, may
not be significant in many cases because warnings are often relatively
inexpensive to provide. However, in some situations, it may not be feasible
technologically to provide a warning, or at least the type of a warning that
claimant suggests should have been provided.3
This attitude that warnings tend to be relatively inexpensive has a good
bit of currency in recent case law.n It is, in our opinion, ill-founded and
seriously unfair to industry. In an earlier article examining failure to warn
cases, we argued that:
The unexamined premise that warnings are not costly in risk-utility
balancing is, in our considered opinion, highly questionable. Warnings, in
order to be effective, must be selective. They must call the consumer's
attention to a danger that has a real probability of occurring and whose
32. UPLL analysis § 104(c), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 3006 (1979) (see Appendix).
33. West v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 197 N.W.2d 202 (Iowa 1972); Moran v. Faberg6,
Inc., 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975).
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impact will be significant. One must warn with discrimination since the
consumer is being asked to discriminate and to react accordingly. the
story of the boy who cried wolf is an analogy worth contemplating when
considering the imposition of a warning in a case of rather marginal risk.
These considerations are of particular significance when considering
whether a warning should be imposed or a design change mandated in a
products libility case. Those who argue for warning as the judicial solution
to latent defect cases labor under a naive belief that one can warn against
all significant risks. The truth is that such a marketing scheme is not
feasible. The warning process, in order to have impact, will have to select
carefully the items which are to become part of the consumer's mental
apparatus while using the product. Making the consumer account men-
tally for trivia or guard against risks that are not likely to occur imposes
a very real societal cost. Even when the risks are significant, one must
consider whether the consumer will perceive them as significant. If the
only way to ensure that the consumer will consider them significant is to
oversell the warning by increasing its intensity, one may again face the
problem that all warnings will come into disrepute as overly alarming. =
In formulating a failure-to-warn standard, it would be helpful to focus
specifically on the broad social costs that could become associated with un-
necessary warnings.
2. The Causation Problem and Warnings
Section 104(C) of the UPLL addresses itself to the cause-in-fact issue as
it effects an action based on failure to warn. The UPLL provides that "[iun
claims based on Section 104(C), the claimant shall prove that if adequate
warnings or instructions had been provided, a reasonably prudent person
would not have suffered the harm."3 The UPLL Analysis explains the reason
for including a special section on causation as follows:
Subsection (2) provides that a claimant must show that if adequate
warnings had been given, it is more probable than not that the injury
would not have occurred. In other words, a claimant must show that the
failure to provide an appropriate warning was a cause of his or her harm.
In this regard the claimant can show that if the warning had been given,
either the product would have been used without incident, or it would not
have been used at all. The later situation is likely to arise with pharma-
ceuticals. The test stated in subsection (2) is an objective one which looks
toward the conduct of the reasonably prudent person. Cf. "Cobbs v.
Grant," 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal Rptr. 505. (1972) (informed
consent).31
At first blush, it might seem that this section does nothing more than
codify the sina qua non or but-for rule for cause in fact. And that it does. The
but-for rule, however, has never been viewed by courts and scholars as an iron
34. Twerski, The Use and Abuse of Warnings, supra note 18, at 514-15 (emphasis added).
35. UPLL § 104(c)(2), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 2998 (1979) (see Appendix).
36. UPLL analysis § 104(c), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 3006 (1979) (see Appendix).
1978-791
Drake Law Review
clad rule37 divorced from substantive liability issues. The writers who have
attacked the hypothetical "but for" as a threshhold test for causation have
demonstrated that policy considerations determine whether a case has been
made out for cause in fact.3" This is especially important in the failure to warn
case. If the necessity of a warning has been made out under Section 104(C)(1),
then a court has already determined that a warning would serve an important
purpose by reducing the risk or by informing consumers about a risk so that
they could avoid use of the product entirely. To add another require-
ment-that plaintiff must establish that a warning would have warded off a
"reasonably prudent person"-simply undoes that which has been estab-
lished by the earlier section which imposes a duty to warn.
The causation requirement becomes a matter of critical importance with
regard to the "informed consent" type 'of warning. With regard to many
products, a warning cannot function to reduce the risk level attendant to the
use of a product. This is especially true with regard to drugs and industrial
chemicals. The function of a warning in these cases is to inform the consumer
of a non-reducible risk and give him the option not to use the product. This
closely parallels the doctrine of "material risk" in the law of medical malprac-
tice.39 To adopt a theory which imposes a duty to warn of such risks and then
to say that recovery will be permitted if, but only if, a reasonable person
would not have suffered the harm (i.e., by not using the product) is to engage
in "Catch 22" reasoning. The purpose of the warning is to provide the oppor-
tunity to the consumer to make a choice. If the warning has not been given,
he has been deprived of his right to choose intelligently. To then say that
recovery will be denied if a reasonable person would have chosen to use the
product makes a mockery of the warning duty. The function of the warning
is to give the plaintiff the right to be unreasonable if he so desires. Thus, a
plaintiff fully informed of the risk of polio vaccination may decide to make a
foolish choice and not take the vaccine. That is the consumer's right. As long
37. See Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096
(1974); Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970); Cun-
nigham v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 532 P.2d 1377 (Okla. 1974); Reynolds v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co.,
37 La. Ann. 694 (1885); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 41 at 237 (4th ed. 1971);
Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REv. 543 (1962); Malone,
Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REv. 60 (1956); Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v.
Proximate Cause and the Rational Allocation of Functions Between Judge and Jury, 1977 UTAH
L. REv. 1.
38. See Bauer, The Degree of Moral Fault as Affecting Defendant's Liability, 81 U. PA. L.
REV. 586 (1933); Owen, The Highly Blameworthy Manufacturer: Implications on Rules of Liabil-
ity and Defense in Products Liability Actions, 10 IND. L. REv. 769, 778-84 (1977); Thode, The
Indefensible Use of the Hypothetical Case to Determine Cause in Fact, 46 TEx. L. REv. 423
(1968).
39. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790-91 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245-46, 502 P.2d 1, 11-12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515-16 (1972);
Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 596, 207 N.W.2d 297, 314-15 (1973); Goldstein, For Harold
Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the Plea
Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 691 (1975); Plant, An Analysis of Informed Consent, 36 FORDHAM L.
REv. 639 (1968).
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as his right to informed choice has been affected, it should be no defense that
a reasonable person, given the risk information, would have chosen to encoun-
ter the risk. If the plaintiff never was given the information, he was deprived
of his right to choose. A far better test is that articulated by the Washington
Court of Appeals in Miller v. Kennedy,10 in which the court, in the context
of a medical malpractice case, defined the duty of a doctor to disclose risks
in the following manner:
The scope of the duty to disclose information concerning the treat-
ment proposed, other treatments and the risks of each course of action and
of no treatment at all is measured by the patient's need to know. The
inquiry as to each item of information which the doctor knows or should
know about the patient's physical condition is "Would the patient as a
human being consider this item in choosing his or her course of
treatment?""
This test can easily be paraphrased to meet the product liability situa-
tion. Once it has been established that a warning is mandated, then the
question should be whether a reasonable consumer would want the informa-
tion before deciding to utilize the product. It should be noted that this test
applies only to those warnings whose function is merely to inform the con-
sumer about non-reducible risks. In those instances where the function of a
warning is to effect consumer behavior in his utilization of the product, we
must revert to a cause-in-fact analysis. However, cause-in-fact should not be
frozen into hard legislative language. It is too complex an issue. It requires
the flexibility of common law case-by-case analysis to determine whether,
given the underlying substantive goals which the law seeks to protect, the
causation issue should be stretched or retracted. This analysis has, at times,
been merged with the proximate cause question, and carries with it consider-
able complexity."2 To place all of this policy analysis within the framework
of the UPLL's four line subsection seems close to ludicrous.
D. State of the Art and Industry Custom
The legal profession will be eternally grateful to the drafters of the UPLL
for clarifying the distinction between the state of the art issue and the ques-
tion of the relevance of custom evidence in a product liability action. "State
of the art" is defined in Section 106(a) of the UPLL as follows:
the safety, technical, mechanical, and scientific knowledge in existence
and reasonably feasible for use at the time of manufacture. 3
40. 11 Wash. App. 272, 522 P.2d 852, alf'd, 85 Wash. 2d 151, 530 P.2d 334 (1975).
41. Id. at - , 522 P.2d at 860 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). It should be noted
that the court in Miller later contradicted itself by requiring proof that "a reasonable, prudent
patient probably would not have consented to the treatment when informed of the material
risks .. " Id. at __, 522 P.2d at 864. The two tests cannot be reconciled.
42. See authorities cited in notes 34 & 36 supra.
43. UPLL § 106(a), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 2998 (1979) (see Appendix).
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This is to be distinguished from industry custom which may be introduced
as a factor in the overall risk analysis. This approach codifies the common
law rule regarding the role of community customs in determining whether
conduct is negligent." Custom is relevant to risk-utility analysis but is not
binding.
When one turns from the definitional section to themethodology utilized
by the UPLL for resolving the problem of technological feasibility, there are
significant grounds for dissatisfaction. Section 106(d) of the UPLL provides:
Evidence that a product conformed to the "state of the art" at the
time of manufacture, raises a presumption that the product was not defec-
tive within the meaning of Sections 104(B) and (C). This presumption
may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that in light of the
factors set forth in Section 104(B) and (C), the product was defective.'5
This section strikes not only at strict liability but at negligence as well. It
appears that even if a plaintiff is able to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant was negligent (i.e., failed to act reasonably at
the time of manufacture) in not advancing the state of the art by developing
a design modification, there will be no recovery. It must be recalled that
under section 103 of the UPLL, all causes of action (including negligence) are
eliminated in favor of the "product liability claim" created by the statute.
Thus, "state of the art" is a defense to a negligence claim as well. The
presumption of non-defectiveness mandated by section 106(d) must then also
be read as a presumption against negligence, which can only be rebutted by
demonstrating that the risk-cost considerations set forth in sections 104(B)
and (C) have been proven by clear and convincing evidence. Since the factors
set forth in sections 104(B) and (C) impose liability only for knowledge and
technology available at the time of manufacture, the question must be faced
as to how does one rebut section 104(B) and (C). Each of those subsections
have as a factor "the technological feasibility of manufacturing a product
designed so as to have prevented claimant's harm." Presumably, technologi-
cal feasibility is to be defined at the time of manufacture. But, if the state of
the art was not available at the time of manufacture, then it was not technol-
ogically feasible to have designed a product which would have prevented the
injury. Thus, the only way to defeat a state of the art presumption is to
demonstrate that what the manufacturer did was not the state of the art (i.e.,
that an alternative design was technologically feasible). If it is thought that
what the authors are suggesting is double talk, we suggest that the UPLL
Analysis supports our reading. It provides:
Section 106 thus provides special protection for the interests of prod-
uct liability claimants in that it allows the trier of fact, in extraordinary
situations, to find a manufacturer liable even though his product con-
formed to the "state of the art."
44. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 295A (1965); Morris, Custom and Negligence,
42 COLUM. L. REV. 1147 (1942).
45. UPLL § 106(d), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 2999 (1979) (see Appendix).
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All presumptions authorized by this section can be rebutted by clear
and convincing evidence that, in light of the factors set forth in § 104(2)
or (3), that the product was defective. An example under § 104(2) where
the presumption might be rebutted is where a product that conferred with
a standard posed a very high probability of extremely serious injury and
at the time of manufacture there were inexpensive and safer alternative
methods of designing the product.
An example under § 104(3) where the presumption might be rebutted
is if a product seller learned about a product hazard after the product was
manufactured. In that instance, even though his product conformed with
the "state of the art", the trier of fact may find that he should have made
a reasonable effort to warn product users about such hazards. 6
Note that the UPLL Analysis suggests that there will be liability only if
inexpensive and safer methods were available at the time of manufacture.
But this is not a state of the art problem; it is the defense of custom. The
state of the art question focuses on technological feasibility. The result of all
this discussion is that a plaintiff, under the UPLL, would be barred from
proving that the defendant was negligent in not advancing the state of the
art. He could not accomplish this feat even if his evidence was clear and
convincing. Thus, the state of the art presumption is irrebuttable as it affects
negligence. If negligence is to be obliterated, then it should be so stated and
we ought not be forced to find our way through a maze only to determine at
the end that there is no way out.
There does appear to be an alternative reading of the statute that de-
serves exploration. It is possible that section 106 creates a presumption of
non-defectiveness which can be rebutted by a clear and convincing demon-
stration of defectiveness. Perhaps the element of technological feasibility
built into sections 104(B) and (C) is not a sine qua non, so that if the product
were highly dangerous the manufacturer could be liable for not developing a
design which advanced the state of the art. Such a reading of the statute
would be at odds with the UPLL Analysis, but would at least make sense out
of the rebuttable presumption section of the statute. The difficulty with this
approach is that it is not logically defensible. If in fact the design was not
technologically feasible and the defendant was not negligent, then the manu-
facturer should not be liable regardless of the danger level of the product.
Rebutting the presumption by demonstrating that the product was highly
dangerous does not make it fair to a defendant who could do no more than
utilize existing technology.
Putting aside the issue of what it would take to rebut the "state of the
art" presumption, there is yet another question which must be confronted.
Why is there a presumption of any kind in favor of the defendant? The self-
evident answer is that once the state of the art has been met the defendant
46. UPLL analysis § 106, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 3007 (1979) (emphasis added) (see
Appendix). There appears to be a typographical error in the text of the Analysis. In the second
quoted paragraph there is reference to §§ 104(2) and (3). The reference should be to §§ 104(B)
and (C). Similarly the reference in the third quoted paragraph to § 104(3) should be to § 104(C).
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should be entitled to a presumption in his favor-he has, after all, conformed
to existing technology. But, we forget in what posture the issue is raised.
Invariably, the plaintiff has raised a design alternative which is both technol-
ogically and economically feasible at the time of trial. 7 There are at least
grounds for suspicion that the state of technology was not as limited as we
might have thought. The key statutory words that require attention are
"[e]vidence that a product conformed to the "state of the art" at the time
of manufacture. . ,, The assumption is that scientific knowledge can be
frozen and easily determined at any given point in time. That is sheer non-
sense. The state of technical knowledge and technological feasibility is in a
constant ebb and flow. The fact that an alternative design was attainable is
significant. To require a plaintiff who stands from the outside to cut through
the maze of industry knowledge and identify technological feasibility at a
particular point in time seems drastically unfair. Technological feasibility
ought to be a total irrebutable defense when it is legitimately made out. But,
the manufacturer who is best able to marshall the evidence to support the
proposition that it was not feasible should be made to carry the burden on
this issue. It makes no sense whatsoever to throw on to the party least able
to marshall the facts the burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence,
that a presently feasible design could have been accomplished by industry if
they had properly advanced the state of their knowledge. If the advance was
not made, industry can best tell us of the false positives and blind alleys of
their research (if in fact they performed the research properly) which led
them away from making the desired advance.
E. Process Liability
The UPLL brings to light for the first time a proposal which would
substantially insulate a manufacturer from liability, if the design safety re-
view process which led to the formulation of a design standard met certain
defined prerequisites. The idea is a most interesting one. Given the sharp
criticism which has been voiced with regard to the complexity and polycen-
tricity of design defect cases," there is much to be said for focusing more on
47. The Analysis to § 106(d) which supports a presumption of nondefectiveness if a product
conformed to the "state of this art" at the time of manufacture contends that the overwhelming
majority of case law would direct a verdict for defendant in this instance. See 44 Fed. Reg. 3007
(1979) (emphasis added). Although this writer would support that conclusion as a prediction of
what courts would do, some of the authority cited does not necessarily speak to that issue. The
Analysis cites two Oregon cases, Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 525 P.2d 125 (1974) and Wilson
v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1978). Roach v. Kononen hardly stands for
the proposition that plaintiff must prove that the design was technologically feasible at the time
of manufacture but rather for the question of the quality of the evidence necessary to make out
a prima facie case under risk-utility analysis. As noted earlier a court could eliminate scienter
as a requirement and still maintain that an alternative design be technologically feasible. None-
theless, the Oregon cases do not support the statement in the Analysis.
48. UPLL § 106(d) reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 2999 (1979)(see Appendix).
49. See Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The
Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLuM. L. REv. 1531, 1534-42 (1973); Henderson, Design Defect
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the process through which design safety decisions are made and less on the
substantive merit of the design. The UPLL proposes such an approach with
regard to voluntary safety standards. Section 106(e) of the UPLL provides:
A product seller may by a motion request the court to determine
whether the injury-causing aspect of the product conformed to a non-
governmental safety standard having the following characteristics:
(1) It was developed through careful, thorough product testing and a
formal product safety evaluation;
(2) Consumer as well as manufacturer interests were considered in
formulating the standard;
(3) It was considered more than a minimum safety standard at the
time of its development; and
(4) The standard was up-to-date in light of the technological and
scientific knowledge reasonably available at the time the product was
manufactured.
If the court makes such a determination in the affirmative, it shall
instruct the trier of fact to presume that the product was not defective.
This presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that
in light of the factors set forth in Sections 104(B) and (C), the product was
defective."
Section 107 repeats almost verbatim the standard set forth above as the
governing rule for governmental safety standards. The idea in principle has
much merit, but it would be reckless to enact it in its present form.
First, with respect to voluntary safety standards, it is clear that without
substantial safeguards it would be impossible to determine whether the prod-
uct was developed through the utilization of a thorough design safety review
process.5' To set up a formal design safety review process is not difficult. To
have some assurance that such a process is not merely an empty shell is quite
another matter. How, for example, is the court to know whether test results
have not been buried? What assurances do we have that documentation of
all risks and hazards which had been considered will take place? The UPLL
contains no criminal penalties for failure to disclose product risks or for
failing to report disturbing test results. It is entirely possible that the formula
design safety review process which will be undertaken to meet the demands
of the statute will be antiseptically clean, whereas the real review process will
take place in executive session. For the UPLL to consider giving a presump-
tion of validity to a safety review process, without mandating the reporting
of test results and the documentation of all risk considerations at pain of
Litigation Revisited, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 541, 547-50 (1976); Epstein, Products Liability: The
Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L. REV. 643, 648-54 (1978).
50. UPLL § 106(e), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 2999 (1979)(see Appendix).
51. The decision to give legal status to both voluntary and governmental standards was
not presaged by Interagency Task Force Report. See PRODUCTS LIABnrrv LEGAL STUDY, INTER-
AGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTS LIABILrrY (Dep't of Commerce), vol. IV at 127-31 (1977). Indeed
the Legal Study, after listing a myriad of reasons for not giving status to voluntary and govern-
mental standards, decisively concludes that they should be only a "floor" below which product-
related dangers are intolerable.
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criminal liability, is to invite a process which has the potential for enormous
fraud.5"
There is yet another and perhaps more important consideration. The
science of design safety review is yet in its infancy. In a study which is
presently in progress 53 we have found that industries with considerable fech-
nological sophistication have significant blind spots in their design safety
review process. For example, the gathering of accident data, a crucial factor
in establishing the degree of risk, is not well attended to. Accident investiga-
tion tends to be in the hands of claims adjustors whose focus is primarily
claims settlement, not product integrity. Thus, the feedback mechanism to
manufacturers does not provide for the kind of in-depth analysis which
would serve to enhance product safety.5' Furthermore, where data is avail-
able it is at the individual manufacturer's level. There is, as yet, no compre-
hensive system for integrating in-depth accident analysis across individual
company lines. In fact, there is a strong tendency to secret this information.
52. This is not to be read as an attack on voluntary standard setting agencies who seek to
foster responsible standards. But, no process can be any better than the information brought to
it by the participants. The reference in the standards to consumer input is not meaningful unless
some provision is made for financing expertise to inform the consumer representatives of the
problem. Even then no outsider can match the information and data which only industry can
provide. Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 525 P.2d 125 (1974), hardly stands for the proposition
that plaintiff must prove that the design was technologically feasible at the time of manufacture.
If anything Roach would lead the reader to believe that the manufacturer's ability to foresee the
hazard is totally relevant in a strict liability case. The court says:
[Ilt is generally recognized that the basic difference between negligence on the
one hand and strict liability for a design defect on the other, is that in strict liability
we are talking about the condition (dangerousness) of an article which is designed in
a particular way, while in negligence we are talking about the reasonableness of the
manufacturer's actions in designing and selling the article as he did. The article can
have a degree of dangerousness which the law of strict liability will not tolerate even
though the actions of the designer were entirely reasonable in view of what he knew at
the time he planned and sold the manufactured article. As Professor Wade points out,
a way of determining whether the condition of the article is of the requisite degree of
dangerousness to be defective (unreasonably dangerous; greater degree of danger than
a consumer has a right to expect; not duly safe) is to assume that the manufacture
knew of the product's propensity to injure as it did, and then to ask whether, with such
knowledge, something should have been done about the danger before the product was
sold. In other words, a greater burden is placed on the manufacturer than is the case
in negligence because the law assumes he has knowledge of the article's dangerous
propensity which he may not reasonably be expected to have, had he been charged with
negligence.
Id. at __, 525 P.2d at 129 (emphasis added). See also Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or.
485, -, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 n.6 (1974). In Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d
1322 (1978), when the court says that "plaintiffs' prima facie case of a defect must show more
than the technical possibility of a safer design," id. at -, 577 P.2d at 1326, it was not
addressing the question of technological feasibility.
53. A research project entitled Product Safety-Developing Standards for Social Responsi-
bility is presently in progress. The investigators are Professors Weinstein, Twerski, Donaher and
Piehler.
54. See MaCollum, Accident Reporting: An Exercise in Futility, NATIONAL SAE' NEws
80 (August 1975).
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Another area of concern is the need to define when in the course of
product development a safety review process should begin, and which disci-
plines are to be involved. Should the law mandate that all disciplines such
as safety engineering, quality control, testing, service and marketing be in-
volved at the concept stage of product development? Should there be a re-
quirement that the hazard considerations raised by each discipline be re-
corded for posterity? Most manufacturers shudder at the thought that hypo-
thetical thinking about product design be documented." Yet, the UPLL
blithely asserts that a formal safety evaluation process will suffice to create
a presumption in favor of the manufacturer without addressing these and
other complex issues which surround the safety review process. The concerns
voiced with regard to voluntary standard setting agencies are equally valid
when considering governmental standards. The data is so shallow and the art
of standard setting. so uncertain that without a clear definition with regard
to what constitutes sophisticated standard setting, we ought not to place the
plaintiff in the difficult position of rebutting a presumption by clear and
convincing evidence that the standard is inadequate.
F. Statutes of Limitation
The structure of the statute of limitations section of the UPLL is inter-
esting and complex." The statute essentially provides for a three year from
time of injury limitation, circumscribed by a repose statute which denies
recovery for injuries occurring after ten years from the time of sale. Both of
the above limitations are further subject to a provision that recovery will be
denied if injury has taken place after the "useful sale life" of the product has
expired.
The three year from time of injury limitation is not controversial. It
reflects the average tort statute of limitation presently existing in most of the
states. The UPLL also contains a provision extending the limitation period
beyond the time of injury in situations where the claimant would be unlikely
to discover that he or she has been injured, and thus protects the consumer
in the relatively rare case where the products injury did not reveal itself to
the plaintiff until well after the injury mechanism has been triggered. 7
The "repose" provisions are directed at what has come to be known as
the "long tail" problem. The UPLL Analysis asserts that the "open-
endedness" of the product liability claim has become a source of major con-
cern to insurers.58 It also acknowledges that the fears are exaggerated:
55. Industry is, in general, wary of documenting its hazard data. The fear that every bit
and shread of information will be revealed in discovery and thus used against it in a future law
suit is real. It would appear that we are on the horns of a dilemma. We cannot have intelligent
standard setting without data but we cannot get data because of industry's trepidation that it
will be used in an illegitimate fashion.
56. UPLL § 109, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 2999-3000 (1979)(see Appendix).
57. Id. § 109(c), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 3000 (1979)(see Appendix).
58. Id. analysis § 109, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 3008 (1979)(see Appendix).
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The limited available data show that the concern about older prod-
ucts may be exaggerated. See ISO, "Closed Claim Survey," at 105-108
(indicating that over 97 percent of product-related accidents occur within
six years of the time the product was purchased and in the captive goods
area 83.5 percent of all bodily injury accidents have occured within ten
years of manufacture). Nevertheless, as the Task Force Report indicated,
the underwriters' concern about potential losses associated with older
products may be an important factor in the recent increase in liability
insurance premiums for manufacturers of durable goods.
5
'
This raises the question of why it is that the statutory provisions are directed
against potentially valid claims when they should be directed toward the
rating practices of insurers. If the fear of the insurers is not well founded, then
it would behoove the government to question rating practices that are built
on nothing more than hypothecation rather than on facts. This criticism be-
comes all the more valid when one examines the impact of the repose statute
on both the workplace and consumer products. The UPLL Analysis correctly
identifies that workplace injuries are often a combination of product fault and
employer disregard for safety. 0 It attempts a slight shift by adding some
additional responsibility to the employer's liability."' However, given the very
long life of capital equipment, the ten year statute of repose is simply unfair.
Admittedly, the UPLL specifically excludes the case of the express warranty
which assures that a product can safely be used for a period in excess of ten
years. However, the fact remains that manufacturers of heavy industrial
equipment place their products on the market with full knowledge that there
is a thriving market in used machinery which permits employees to be ex-
posed to the product for many years. The original sales price reflects the
resale value. Why then should there be a blanket exemption merely because
the manufacturer has avoided the use of express warranty language?
Furthermore, the statutory language which focuses on the date of deliv-
ery of the product, rather than on the tortious activity of the manufacturer,
seems to exempt the manufacturer from any duty to either warn or retrofit
machinery after the ten year period has expired. Thus, if the manufacturer
were to discover that injuries of a certain variety were taking place with such
frequency that the introduction of a safety guard would be in order, as long
as this information had come to light after the ten year repose date, the
manufacturer would have no duty to warn or retrofit the machine. Liability
would not attach because the duty to warn arose after the repose period had
run. The only exception to the repose statute which could possibly affect such
59. Id., reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 3009 (1979)(see Appendix).
60. Id.
61. After the ten year repose statute has run, if the worker can prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the product causing the injury was unsafe, the worker may bring a claim
against the workplace employer and recovers all loss of wages that otherwise would not be
compensated under the applicable worker compensation statute. Id. § 109(B)(1)(a), reprinted
in 44 Fed. Reg. 2999 (1979)(see Appendix).
62. Id. § 109(B)(3)(a), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 3000 (1979)(see Appendix).
[Vol. 28
"Uniform Products Liability Law
a case does not, in our opinion, do so. Section 109(B)(3)(b) of the UPLL
provides that "[t]he ten (10) year period of repose established in Section
109(B) does not apply if the product seller intentionally misrepresents a
product, or fraudulently conceals information about it, where that conduct
was a substantial cause of the claimant's harm. '6 3 The UPLL Analysis does
not indicate that this subsection would cover the failure to warn which arises
due to information which comes to a manufacturer's attention after the re-
pose period had run." Again, the very real question is why manufacturers
should be totally absolved from responsibilities for products which they well
know will remain in use for well past the repose period. Such blanket immun-
ity is defended primarily on the grounds that insurance companies are nerv-
ous about claim practice, which to date has little basis in fact. Insurance
regulation would seem a far superior method to deal with such illegitimate
considerations.
The most novel part of the UPLL seeks to limit liability based on the
useful sale life of a product. The UPLL provides that in determining whether
the useful sale life has expired, the trier of fact may consider the following:
(a) The effect on the product of wear and tear or deterioriation from
natural causes;
(b) The effect of climatic and other local condiction conditions in
which the product was used;
(c) The policy of the user and similar users as to repairs, renewals and
replacements;
(d) Representations, instructions and warnings made by the product
seller about the product's useful sale life; and
(e) Any modification or alteration of the product by a user or third
party."
Although the UPLL suggests that representations made by the product
seller may be taken into account, it does not address itself to the fact that in
most instances sellers as a class tell us very little about "useful sale life."
Products are not sold with reference to their life cycle. It is a subject which
is scarcely mentioned by sellers except within the context of advertising
puffing.
There is no way to avoid this problem in a product liability action since
the first element which must be established in each case is defect. When the
product has been subject to prolonged use, the question becomes whether the
product is defective, or whether it has been used past its prime. In discussing
this question in another forum the authors argued that:
The first step in resolving this problem is to recognize that we have
been permitting marketing problems to masquerade as basic liability
questions. It is strange that the question of how long is a product supposed
to last is viewed to be within the purview of the jury in the standard
63. Id. § 109(B)(3)(b), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 3000 (1979)(see Appendix).
64. Id. analysis § 109(B)(3), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 3010 (1979)(see Appendix).
65. Id. § 109(A)(1), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 2999 (1979)(see Appendix).
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product liability case. If a car, for example, becomes a dangerous instru-
mentality after six years, and a hair dryer subject to serious failure after
three years, those facts are well within the possession of manufacturers.
Repair data and product life information are calculated by major industry
and figure into the determination of output. To be sure, this data is not
able to pinpoint product failure with exactitude. But product deteriora-
tion information is available in the sense that there is knowledge of when
the troublesome period tends to set in. Yet, for some reason this informa-
tion is kept a deep dark secret from the consuming public. It is only when
plaintiffs bring a product claim that product life becomes a focal question.
It does seem ludicrous to send the issue of how long should a product last
to a jury when industry knows the answer to that question-and could
affect consumer behavior by sharing it with the public."
It is disappointing that the UPLL-which purports to establish national
products liability law-does not seek to assign any responsibility to the
manufacturer for failing to identify useful sale life, but satisfies itself with a
bland provision which permits the consideration of affirmative representa-
tions by the product seller.
There is yet another aspect of the useful sale life question that deserves
attention. The UPLL identifies as a relevant consideration "[tihe policy of
the user and similar users as to repairs, renewals and replacements."67 Why
the statute limits this consideration to "users" and not to manufacturers is
mystifying. One of the most significant questions that must be asked with
regard to prolonged product life is whether the manufacturer bears responsi-
bility for keeping a product alive beyond its useful sale life. The sale of
replacement parts is one of the most lucrative aspects of product sales.
Should not the question be asked as to whether the product or machine that
failed was kept alive by the sale of replacement parts? Perhaps a product that
failed safely at an earlier stage of its existence failed catastrophically several
years after a replacement part was sold which permitted the product to re-
enter the useful sale life cycle. In short, useful sale life cannot be determined
without first asking whether product sellers, through their replacement part
business and their service and repair policy, do not have a hand in prolonging
product life. To throw this entire burden on the consumer is drastically un-
fair.
G. Plaintiff's Conduct
This section purports to follow the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. The
authors have been critical with the across the board application of the com-
parative fault principle in product liability because it significantly dimin-
ishes manufacturer responsibility in certain classes of design defect cases."
66. Twerski, From Defect To Cause To Comparative Fault - Rethinking Some Product
Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 297, 338-39 (1977).
67. UPLL § 109(A)(1)(c), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 2999 (1979)(emphasis added)(see
Appendix).
68. Twerski, The Use and Abuse of Comparative Negligence in Products Liability, 10 IND.
L. REV. 797 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Twerski-INDIANA].
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This Act aggravates the problem. Not only does it recognize the comparative
fault principle for almost all product liability cases, but it also totally elimi-
nates liability based on plaintiff's conduct in certain defined categories.
1. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act-Causation
The Uniform Comparative Fault Act (UCFA) is a carefully drafted and
balanced piece of legislation. In a thoughtful, well-considered section, the
UCFA provides:
In determining the percentages of fault, the trier of fact shall consider
both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the extent of
the causal relation between the conduct and the damages claimed."
The drafters of the UCFA have indicated in their comments that the policy
factors embodied in the proximate cause concept are subject to apportion-
ment. They say:
In determining the relative fault of the parties, the factfinder will also
give consideration to the relative closeness of the causal relationship of the
negligent conduct of the defendants and the harm to the plaintiff. Degrees
of fault and proximity of causation are inextricably mixed, as a study of
last clear chance indicates, and that common law doctrine has been ab-
sorbed in this Act. This position has been followed under statutes making
no specific provision for it.10
This section must be read together with section 1(b) of the same Act which
reads:
"Fault" includes acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent
or reckless toward the person or property of the actor or others, or that
subject a person to strict tort liability. The term also includes breach of
warranty, unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting an enforceable
express consent, misuse of a product for which the defendant otherwise
would be liable, and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate
damages. Legal requirements of causal relation apply both to fault as the
basis for liability and to contributory fault."
The drafters of the UCFA explain their position in a comment to this section:
For the conduct stigmatized as fault to have any effect under the
provisions of this Act it must have had an adequate causal relation to the
claimant's damage. This includes the rules of both cause in fact and
proximate cause.
69. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT Acr § 2(b) [hereinafter cited as UCFAJ. The UCFA was
drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and approved and
recommended by it for enactment in all the states, at its annual conference, Vail, Colorado July
29-August 5, 1977. The UCFA was the subject of commentary by Wade, Products Liability and
Plaintiff's Fault: The Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 29 MEzcER L. Rzv. 373 (1978) [herein-
after cited as Wade-MERcER]. The UCFA and comments are reproduced in full at 29 MincMa
L. Rsv. 392-401 (1978).
70. UCFA comment § 2(b).
71. UCFA § l(b) (emphaiss added).
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"Injury attributable to the claimant's contributory fault" refers to the
requirement of a causal relation for the particular damage. Thus, negli-
gent failure to fasten a seat belt would diminish recovery only for damages
in which the lack of a seat-belt restraint played a part, and not, for exam-
ple, to the damage to the car. A similar rule applies to a defendant's fault;
a physcian, for example, negligently setting a broken arm, is not liable for
other injuries received in an automobile accident."
It would appear that under the UCFA cause-in-fact is not subject to
apportionment, but that the proximate cause question is a factor in the
overall determination of fault. The reason for this distinction is that the
proximate cause question deals with the question of whether a particular risk
properly falls within the risk of the harm which the law has condemned. This
is so closely related to the fault question that it becomes artificial to separate
it out when dealing with the fault apportionment.
The UPLL takes a different position on this question. The UPLL Analy-
sis states:
Section 111 departs from the UCFA in one respect-it does not con-
sider "the extent of the casual relationship between the conduct and the
damages claimed" as a factor in apportioning responsibility. While the
distinction may be a difficult one to draw, this Act is premised on appor-
tioning responsibility only-pure causation in terms of the physical cause
of the particular injury is irrelevant to that concept.7s
Apparently the UPLL opposition to the view of the UCFA is that it seeks to
apportion the cause-in-fact question. As indicated above, we do not believe
that this is an accurate reading of theUCFA. But if that is the problem, it is
easily remedied by limiting the fault apportionment to the proximate cause
question and specifically excluding cause-in-fact from the apportionment
process. It is our view, however, that whether we formally merge cause-in-
fact and proximate cause into fault apportionment or not, juries will be
affected by those issues and will set their apportionment with those issues
well in mind. Furthermore, courts will be loathe to direct verdicts on proxi-
mate cause and cause-in-fact with full knowledge that apportionment is in
the wings as a possible compromise to the all or nothing decision mandated
by a directed verdict. Finally, there is the real hope that by utilizing the com-
parative fault mechanism, we might permit experts to testify on the causa-
tion issue with something other than the exaggerated form of all or nothing
testimony which does not reflect the real world." For legislation which seeks
72. UCFA comment § 1(b).
73. UPLL analysis § 111, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 3011-12 (1979) (see Appendix). The
Analysis cites as authority, Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REv. 60 (1956),
as authority for its stand on the apportionment of cause-in-fact. The authors are mystified as to
how that article supports the UPLL contention. The major thrust of the Malone article is that
cause-in-fact is inextricably tied to policy grounds.
74. Twerski, The Many Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry into the Emerging Doctrine of Com-
parative Causation, 29 Manci L. REv. 403, 414 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Twerski-MmtcEl]
and Donaher, Piehler, Twerski and Weinstein, The Technoloogical Expert in Products Liability
Litigation, 52 TEx. L. REv. 1303 (1974).
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to bring a sense of fairness to product liability law, the contraction of the
comparative fault question seems a rather odd choice.
2. Failure to Inspect and Failue to Discover Defect
Section 111(c) of the UPLL provides:
(i) A claimant is not required to have inspected the product for defec-
tive condition. Failure to have done so does not render the claimant re-
sponsible for the harm caused.
(ii) Where a claimant using a product is injured by a defective condi-
tion that would have been apparent to an ordinary prudent person, the
claimant's damages are subject to reduction according to the principles
of subsections (a) and (b).7
The UPLL begins by drawing a distinction between two kinds of plaintiff
conduct (i) failure to inspect for defect and (ii) failure to discover an obvious
defect. The former is not an affirmative defense while the latter reduces the
plaintiff's verdict by the percentage of his fault. No argument could be more
compelling against the utilization of the comparative fault principle in the
instance of plaintiff's failure to discover a defect than that presented in the
UPLL Analysis in support of the proposition.
Cases can arise where a defect would be very apparent to an ordinary
prudent person. In such cases, it is appropriate to allow the trier of fact
to diminish claimant's damages according to the latter's responsibility for
the injury that occurred. Thus, in the example of the candy bar, if a
claimant with good eyesight ate a candy that had bright green worms
crawling over it, he or she should bear some responsibility for any ill
effects suffered. If the product seller was aware of the defect in the goods
at the time of sale, the punitive damages section of the Act (Section 120)
would provide a strong disincentive to not sell such a product."
The example offered is grotesque and demonstrates beyond cavil that
comparative fault ought not to be utilized in this class of product cases.
Indeed, a legislator would probably be drawn and quartered if forced to
publicly defend a vote in favor of the reduction of damages to the plaintiff in
the candy bar case. The questions are obvious. Why did the plaintiff eat the
candy bar? Do we really believe that he saw the green worms and proceeded
to eat the candy? The obvious answer is that the plaintiff did not notice the
worms. But, why? Well, he did not expect a candy bar to have worms. That
is hardly an unreasonable position to defend. Then why should his recovery
be diminished? The only answer is that he did not look before he ate. But,
that means that he has a duty to inspect for defects-a proposition which
is denied by the above section 111(c)(1)(i). The UPLL Analysis to that sec-
tion makes it crystal clear that a plaintiff has no duty to inspect a product
because the law assures him a product which is reasonably safe for ordinary
use." If we impose a duty to discover obvious defects it can only stem from
75. UPLL § 111(c), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 3000 (1979)(see Appendix).
76. Id. analysis § 111(c), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 3012 (1979)(see Appendix).
77. Id.
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our belief that plaintiff has seen the defect and has decided to encounter it
nonetheless. In the candy bar case that would be a most unlikely explana-
tion, but if it were true then it ought to place the plaintiff's conduct within
the category of voluntary and unreasonable assumption of a known risk-
conduct which under UPLL section 109(c)(2) is a complete defense. We are
thus puzzled by the "failure to discover" duty which is imposed on the plain-
tiff. If it analytically a hybrid and does not deserve status as a discrete
category.
3. Using a Product With a Known Defective Condition
The sections concerning the assumption of risk defense draw a distinc-
tion between plaintiff conduct which is clearly unreasonable and that which
is arguably unreasonable. In the former, plaintiff's conduct is an absolute
bar-in the latter, the issue goes to the jury for a comparative fault determi-
nation. The UPLL provides in section 111 (c)(2):
(2) Using a Product With a Known Defective Condition.
(i) A claimant who knew about a product's defective condition, but
who voluntarily and unreasonably used the product, shall be held solely
responsible for injuries caused by that defective condition.
(ii) In circumstances where a claimant knew about a product's defec-
tive condition and voluntarily used the product, but where the reasonable-
ness of doing so was uncertain, claimant's damages shall be subject to
reduction according to the principles of subsections (a) and (b).11
It thus appears that if a jury were to find a plaintiff's conduct to be unreason-
able under subsection (ii) he would merely have his recovery reduced,
whereas if the court (presumably) were to find the selfsame conduct clearly
unreasonable it would direct a verdict for the defendant. This must be the
first time that anyone has proposed that a determination of fact by a jury
will lead to a result different than if the selfsame finding of fact were made
by a court. The UPLL Analysis supports this interpretation, stating:
Where it is clear that a claimant both voluntarily and unreasonably
used a product with a known defective condition, the product seller is not
liable under this Act. To allow a claim in such a situation would permit
individuals, in effect, to create their own product liability claim. In that
regard, it should be noted that consent is a defense to even intentional
wrongs.
However, there may be cases where an individual voluntarily uses a
product with a known defective condition, but the reasonableness of this
conduct becomes a matter of dispute. For example, if a person discovers
a welt in a tire, should that person be required to stop immediately and
call for assistance, or is it reasonable to proceed to a nearby gasoline
station to have the tire repaired? Many cases arise in this shadowgi
zone. . . .Subsection (c)(2) allows the trier of fact to consider claimant's
conduct and reduce damages where it is appropriate to do so."
78. Id. § 111(c)(2), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 3000 (1979)(see Appendix).
79. Id. analysis § 111(c), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 3012 (1979)(see Appendix).
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It would appear that a fair reading of the UPLL Analysis leads to the conclu-
sion that cases which arise in the "shadowy zone" of reasonableness will go
to the jury for a determination of comparative fault." Thus a jury could find
the conduct "unreasonable" and the plaintiff would merely have his recovery
reduced. If the court, however, were to find such conduct unreasonable (be-
cause reasonable persons could not differ) then recovery would be barred.
Such a jurisprudential anamoly deserves explanation. None is found in the
UPLL or its Analysis.
There are, however, more fundamental problems with this section of the
UPLL. The Analysis suggests that we ought to adopt voluntary assumption
of the risk as a defense because it is analogous to consent, which is a com-
plete defense to an intentional tort. The argument is hardly to be taken seri-
ously. The difference between consent granted in advance-which serves as
an invitation to the intentional act of the defendant-and the conduct of a
defendant which has been condemned as substandard and puts the plaintiff
to a choice has been long recognized."s Indeed, the very problem which is so
serious in product liability cases is determining the voluntariness of the plain-
tiff's action. How free is the plaintiff to chose? How voluntary is voluntary?
Is a plaintiff who- makes a conscious choice to utilize a piece of dangerous
machinery in an employment setting acting voluntarily? Is one who decides
to use his car (defect and all) for a business appointment a free agent? The
most significant virtue of the merging of assumption of the risk into the
general contributory fault formula is that the jury is given all of the factors
and is asked to weigh them in the balance. The UPLL does not define volun-
tariness. It merely returns us to one of the most confused areas of the common
law at a time when statutory law has taken hold of the problem and fostered
a reasonable solution to it.
When one turns to the merits of recognizing voluntary and unreasonable
assumption of a known risk as a complete bar, it becomes important to focus
on the kinds of fact patterns in which plaintiffs may be totally precluded from
recovery. Consider, for example, the case of Bartkewich v. Billinger. Plain-
tiff was at work on the west side of a glass cutting machine while his supervi-
sor operated the controls on the east side of the machine. At some time prior
80. The UPLL does not directly address the question as to whether "reasonable assump-
tion of the risk" is to be considered in 'the comparative fault formulation. The UCFA Sec. 1(b)
recognizes.only "unreasonable assumption of the risk" as a defense. The comments to the UCFA
specifically exclude the case of reasonable assumption of risk from comparative fault (since it is
not fault and should have no bearing on recovery).
The ambiguity of the UPLL is especially serious since it commits the "shadowy zone" cases
of reasonableness to go to the jury. Is the jury to be instructed that they are to reduce the
plaintiff's verdict only if they find the plaintiff's conduct to be unreasonable? Section
111(c)(2)(ii) refers us only to sections (a) and (b) for guidance as to the principles for reduction
of damages. Those sections shed no light on this problem.
81. Mansfield, Informed Choice in the Law of Torts, 22 LA. L. Rzv. 17 (1961) and Twerski,
Old Wine in a New Flask - Restructuring Assumption of Risk in This Products Liability Era, 60
IowA L. REv. 1, 19-20 n.83 (1974).
82. 432 Pa. 351, 247 A.2d 603 (1968).
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to the accident the supervisor left the scene, leaving the plaintiff alone at the
machine. As he continued to operate the machine Bartkewich noticed that
glass appeared to be jamming the mechanism, and became concerned that
the machine was being damaged. To thwart this possibility plaintiff at-
tempted to remove a piece of glass with his hand, but his glove caught in the
machinery and he was injured. The plaintiff presented expert testimony that
the machine was defectively designed in that it did not contain adequate
safety features such as on-off switches on both sides of the machine, or a
barrier or guard to keep individuals from putting their extremities into the
machine.
In reversing a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court took the position that in certain instances the lack of proper safety
devices could constitute an unreasonable danger. This result would follow,
however, only where the absence of the safety device caused an accidental
injury of the type that could be expected from the normal use of the product.
In this case defendant did exactly what was obviously dangerous-he reached
into an operating glass-breaking machine. The court in righteous indignation
asked the following question of the plaintiff:
If he thought the machine was being damaged, what did he think would
happen to his hand? It is unfortunate that [plaintiff] incurred a serious
injury, but we do not believe that appellant was obligated to build a
machine that was designed not only to keep glass in, but also to keep
people out.8
Having defined the defendant's duty in this fashion, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court directed that the defendant's motion for a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict be granted. It is to be expected that a court interpreting
section 111(c)(2) would find that a plaintiff had voluntarily and unreasonably
assumed a known risk and would thus be totally barred from recovery. The
reason for this conclusion is elementary. Plaintiff saw the jamming of the
machine and realized the danger to the machine. In a split second he made
a judgment which was both voluntary and unreasonable. He decided to
chance his hand believing that his knowledge of the cutting process in the
machine was such that he had enough time to get in and out before injury.
He was wrong. His reaching into the machine certainly was not "involuntary"
in any common sense of the word. And his actions could be found by a court
to be most unreasonable.
There is something terribly distasteful about this result, however. Was
it not foreseeable on the part of the manufacturer that workmen who operate
these machines for endless hours at a stretch will make the kinds of voluntary
and unreasonable judgments that the Bartkewich plaintiff actually made? Is
it not common knowledge that employees who work with dangerous machi-
nery develop psychological resistance to the danger level? And should not
the safety features be embodied to care for one who may make voluntary
and unreasonable choices? If nothing else, should we not be required to
83. Id. at 355, 247 A.2d at 605.
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evaluate the time factor in the decision-making process? The defendant-
manufacturer's decision to design a safety guard or not is made at the design
drawing board and in the testing laboratory. It is made or not made with great
deliberation and with cost and marketing considerations in mind. The plain-
tiff's decision to encounter the harm, be it voluntary or involuntary, reason-
able or unreasonable, is made in a split second under the most adverse and
pressing cicumstances. Should not the product have been manufactured so
as to protect a Bartkewich-type plaintiff from his own foolish decision
making?
We have argued that in this kind of setting a plaintiff's verdict should
not be subject to comparative fault, but that his recovery should be undimin-
ished.8l The very harm that was to be protected against took place in a totally
foreseeable manner. We are cognizant of the fact that the UCFA takes the
position that in any event a plaintiff's conduct should be taken into account.
But, to take the position that comparative fault will not operate and that a
plaintiff should be totally barred from recovery seems manifestly unfair. It
negates the judgment that a safety feature should have been integrated into
the machine-a judgment that would have been sustained by sections 104(B)
and (C) of the UPLL.
4. Misuse of a Product
Section 111(c)(3) of the UPLL provides:
(i) Where a claimant has misused a product by using it in a manner
that the product seller could not have reasonably anticipated, the claim-
ant's damages shall be reduced according to the principles of subsections
(a) and (b).
(ii) Where the injury would not have occurred but for the misuse
defined in subsection (3)(i), the product is not defective for purposes of
liability under this Act."
a. Foreseeable Misuse
The first question that must be faced with regard to this section is
whether a plaintiffs verdict will be reduced when his misuse was foreseeable.
The UPLL does not appear to address itself to this question. The inference
is that foreseeable misuse is simply not grounds for reduction of the plaintiff's
verdict. Although the authors have expressed general agreement with this
principle elsewhere,"" we are mildly surprised by the omission of this category
of a plaintiff's conduct from the scope of the comparative fault doctrine.
Consider the following example:
Plaintiff is speeding 50 mph in a 25 mph zone. The tire on his car is
defectively beaded. Plaintiff suffers a blowout but as a result of his speed-
84. Twerski-INDMNA, supra note 59, at 811-12.
85. UPLL § 111(c)(3), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 3000 (1979)(see Appendix).
86. Twerski-MEncCR, supra note 64, at 426-30.
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ing he is not able to bring his car under control. It hits a culvert and the
plaintiff is seriously injured.
Note that the misuse of the product is quite foreseeable. The defect in the
tire and the conduct of the plaintiff were both "but for" causes of the accident
since the absence of either of the causes would have avoided the accident.
Should a plaintiff's verdict be reduced by the percentage of his fault? We
have argued that a reduction in this instance is not justified:
The plaintiff has been sold a product which has created in his mind a set
of consumer expectations with regard to performance. At fifty miles per
hour the plaintiff has a right to total reliance on the assumption that the
product will function as marketing has represented. It is of no great conse-
quence that we may not be able to make out a technical case of express
warranty or misrepresentation; the realities to the consumer are precisely
the same. In short, when the consumer is using the product within the
clear parameters of its normal functioning mode, the general or non-
product contributory negligence should not enter into the picture, even as
comparative negligence. The factor of reliance on product performance is
so significant that it is simply unfair to penalize the plaintiff for relying
on the set of consumer expectations which the defendant led him to rely
upon. 7
It is quite clear that the UCFA disagrees with this position and believes that
comparative fault ought to be imposed even when the plaintiff's conduct is
foreseeable.- It is hard to believe that the UPLL has cast its lot with the
authors' position on this matter, but if it has it should be spelled out clearly.
Neither the UPLL nor its Analysis considers the foreseeable misuse question
as it effects the reduction of a plaintiff's damages.
b. Unforeseeable Misuse
The position of the UPLL with regard to unforeseeable misuse is difficult
to follow. Section 111(c)(3)(i) seems to provide that damages will be reduced
by the percentage of a plaintiff's fault in the case of unforeseeable misuse.
This is, however, modified by subsection (ii) immediately following, which
provides that where the injury would not have occurred but for the misuse,
the product is to be declared non-defective. This language is puzzling. If when
the misuse is a "but for" cause the product is declared non-defective then the
previous subsection (i) which provides for reduction of damages must apply
when the misuse was not a "but for" cause. This would lead to the rather
nonsensical conclusion that a plaintiff would have his recovery reduced for
misuse even when the misuse was not a "but for" cause of his harm.
The language of the UPLL Analysis contradicts the plain reading of the
UPLL and leads one to a more rational interpretation of this section. It
explains that:
87. Twerski-INDIANA, supra note 59, at 816-17.
88. Wade-MExcER, supra note 60, at 384.
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Subsection (c)(3) imposes no liability on the product seller where an
injury occurs solely because claimant misused the product not in some
way that the product seller could not reasonably anticipate. Reasonably
anticipated conduct is conduct which would be expected of an ordinary
and prudent person. See Section 102(6) and commentary. Misuse by
claimant in this context is equivalent to modification or alteration of the
product by a third party ...
In determining whether the product seller should have warned or
instructed the claimant about potential misuses, the trier of fact should
consider the factors listed in Section 104(C).
Where misuse of a product was a partial cause of an injury, claimant's
damages are subject to reduction."'
Note that under the gloss of the UPLL Analysis, only where the misuse is the
sole cause of the injury (and the product has no causal relationship to the
injury) is misuse a total defense. Where, however, both the product and the
misuse are partial causes of the injury the plaintiffs verdict will be reduced
under the comparative fault principle. The UPLL should be conformed to
meet with the explanation set forth in Analysis.
The section on product misuse is but another example of why a statutory
definition of misuse is premature at this stage of product liability litigation.
The belief that the misuse cases can be divided into two categories and retain
any sense of sophistication is simply wrong." Such a classification does not
differentiate between plaintiff conduct which tests the warranty and plaintiff
conduct which fails to maintain product integrity. Both of the aforemen-
tioned may be foreseeable; yet, a court may wish to reduce recovery for a
plaintiff who fails to do his share to repair and care for a product, and not
penalize a plaintiff for conduct which is negligent in general, but yet not
negligent in relation to the product manufacturer who had every reason to
believe that his product would be put to the test." The misuse question is
most often tied to the proximate cause question. It is highly fact sensitive and
really not a proper topic for legislation which must of necessity speak in
universal language.
H. Miscellany
This commentary has focused primarily on the "elements" of the cause
of action in a products liability case. The UPLL has a broad range of provi-
sions which touch such diverse issues as limitation of liability for non-
pecuniary damages (pain and suffering); the collateral source rule, punitive
damages, the regulation of expert testimony and arbitration of claims where
the amount in dispute is below $30,000.
The sense impression after a full reading of the UPLL is that what has
been undertaken, in fact, is a total reformation of the law of torts. It is not
89. UPLL analysis § 111(c), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 3012 (1979)(see Appendix).
90. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
91. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
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necessary to take a position at this time with regard to the wisdom of any of
the aforementioned provisions. They are a mixed bag, but this much seems
certain; if a drastic reformation of the common law of torts is to be under-
taken, it should be done only after a full and complete discussion with all
parts of the legal community. And it should not be done only with regard to
the law of products liability. If reformation of the law of non-pecuniary dam-
ages is to be undertaken or the doctrine of collateral source is to be redefined,
it should not be done piecemeal. We should not forget that the impetus for
much of this change came from what the Interagency Task Force has itself
characterized as a "non-crisis" situation.'2 The mere fact that manufacturers
have developed a powerful lobby with regard to products liability does not
in itself justify manhandling a system of law which has a demonstrated
marvelous ability to respond to social change.
L Some Jurisprudential Thoughts
These comments would not be complete without some brief remarks as
to the jurisprudential implications that would attend the enactment of the
UPLL. The law of torts has been among the most creative and dynamic areas
of the common law. The ability of the law of torts to respond to individual
fact situations, to sense injustice and balance the needs of society against the
compensatory demands of the plaintiff is a value not easily dismissed. When
one cuts through the maze of provisions in the UPLL, what one finds is a plan
to rigidify the law of torts and destroy one of its most important features-its
flexibility. Manufacturers will argue that flexibility means the absence of
standards and high plaintiff verdicts. But that is not an accurate reading of
the general thrust of the case law. It has been surprisingly evenhanded even
at a time when it was at its most creative stage.
There is another dominant feature that strikes one upon reading the
UPLL. Products liability law has for the first time called American manufac-
turers onto the carpet and held them accountable for their design, testing and
advertising practices. It is perhaps unpleasant for manufacturers to have to
justify practices which should have been discarded, and costly to have such
practices rectified. It is also important to a free a democratic society to
subject the practices of manufacturers to public scrutiny. Part of the products
liability crisis has little to do with dollars and cents. It has to do with the
invasion of what was previously the private domain of manufacturers by
courts, lawyers, consumers and public regulators. Manufacturers do not like
it because it costs money. And they do not like it because they simply believe
that they ought to be able to go along without being held accountable. The
UPLL reduces accountability to a substantial degree. The willingness to im-
pose voluntary and governmental standards as governing law is but one ex-
ample of this phenomenon. The state of the art exception is another.
The UPLL should be opposed by the legal profession because its substan-
92. INTEMGENcy TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTS LIuABrry (Dep't of Commerce), BumFInG REP. 2
(Jan. 1977).
[Vol. 28
Uniform Products Liability Law
tive provisions are inadequate to the task. That has been chronicled in the
earlier sections, but it also deserves opposition on a philosophical basis. It
strikes at an important democratic institution by limiting its scope and re-
ducing its ability to search into the gizzards of American industry.
Im. CONCLUSION
It is unfortunate that much of the hysteria with regard to products liabil-
ity law has been in response to some isolated, irresponsible decisions.' 3 These
cases have been pushed to the forefront and wedded with some ill-considered
language which appears in some of the better cases. But, lawyers know that
crazy cases do not make doctrine for the country or even for the state in which
they have been decided." The common law process goes through a "shake
down" period while new doctrine is being developed. Those who believe that
defendants have not gotten a fair shake in court are not reading the steady
flow of judicial decisions in the products liability field. Those defendants who
have taken a strong stand and have demonstrated their willingness to litigate
have done very well indeed. This Draft Uniform Product Liability Law comes
to us just at the time when the shake down period is coming into its own. Its
provisions are unfair to consumers and unfair to industry. What is needed at
this time is not new legislation, but a strong hand with insurers who have
panicked industry into convulsive reaction. The common law of products
liability is coming along nicely. It should be let alone to complete its mosaic.
For those who seek wholesale reformation of the law of torts, we suggest that
the effort deserves the broadest kind of inquiry. It ought not to be pigeonholed
into the resolution of some temporary dislocation problems created by the
non-crisis of products liability.
93. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974); Moran v.
Faberg6, 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975); Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., - Pa. -, 391 A.2d
1020 (1978).
94. The elimination of the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement in Cronin v. J.B.E.
Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972) did not prevent California
courts from doing a risk-utility analysis even prior to Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413,
573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). See discussion in note 18 supra. Likewise, given the
nature of the sharp criticism which the Moran v. Faberg6 case drew in the law reviews, it is
hard to imagine either Maryland or any other state following that decision.
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IV. Appendix
Draft Uniform Product Liability Law*
* The Draft Uniform Product Liability Law appears in its entirety (both statutory text and
the analysis following) in 44 Fed. Reg. 2996-3019 (1979).
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UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILT AcT
PREAMBLE
This Act sets forth uniform standards for state product liability tort law.
It does not cover all issues that may be litigated in product liability cases;
rather, it focuses on those where the need for uniform rules is the greatest.
The purpose of these these uniform rules is to eliminate existing confusion
and uncertainty on the part of both product users and product sellers about
their respective legal rights and obligations. Improving the level of certainty
as to how state product liability law will deal with claims for injuries caused
by allegedly defective products should also, over time, promote greater avail-
ability and affordability in product liability insurance and greater stability
in rates and premiums.
Sec. 100. SHORT TITLE
This Act shall be known and may be cited as the "Uniform Product
Liability Act."
Sec. 101. FINDINGS
(a) Sharply rising product liability insurance premiums have created
serious problems in interstate commerce resulting in:
(1) Increased prices of consumer and industrial products;
(2) Disincentives to develop high-risk but potentially beneficial prod-
ucts;
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(3) Businesses going without product liability insurance coverage, thus
jeopardizing the availability of compensation to injured persons; and
(4) Panic "reform" efforts that would unreasonably curtail the rights of
product users.
(b) One cause of these problems is that product liability law is frought
with uncertainty; the rules vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and are in a
constant state of flux, thus militating against predictability of litigation out-
come.
(c) Insurers have cited uncertainty in product liability law and litigation
outcome as a justification for setting rates and premiums that, in fact, may
not reflect actual product risk.
(d) Product liability insurance rates are set on the basis of a countrywise,
not an individual state, experience. Thus, individual states can do little to
solve the problem because a product manufactured in one state can readily
cause injury in any one of the other 49 states or the District of Columbia.
(e) Uncertainty in product liability law and litigation outcome is added
to litigation costs and may put an additional strain on the judicial system.
(f) Recently enacted state product liability legislation has widened al-
ready existing disparities in the law.
Sec. 102. DEFINITIONS
(1) Product Seller.
"Product seller" means any person or entity, including a manufacturer,
wholesaler, distributor, or retailer, who is engaged in the business of selling
such products, whether the sale is resale, or for use or consumption. The term
"product seller" also includes lessors or bailors of products who are engaged
in the business of leasing or bailment of products.
(2) Product Liability Claim.
"Product liability claim" includes all claims or actions brought for per-
sonal injury, death, or property damage caused by the manufacture, con-
struction, design, formula, preparation, assembly, installation, testing, warn-
ings, instructions, marketing, packaging, or labeling of any product. It in-
cludes, but is not limited to, all actions based on the following theories: strict
liability in tort; negligence; breach of warranty, express or implied; breach
or failure to discharge a duty to warn or instruct, whether negligent or inno-
cent; misrepresentation, concealment, or nondisclosure, whether negligent or
innocent; or under any other substantive legal theory in tort or contract.
(3) Claimant.
"Claimant" means a person asserting a legal cause of action or claim
and, if the claim is asserted on behalf of an estate, claimant includes claim-
ant's decedent. Claimants include product users, consumers, and bystanders
who are harmed by defective products.
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(4) Harm.
"Harm" includes damage to property and personal physical injuries in-
cluding emotional harm. It includes damage to the product itself. Damage
caused by loss of use of a product is not included, but a claim may be allowed
if the seller expressly warranted this protection and this warranty was in-
tended to extend to claimant.
(5) Manufacturer.
"Manufacturer" includes product sellers who design, assemble, fabri-
cate, construct, process, package, or otherwise prepare a product or compo-
nent part of a product prior to its sale to a user or consumer. It includes a
product seller or entity not otherwise a manufacturer that holds itself out as
a manufacturer.
(6) Reasonably Anticipated Conduct.
"Reasonably anticipated conduct" means conduct which would be ex-
pected of an ordinary prudent person who is likely to use the product.
(7) Clear and Convincing Evidence.
"Clear and convincing evidence" is that measure or degree of proof that
will product in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to
the allegations sought to be established.
Sec. 103. SCOPE OF THIS ACT
(a) A product liability claim provided by this Act shall be in lieu of all
existing claims against product sellers (including actions in negligence, strict
liability, and warranty) for harms caused by a product.
(b) A claim may be asserted successfully under this Act even though the
claimant did not buy the product from or enter into any contractual relation-
ship with the product seller.
(c) The previously existing applicable state law of product liability is
modified only to the extent set forth in this Act.
Sec. 104. THE BASIC STANDARDS OF
RESPONSIBILITY
A product seller may be subject to liability for harm caused to a claimant
who proves by a preponderance of the evidence that one or more of the
following conditions apply: the product was defective in construction (Subdi-
vision 104A); the product was defective in design (Subdivision 104B); or the
product was defective in that adequate warnings or instructions were not
provided (Subdivision 104C).
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104(A) The Product Was Defective in Construction.
The harm was caused because the product was not made in accordance
with the product seller's own design or manufacturing standards. In deter-
mining whether the product was defective, the trier of fact may consider the
product seller's specifications for the product, and any differences in the
product from otherwise identical units of the same product line.
104(B) The Product Was Defective in Design.
The harm was caused because the product was defective in design. In
determining whether the product was defective, the trier of fact shall consider
whether an alternative design should have been utilized, in light of:
(1) The likelihood at the time of manufacture that the product would
cause the harm suffered by the claimant;
(2) The seriousness of that harm;
(3) The technological feasibility of manufacturing a product designed so
as to have prevented claimant's harm;
(4) The relative costs of producing, distributing, and selling such an
alternative design; and
(5) The new or additional harms that may result from such an alternative
design.
104(C) The Product Was Defective Because Adequate Warnings or Instruc-
tions Were Not Provided.
The harm was caused because the product seller failed to provide ade-
quate warnings or instructions about the dangers and proper use of the prod-
uct.
(1) In determining whether adequate instructions or warnings were pro-
vided, the trier of fact shall consider:
(a) The likelihood at the time of manufacture that the product would
cause the harm suffered by the claimant;
(b) The seriousness of that harm;
(c) The product seller's ability to anticipate at the time of manufacture
that the expected product user would be aware of the product risk, and the
nature of the potential harm; and
(d) The technological feasibility and cost of warnings and instructions.
(2) In claims based on Section 104(C), the claimant shall prove that if
adequate warnings or instructions had been provided, a reasonably prudent
person would not have suffered the harm.
(3) A product seller may not be considered to have provided adequate
warnings or instructions unless they were devised to communicate with the
person(s) best able to take precautions against the potential harm.
Sec. 105. UNAVOIDABLY UNSAFE ASPECTS
OF PRODUCTS
(a) An unavoidably unsafe aspect of a product is that aspect incapable
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of being made safe in light of the state of scientific and technological knowl-
edge at the time of manufacture.
(b) A product seller may be subject to liability for failing to provide an
adequate warning or instruction about an unavoidably unsafe aspect of the
seller's product, if the factors set forth in Section 104, subdivision (C) indi-
cate that such warnings or instructions should have been given. This obliga-
tion to warn or instruct may arise after the product is manufactured.
(c) If Section 104(C) is not applicable, the product seller shall not be
subject to liability for harm caused by an unavoidably unsafe aspect of a
product unless the seller has expressly warranted by words or actions that the
product is free of such unsafe aspects.
Sec. 106. RELEVANCE OF THE "STATE OF
THE ART" AND INDUSTRY CUSTOM
(a) For the purposes of this section, "state of the art" means the safety,
technical, mechanical, and scientific knowledge in existence and reasonably
feasible for use at the time of manufacture.
(b) Evidence of changes in a product design, in the "state of the art," or
in the custom of the product seller's industry- occurring after the product was
manufactured is not admissible for the purpose of proving that the product
was defective in design under Section 104(B), or that a warning or instruction
should have accompanied the product at the time of manufacture under
Section 104(C). The evidence may be admitted for other purposes if its proba-
tive value outweighs its prejudicial effect.
(c) Evidence of custom in the product seller's industry is generally ad-
missible. The product seller's compliance or non-compliance with custom
may be considered by the trier of fact in determining whether a product was
defective in design under Section 104(C), or whether there was a failure to
warn or instruct adequately under Section 104(C).
(d) Evidence that a product conformed to the "state of the art" at the
time of manufacture, raises a presumption that the product was not defective
within the meaning of Sections 104(B) and (C). This presumption may be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that in light of the factors set forth
in Section 104(B) and (C), the product was defective.
(e) A product seller may by a motion request the court to determine
whether the injury-causing aspect of the product conformed to a non-
governmental safety standard having the following characteristics:
(1) It was developed through careful, thorough product testing and a
formal product safety evaluation;
(2) Consumer as well as manufacturer interests were considered in for-
mulating the standard;
(3) It was considered more than a minimum safety standard at the time
of its development; and
(4) The standard was up-to-date in light of the technological and scien-
tific knowledge reasonably available at the time the product was manufac-
tured.
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If the court makes such a determination in the affirmative, it shall in-
struct the tier of fact to presume that the product was not defective. This
presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that in light
of the factors set forth in Sections 104(B) and (C), the product was defective.
SEC. 107 RELEVANCE OF COMPLIANCE WITH LEGISLATIVE OR
ADMINISTRATIVE STANDARDS
(a) A product seller may by a motion request the court to determine
whether the injury-causing aspect of the product conformed to an administra-
tive or legislative standard having the following characteristics:
(1) It was developed as a result of careful, thorough product testing and
a formal product safety evaluation;
(2) Consumer as well as manufacturer interests were considered in for-
mulating the standard;
(3) The agency responsible for enforcement of the standard considered
it to be more than a minimum safety standard at the time of its promulga-
tion; and
(4) The standard was up-to-date in light of the technological and scien-
tific knowledge reasonably available at the time the product was manufac-
tured.
(b) If the court makes such a determination in the affirmative, it shall
instruct the trier of fact to presume that the product was not defective. This
presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that in light
of the factors set forth in Section 104 (B) and (C), the product was defective.
SEC. 108. NOTICE OF POSSIBLE CLAIM
REQUIRED
(a) An attorney who anticipates filing a claim under this Act shall pres-
ent a notice of this claim stating the time, place and circumstances of events
giving rise to the claim along with an estimate of compensation or other relief
to be sought.
(b) This notice shall be given within six months of the date of entering
into an attorney-client relationship with the claimant in regard to the claim.
For the purposes of this Act, such a relationship arises when when the attor-
ney, or any member or associate of the attorney's firm, agrees to serve the
claimant's interests in regard to the anticipated claim. Notice shall be given
to all persons or entities against whom the claim is likely to be made.
(c) Any product seller who receives notice pursuant to subsection (a)
promptly shall furnish claimant's attorney with the names and addresses of
all persons the product seller knows to be in the chain of manufacture and
distribution, if requested to do so by the attorney at the time the notice is
given. Any product seller who fails to furnish such information shall be sub-
ject to liability as provided for in subsection (e).
(d) A claimant who delays entering into an attorney-client relationship
to delay unreasonably the notice required by subsection (a) shall be subject
to liability as provided in subsection (e).
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(e) Any person who suffers monetary loss because of the failure of a
claimant or his attorney or of a product seller in the chain of manufacture
and distribution to comply with the requirements of this section may recover
damages, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees from that party. Failure to
comply with the requirements of this section does not affect the validity of
any claim or defense under this Act.
SEC. 109. LENGTH OF TIME PRODUCT SELLERS ARE SUBJECT TO
LIABILITY FOR HARM CAUSED BY THEIR PRODUCTS
(A) Useful Safe Life.
(1) A product seller may be liable to a claimant for harm caused by the
seller's product during the useful safe life of that product. "Useful safe life"
refers to the time during which the product reasonably can be expected to
perform in a safe manner. In determining whether a product's useful safe life
has expired, the trier of fact may consider:
(a) The effect on the product of wear and tear or deterioration from
natural causes;
(b) The effect of climatic and other local conditions in which the product
was used;
(c) The policy of the user and similar users as to repairs, renewals and
replacements;
(d) Representations, instructions and warnings made by the product
seller about the product's useful safe life; and
(e) Any modification or alteration of the product by a user or third party.
(2) A product seller shall not be liable for injuries or damage caused by
a product beyond its useful safe life unless the seller has so expressly war-
ranted.
(B) Statutes of Repose.
(1) Workplace Injuries.
(a) A claimant entitled to compensation under a state worker compensa-
tion statute may bring a product liability claim under this Act for harm that
occurs within ten (10) years after delivery of the completed product to its first
purchaser or lessee who was not engaged in the business of selling products
of that type.
Where this Act precludes a worker from bringing a claim because of
subdivision (1)(a), but the worker can prove, by the preponderance of evi-
dence, that the product causing the injury was unsafe, the worker may bring
a claim against the workplace employer. If possible, the claim should be
brought in a worker compensation proceedng, and shall include all loss of
wages that otherwise would not be compensated under the applicable worker
compensation statute.
(c) Where this Act precludes a worker's beneficiaries under an applicable
wrongful death statute from bringing a wrongful death claim because of sub-
division (1)(a), but they can prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that the
product that caused the worker's death was unsafe, they may bring a claim
against the workplace employer. If possible, the claim must be brought in a
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Worker Compensation proceeding, and shall include pecuniary losses that
would not have otherwise been compensated under the applicable worker
compensation statute.
(d) An employer who is subject to liability under either subsection (1)(b)
or (c) shall have the right to seek contribution from the product seller in an
arbitration proceeding under Section 116 of the Act. Contribution shall be
limited to the extent that the product seller is responsible for the harm
incurred under the principles of Section 104 of this Act. The final judgment
in that proceeding shall not be subject to trial de novo, but shall be treated
as a final judgment of a trial court.
(2) Non-Workplace Injuries.
For product liability claims not included in subdivision (B) that involve
harms occurring more than ten (10) years after delivery of the completed
product to its first purchaser or lessee who was not engaged in the business
of selling products of that type, the presumption is that the product has been
utilized beyond its useful safe life as established by subdivision (A). This
presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.
(3) Limitations on Statutes of Repose.
(a) Where a product seller expressly warrants or promises that the seller's
product can be utilized safely for a period longer than ten (10) years, the
period of repose shall be extended according to these warranties or promises.
(b) The ten (10) year period of repose established in Section 109(B) does
not apply if the product seller intentionally misrepresents a product, or fraud-
ulently conceals information about it, where that conduct was a substantial
cause of the claimant's harm.
(c) Nothing contained in Section 109(B) shall affect the right of any
person found liable under this Act to seek and obtain contribution or indemn-
ity from any other person who is responsible for harm under this Act.
(d) The ten (10) year period of repose established in Section 109(B) does
not apply if the harm was caused by prolonged exposure to a defective prod-
uct, or if an injury-causing aspect of the product existing at the time it was
sold did not manifest itself until ten years after the time of its first use.
(C) Statute of Limitations.
All claims under this Act shall be brought within three years of the time
the claimant discovered, or in the exercise of due diligence should have dis-
covered, the facts giving rise to the claim.
SEC. 110. RELEVANCE OF THIRD-PARTY ALTERATION
OR MODIFICATION OF A PRODUCT
(a) A product seller shall not be liable for harm that would not have
occurred but for the fact that his product was altered or modified by a third
party unless:
(1) The alteration or modification was in accordance with the product
seller's instructions or specifications;
(2) The alteration or modification was made with the express consent of
the product seller; or
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(3) The alteration or modification was the result of conduct that reason-
ably should have been anticipated by the product seller.
(b) For the purposes of this section, alteration or modification includes
changes in the design, formula, function, or use of the product from that
originally designed, tested or intended by the product seller. It includes fail-
ure to observe routine care and maintenance, but does not include ordinary
wear and tear.
SEC. 111. RELEVANCE OF CONDUCT ON THE
PART OF PRODUCT LIABILITY CLAIMANTS
(a) General Rule.
In any claim under this Act, the comparative responsibility of, or attrib-
uted to, the claimant, shall not bar recovery but shall diminish the award of
compensatory damages proportionately, according to the measure of respon-
sibility attributed to the claimant.
(b) Apportionment of Damages.
In any claim involving comparative responsibility, the court, unless oth-
erwise requested by all parties, shall instruct the jury to give answers to
special interrogatories, or the court shall make its own findings if there is no
jury, indicating-
(1) The amount of damages each claimant would have received if com-
parative responsibility were disregarded, and
(2) The percentage of responsibility allocated to each party, including
the claimant, as compared with the combined responsibility of all parties to
the action. For this purpose, the court may decide that it is appropriate to
treat two or more persons as a single party.
(3) In determining the percentage of responsibility, the trier of fact shall
consider, on a comparative basis, both the nature and quality of the conduct
of the party.
(4) The court shall determine the award for each claimant according to
these findings and shall enter judgment against parties liable on the basis of
the common law joint and several liability of joint tortfeasors. The judgment
shall also specify the proportionate amount of damages allocated against each
party liable, according to the percentage of responsibility established for that
party.
(5) Upon a motion made not later than one year after judgment is en-
tered, the court shall determine whether all or part of a party's share of the
obligation is uncollectible from that party, and shall reallocate any uncollec-
tible amount among the other parties, including a claimant at fault, accord-
ing to their respective percentages of fault. A party whose liability is reallo-
cated is still to be subject to contribution and to any continuing liability to
the claimant on the judgment.
(c) Conduct Affecting Claimant's Responsibility.
(1) Failure to Discover a Defective Condition.
(i) A claimant is not required to have inspected the product for defective
condition. Failure to have done so does not render the claimant responsible
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for the harm caused.
(ii) Where a claimant using a product is injured by a defective condition
that would have been apparent to an ordinary prudent person, the claimant's
damages are subject to reduction according to the principles of subsections
(a) and (b).
(2) Using a Product With a Known Defective Condition.
(i) A claimant who knew about a product's defective condition, but who
voluntarily and unreasonably used the product, shall be held solely responsi-
ble for injuries caused by that defective condition.
(ii) In circumstances where a claimant knew about a product's defective
condition and voluntarily used the product, but where the reasonableness of
doing so was uncertain, claimant's, damages shall be subject to reduction
according to the principles of subsections (a) and (b).
(3) Misuse of a Product.
(i) Where a claimant has misused a product by using it in a manner that
the product seller could not have reasonably anticipated, the claimant's dam-
ages shall be reduced according to the principles of subsections (a) and (b).
(ii) Where the injury would not have occurred but for the misuse defined
in subsection (3)(i), the product is not defective for purposes of liability under
this Act.
SEC. 112. MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS:
CONTRIBUTION AND IMPLIED INDEMNITY
(a) Rights of contribution and implied indemnity among multiple defen-
dants shall be determined by reference to the principles of Section 111 (a &
b).
(b) If the proportionate responsibility of the parties to a claim for contri-
bution has been established previously by the court, as provided in Section
111, a party paying more than its share of the obligation, upon motion, may
recover judgment for contribution.
(c) If the proportionate responsibility of the parties to the claim for
contribution has not been established by the court, contribution may be
enforced in a separate action, whether or not a judgment has been rendered
against either the person seeking contribution or the person from whom con-
tribution is being sought.
(d) Contribution is available to a person who enters into a settlement
with a claimant only: (1) if the liability of the person against whom contribu-
tion is sought has been extinguished, and (2) to the extent that the amount
paid in settlement was reasonable.
(e) If a judgment has been rendered, the action for contribution must be
brought within one (1) year after the judgment becomes final. If no judgment
has been rendered, the person bringing the action for contribution either must
have: (1) discharged by payment the common liability within the period of
the statute of limitations or repose applicable to the claimant's right of action
against him and commenced the action for contribution within one year after
payment, or (2) agreed while action was pending to discharge the common
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liability and, within one year after the agreement, have paid the liability and
brought an action for contribution.
SEC. 113. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRODUCT LIABILITY AND
WORKER COMPENSATION
In the case of any claim brought under this Act by or on behalf of a
person who has been or will be compensated for injuries under a state worker
compensation law, where an employer's failure to comply with any statutory
or common law duty relating to workplace safety contributed to the claim-
ant's injuries, the employer shall be subject to a contribution claim as pro-
vided in Section 112 of this Act for a sum not to exceed the amount of the
worker compensation lien.
SEC. 114. THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY OF PRODUCT
SELLERS OTHER THAN MANUFACTURERS AS COMPARED
TO OTHER PRODUCT SELLERS
(a) Manufacturers shall be responsible for defective conditions in their
products according to the provisions of this Act. In the absence of express
warrantees to the contrary, other product sellers shall not be subject to liabil-
ity in circumstances where they do not have a reasonable opportunity to
inspect the product in a manner which would or should, in the exercise of
reasonable care, reveal the existence of the defective condition.
(b) The duty limitation of subsection (a) shall not apply, however, if:
(1) The manufacturer is not subject to service of process in the claimant's
own state;
(2) The manufacturer has been judicially declared insolvent;
(3) The court determines that the claimant would have appreciable diffi-
culty enforcing a judgment against the product manufacturer.
SEC. 115. SANCTIONS AGAINST THE BRINGING OF FRIVOLOUS
CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
(a) After final judgment has been entered under this Act, either party,
by motion, may seek reimbursement for reasonable attorneys' fees and other
costs that would not have been expended but for the fact that the opposing
party pursued a claim or defense that was frivolous.
(b) For the purposes of this Act, a claim or defense is considered frivolous
if the court determines that it was without any reasonable legal or factual
basis.
(c) If the court decides in favor of a party seeking redress under this
section, it shall do so on the basis of clear and convincing evidence. In all
motions under this section, the court shall make and publish its findings of
fact.
(d) The motion provided for in subsection (a) may be filed and the claim
assessed against the person who was responsible for the frivolous nature of
the claim or defense.
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(e) In situations where a claimant has been represented on a contingent
fee basis and no legal costs have been or will be incurred by that claimant,
the attorney for claimant may recover reasonable attorneys' fees based on the
amount of time expended in opposing a frivolous defense.
(f) Claims for damages under this section shall not include expenses of
persons not parties to the action.
SEC. 116. ARBITRATION
(a) Applicability.
In any claim brought under this Act where the amount in dispute is less
than $30,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and the court determines in its
discretion that any non-monetary claims are insubstantial, either party may
by a motion institute a pre-trial arbitration proceeding.
(b) Rules Governing.
(1) The substantive rules of a Section 116 arbitration proceeding shall
be those contained in this Act as well as those in applicable state law.
(2) The procedural rules of a Section 116 artibration proceeding shall be
those contained in this section. If this section does not address a particular
issue, guidance may be obtained from the the Uniform Arbitration Act.
(3) A legislatively designated state agency may formulate additional
procedural rules under this Act.
(c) Arbitrators.
(1) Unless the parties agree otherwise, the arbitration shall be conducted
by three persons, one of whom shall be either an active member of the state
bar or a retired judge of a court of record in the state, one shall be an
individual who possesses expertise in the subject matter area that is in dis-
pute, and one shall be a lay person.
(2) Arbitrators shall be selected in accordance with applicable state law
in a manner which will assure fairness and lack of bias.
(d) Arbitrators' Powers.
(1) Arbitrators to whom claims are referred pursuant to Section 116 shall
have the power within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, to conduct
arbitration hearings and make awards consistent with the provisions of this
Act.
(2) State laws applicable to subpoenas for attendance of witnesses and
the production of documentary evidence shall apply in procedures conducted
under this chapter. Arbitrators shall have the power to administer oaths and
affirmations.
(e) Commencement.
The arbitration hearings shall commence not later than 30 days after the
claim is referred to arbitration, unless for good cause shown the court shall
extend the period. Hearings shall be concluded promptly. The court may
order the time and places of the arbitration.
(f) Evidence.
(1) The Federal Rules of Evidence [or designated state evidence code]
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may be used as guides to the admissibility of evidence in an arbitration
hearing.
(2) Strict adherence to the rules of evidence, apart from relevant state
rules of privileges, is not required.
(g) Transcript of Proceeding.
A party may have a recording and transcript made of the arbitration
hearing at its own expense. A party that has had a transcript or tape record-
ing made shall furnish a copy of the transcript or tape recording at cost to
any other party upon request.
(h) Arbitration Award and Judgment.
The arbitration award shall be filed with the court promptly after the
hearing is concluded and shall be entered as the judgment of the court after
the time for requesting a trial de novo has expired, unless a party demands a
trial de novo before the court pursuant to subsection (i). The judgment so
entered shall be subject to the same provisions of law, and shall have the
same force and effect as a judgment of the court in a civil action, except that
it shall not be subject to appeal.
(i) Trial De Novo.
(1) Within 20 days after the filing of an arbitration award with the court,
any party may demand a trial de novo in that court.
(2) Upon demand for a trial de novo, the action shall be placed on the
calendar of the court and treated for all purposes as if it had not been referred
to arbitration. Any right of trial by jury that a party would otherwise have
shall be preserved inviolate.
(3) At the trial de novo, the court shall not admit evidence that there
had been an arbitration proceeding, the nature or amount of the award, or
any matter concerning the conduct of the arbitration proceeding, except that
the testimony given at the arbitration hearing may be used for impeachment
purposes at a trial de novo.
(4) A party who has demanded a trial de novo but fails to obtain a
judgment in the trial court, exclusive of interest and cost, more favorable
than the arbitration award, shall be assessed the cost of the arbitration pro-
ceeding, including the amount of the arbitration fees, and-
(i) If this party is a claimant and the arbitration award is in its favor,
the party shall pay to the court an amount equivalent to interest on the
arbitration award from the time it was filed; or
(ii) If this party is a product seller, it shall pay interest to the claimant
on the arbitration award from the time it was filed.
SEC. 117. EXPERT TESTIMONY
(a) Appointment.
The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any party enter an
order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and may
request the parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint any expert
witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint witnesses of its own
selection. An expert witness shall not be appointed by the court unless he or
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she consents to act. An expert witness appointed by the court shall be in-
formed of his or her duties in writing, a copy of which shall be filed with the
clerk, or at a conference in which the parties shall have opportunity to partici-
pate. An expert witness so appointed shall advise the parties of any findings;
shall be available for deposition by any party; and may be called to testify
by the court or any party. The court appointed expert witnesses shall be
subject to cross-examination by each party, including a party calling that
expert as a witness.
(b) Compensation.
(1) Expert witnesses appointed by the court are entitled to reasonable
compensation in whatever amount the court may allow. The court, in its
discretion, may tax the costs of such expert on one party or apportion them
between both parties in the same manner as other costs.
(2) In exercising this discretion, the court may consider:
(i) Which party won the case;
(ii) Whether the amount of damages recovered in the action bore a rea-
sonable relationship to the amount sought by the claimant or conceded to be
appropriate by the product seller.
(c) Disclosure of Appointment.
In the exercise of its discretion, the court may authorize disclosure to the
jury of the fact that the court has appointed the expert witness.
(d) Parties' Experts of Own Selection.
Nothing in this section limits the parties in calling expert witnesses of
their own selection.
(e) Pre-Trial Evaluation of Experts.
The court in its discretion may conduct a hearing to determine the quali-
fication of proposed expert witnesses. The court may order a hearing on its
own motion or on the motion of either party.
(1) Need for Pre-Trial Evaluation.
In determining whether to grant such a motion, the court shall consider:
(i) The complexity of the issues in the case; and
(ii) Whether the hearing would deter the presentation of witnesses who
are not qualified as experts on the specific issues.
(2) Factors in Evaluation.
If the court decides to hold such a hearing, it shall consider:
(i) The scope of the proposed witness' background and skills;
(ii) The formal and self-education the proposed witness has undertaken
relevant to the instant case or similar cases; and
(iii) The proposed witness' potential bias.
(3) Findings of Fact.
In making a determination that a proposed expert witness is or is not
qualified, the court shall state its findings of fact.
SEC. 118. NON-PECUNIARY DAMAGES
(a) Non-pecuniary damages, including "pain and suffering," shall be
determined by the trier of fact. The court shall have the power to review such
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damage awards.
(b) In cases where the claimant has not suffered permanent serious dis-
figurement, permanent impairment of bodily function, or permanent mental
illness as a result of the product-related harm, non-pecuniary damages shall
be limited to $25,000.
SEC. 119. THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE.
In any claim brought under this Act, the claimant's recovery shall be
diminished by any amount he or she has received-or will receive in compensa-
tion for the same damages from a public source. This provision shall also
apply to parties who may be subrogated to the claimant's rights under this
Act.
SEC. 120. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
(a) Punitive damages may be awarded if the claimant shows by clear and
convincing evidence that the harm suffered was the result of the product
seller's reckless disregard for the safety of product users, consumers, or by-
standers who might be injured by the product.
(b) If the trier of fact determines that punitive damages should be
awarded, the court shall determine the amount of those damages. In making
this determination, the court shall consider:
(1) The likelihood at the time of manufacture that a serious harm would
arise from the product seller's misconduct;
(2) The degree of the product seller's awareness of that likelihood;
(3) The profitability of the misconduct to the product seller;
(4), The duration of the misconduct and any concealment of it by the
product seller;
(5) The attitude and conduct of the product seller upon discovery of the
misconduct;
(6) The financial condition of the product seller; and
(7) The total effect of other punishment imposed or likely to be imposed
upon the product seller as a result of the misconduct, including punitive
damage awards to persons similarly situated to claimant and the severity of
criminal penalties to which the product seller has been or may be subjected.
SEC. 121. EFFECTIVE DATE
This Act shall be effective with regard to all claims accruing on or after
September 1, 1979.
ANALYSIS
PREAMBLE
The importance this Act places in increasing the degree of certainty in
the product liability litigation process is tempered by the recognition that
even with a nationwide adoption of a uniform code, its application may vary
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from state to state on some issues. The goal is to promote a greater degree of
certainty than the present system.
ANALYSIS
SEC. 100. SHORT TITLE
This is the customary "short title" provision. It may be placed wherever
state legislative practice dictates. If a state legislature introduces parts of the
Uniform Product Liability Act as separate measures, the short title should
be adjusted accordingly.
ANALYSIS
SEC. 101. FINDINGS
Chapter VI and VII of the "Final Report" of the Interagency Task Force
on Product Liaiblity (Task Force Report) provide support for most of the
findings made here. Additional support comes from the Report of the Sub-
committee on Capital, Investment and Business Opportunities, "Product
Liability Insurance," 95th Cong., 2d Sess., Report No. 95-977 (1978) (Sub-
committee Report). Among other things, this Report called for clarification
and simplification of "present tort law relating to product liability for formu-
lating Federal standards to be adopted by the States***" (Subcommittee
Report, at 76).
Individual state studies on product liability conducted in Missouri
(Report of the Senate Select Committee on Product Liability, 1977); Illinois
(Judiciary I Subcommittee on Product Liability; Report and Recommenda-
tions-Part 1, undated); Georgia (Report of the Senate Products Liability
Study Committee, 1978); Maine (Governor's Task Force, 1978); Michigan
(Department of Commerce Task Force on Product Liability Insurance, 1978);
and Wisconsin (Product Liability, An Overview, Wisconsin Legislative
Council Staff, 1978) provide additional support for individual findings.
The Maine and Georgia reports emphasize that individual state tort
reforms can do little to affect the product liability problem. Governor
Grasso's message vetoing a product liability tort bill passed by the Connecti-
cut legislature in 1978 emphasizd that individual state tort actions will not
stabilize product liability insurance rates.
More specific references to the findings appear in the following citations
keyed to the various findings.
(a)(1) Task Force Report at VI-27-28, V-19.
(2) Task Force Report at VI-28-32.
(3) Task Force Report at VI-2-26.
(4) Options Paper on Product Liability and Accident Compensation Is-
sues, 43 FR 14612-4 (1978); Georgia Report Appendix B; Johnson Products
Liability "Reform": A Hazard to Consumers, 56 N. "Carol L. Rev." 677
(1978); Comment, "State Legislative Restrictions on Product Liability Ac-
tions," 29 "Mercer L. Rev." 619 (1978). See Product Liability Legislation,
Federal-State Reports, Inc. (1977-1978).
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(b) Task Force Reportat 1-26-28, VII-15-17; Subcommittee Report at 72;
Michigan Report at p. 6 (1978).
(c) Task Force Insurance Study (citing uncertainty); Task Force Report
a V-48-49 (relationship of premium to risk).
(d) Task Force Report at 1-28; Maine Report at 23.
(e) Task Force Report at VII-214-216; see ISO Product Closed Claim
Survey at 118-130.
(f) See Federal State Product Liability Legislation; Federal State Re-
ports (1977-1978); Product Liability Trends at 97-98, 104-05, 157-58 (1978);
Business Insurance, p. 22 (12/25/78); see also Wisconsin Report at 29-37
(describing twenty-five separate bills on product liability introduced in one
legislative session).
ANALYSIS
SEC. 102. DEFINITIONS
(1) "Product seller" includes all parties in the regular commercial distri-
bution chain. It does not include the occasional private seller. This is in
accord with the "Restatement (Second) of Torts." The term also includes
lessors and bailors of products, in accord with the majority of case law deci-
sions that have addressed that issue. See Annot. 52, "A.L.R." 3d 121 (1973).
The Act does not address several definitional problems of "product
seller." First, it does not address the problem of the product seller engaged
in a service. See "Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc.," 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697
(1969). It is suggested that a party be considered a product seller where a sale
of a product is a principal part of the transaction and where the essence of
the relationship between the buyer and seller is not the furnishing of profes-
sional skill or services. See Annot., 29 "A.L.R." 3d 1425 (1970).
Second, the Act does not address the potential product liability problems
of the seller of real property. It is suggested that it is only appropriate to apply
product liability standards to builder-vendors who engage in the mass pro-
duction and sale of homes. See "Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.," 44 N.J.
70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); But see "Wright v. Creative Corp.," 30 Colo. App.
575, 498 P.2d 1179 (1972) (rejecting "Schipper).
Finally, the Act does not indicate whether a commercial seller of used
products is subject to liability under this Act. This issue is left for resolution
as a matter of individual state policy. See "Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevro-
let Co.," 61 Ill.2d 17, 329 N.E.2d 785 (1975).
(2) "Product Liability Claim." One key purpose of this act is to consoli-
date product liability actions that traditionally have been separated under
theories of negligence, warranty, and strict liability. This approach was sug-
gested by the Task Force "Legal Study" as well as the report of the Subcom-
mittee on Capital, Investment and Business Opportunities. While an argu-
ment may be made that negligence theory is qualitatively different from
strict liability and, therefore, should be preserved, product liability theory
and practice has become an entity in and of itself and can only be stabilized
if there is one, and not a multiplicity of causes of action.
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"Product liability claim" embraces express as well as implied warran-
ties.
(3) "Claimant." Both living persons and those claiming through or on
behalf of an estate are included within the meaning of the word "claimant."
This would include both wrongful death and survival actions.
Although the "Restatement (Second) of Torts" left open the question of
whether bystanders should be included within the compass of strict liability
claims, subsequent case law has been almost uniform that bystanders should
be included. See "Giberson v. Ford Motor Co.," 504 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. 1974)
(collecting cases). See also, Annot., 33 "A.L.R." 3d 415 (1970). The definition
follows this line of decisions.
Bystanders include rescuers who come upon the scene. See "Guarino v.
Mine safety Appliance Co.," 25 N.Y.2d 460, 255 N.E.2d 173 (1969).
(4) "Harm." The "Restatement" provision included physical harm to
persons and property. This Act also includes emotional harm, but only as an
element of parasitic damages, e.g., when a person has alss been harmed
physically. The Act leaves open the question of whether an individual may
recover for emotional harm alone under a product liability theory; this issue
is left to common law development.
The Act also includes damage to the product itself. See "Gherna v. Ford
Motor Co.," 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1966). Some courts
consider this an economic loss and relegate the claimant to whatever rights
he or she has under the sales provision of the Uniform Commercial Code. See
"Hawkins Construction Co. v. Matthews Co., Inc.," 190 Neb. 546, 209
N.W.2d 643 (1973).
Apart from a very limited express warranty claim, the Act does not
include damages for consequential economic losses. Most courts have been
in accord with "Seely v. White Motor Co.," 63 Cal. 2d 9, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17
(1965) on this issue and have left the claimant with whatever rights he or she
has under the Uniform Commercial Code. See "Brown v. Western Farmers
Assn.," 268 Or. 470, 521 P.2d 537 (1974); "Eli Lilly and Co. v. Casey," 472,
S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971); "Paul O'Leary Lumber Corp. v. Mill
Equipment, Inc.," 448 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1971).
The insurance costs of extending consequential economic losses beyond
parties to a contract would be enormous. It is much cheaper and more effi-
cient for the product purchaser to obtain insurance against consequential
economic losses caused by business stoppage. Also, most courts believe that
a commercial purchaser should be charged with the risk that his product will
not match his economic expectations unless the manufacturer agrees it will.
See Note, "Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence," 66 "Colum.
L. Rev." 917 (1966). However, a claimant can recover for consequential eco-
nomic losses under an express warranty theory. See "Seely v. White Motor
Co.," supra.
(5) "Manufacturer." This definition is based on one in Arizona's product
liability law. See "Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann." § 12-681 (1) (1978). Its greatest
import within this act is in regard to the responsibility of a manufacturer for
defective products as contrasted with other product sellers. See Section 114.
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(6) "Reasonably Anticipated Conduct." The definition is based in part
on Arizona product liability law. See "Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann." § 12-681(4)
(1978). The meaning of "reasonably anticipated" should be contrasted with
"foreseeable." Almost any kind of misconduct with regard to products can
be foreseeable-especially if the trier of fact is permitted to use hindsight,
e.g., that a soda bottle will be used for a hammer, that someone will attempt
to drive a land vehicle on water, that perfume will be poured on a candle in
order to scent it. See "Moran v. Faberge, Inc.," 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11
(1975).
The approach taken places incentives for risk prevention on product
sellers, while also ensuring that the price of products is not affected by the
liability insurance costs that would spring from providing coverage for abnor-
mal product use.
(7) "Clear and Convincing Evidence. "Proof that is clear and convincing
carries with it not only the power to persuade the mind as to its probable
truth or correctness of fact; it has an additional element of clinching such
truth. The term is understood best in context. It requires more proof than the
mere preponderance of evidence (the ordinary standard under this Act), but
does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See e.g., "Aiello v. Knoll
Golf Club," 64 N.J. Super. 156, 165 A.2d 531 (1960); "Cross v. Ledford," 161
Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954); "Brown v. Warner," 78 S.D. 647, 107
N.W.2d 1 (1961).
ANALYSIS
SEC. 103. SCOPE OF THIS ACT
(a) The Act consolidates all product liability recovery theories into one.
The approach taken is in accord with the Task Force "Legal Study." While
some have argued that for trial tactics purposes it is useful to retain the
negligence cause of action as distinct from strict liability, a claimant's attor-
ney can retain the essence of this utility by showing the basic wrongfulness
of the product seller's conduct under Section 104.
(b) The Act is in accord with the "Restatement (Second) of Torts" in
that it is unnecessary for the claimant to be in contractual privity with the
product seller. See "Restatement (Second) of Torts" § 402A, Comment c.
(c) The Act and its accompanying commmentary do not purport to be
an exhaustive compilation of the entire subject of product liability law;
rather, they focus on subject matter areas that the Task Fqrce Report sug-
gested have created the most problems and are of major importance.
The interstices of the Act will be filled by statutory or common law
additions of the individual states. Some of these interstitial issues will be
pointed out in the section-by-section commentary; others will be discovered
in the course of litigation under the Act.
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ANALYSIS
SEC. 104. BASIC STANDARDS OF
RESPONSIBILITY
Perhaps no single product liability issue has generated more controversy
than the question of defining the basic standard of responsibility to which
product sellers are to be held. Much of this controversy appears to have
sprung from the fact that the authors of § 402A of the "Restatement (Second)
of Torts" were focusing on problems relating to product mismanufacture or
defects in construction; they were not directly concerned with problems relat-
ing to defects in design or to the duty to warn. See Wade, "On the Nature of
Strict Tort Liability for Products," 44 "Miss. L.J." 825, 830-32 (1973).
Courts continue to struggle to articulate the standards of responsibility
of product sellers. A multiplicity of approaches have been offered. See e.g.,
"Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc.," 20 Cal. 3d 413, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1978); "Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering Co. Inc.," 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d
816 (1978); "Phillips v. Kimwood machine Co.," 269 Ore. 485, 525 P.2d 1033
(1974).
The approach taken in Section 104 is to distinguish cases based on de-
fects in construction, defects in design, and defects caused by a failure to
instruct or warn. Each type of case calls for a particular type of treatment.
For this reason, thig Act does not have a "single" definition of the term
"defect," nor does it attempt to resolve the debate over whether a product
liability claimant should have to prove that the product was "unreasonably"
dangerous. Compare "Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc.," supra, and
"Byrns v. Riddell, Inc.," 113 Ariz. 264, 550 P.2d 1065 (1976). Instead, Section
104 takes an approach which avoids terminological difficulties by focusing on
practical considerations that courts and juries have looked to in deciding
product liability cases.
This approach should not lead to problems of characterization. The
claimant's pleading should indicate the theory on which he or she is proceed-
ing within the framework of Section 104, subdivisions A, B, and C.
A product may be defective in more than one way. Furthermore, there
is an important linkage between the duty to warn and defective design. In
appropriate cases, a product may be found not to be defective in design if the
product seller has given adequate warning about the alleged hazard. See e.g.,
"Wagner v. Larsen," 257 Iowa 1202, 136 N.W.2d 312 (1965); "Penn v. Inferno
Mfg. Corp.," 199 So.2d 210 (La. App.) aff'd, 251 La. 27, 202 So.2d 649 (1967).
There are limits to this possibility, however, since a product seller will not
be shielded from liability for a poorly designed product, simply by indicating
that the product "may be hazardous."
The following commentary discusses each subdivision of Section 104 in
turn. First:
(A) The Product Was Defective in Construction. This history of imposing
strict liability for defects in the construction of products goes back as far as
1913 when sellers of food were first held liable for failure to produce a product
reasonably fit for its intended use. See "Masetti v. Armour & Co.," 75 Wash.
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622, 135 P.633 (1913); Prosser,."The Assault Upon the Citadel," 69 "Yale
L.J." 1099 (1960).
Subdivision (A) imposes pure strict liability on the product seller in
accordance with Section 402A of the "Restatement (Second) of Torts." This
has been an evolving area of strict liability intended to protect the consumer.
As Comment c to the "Restatement" states, the seller "has undertaken and
assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming public
who may be injured [by the product]." Furthermore, "the public has the
right to and does expect, in case of products which it needs and for which it
is forced to rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their
goods * * *" Id.
In the course of its study, the Interagency Task Force on Product Liabil-
ity found that many product sellers can absorb the financial impact of strict
liability based on defects in construction. See Task Force Report, at VII-17.
The product seller as a distributor of many products absorbs the costs of
injuries caused by such a defect (even though having exercised all reasonable
care) as part of a responsibility inextricably connected with the modern mer-
chandising of products.
Second:
(B) The Product Was Defective in Design. As compared to the situation
with respect to defect in construction, no court yet has imposed true strict or
absolute liability on product sellers for defects in design appreciating, no
doubt, the unlimited liability potential inherent in such cases where it is
almost always possible to design a product more safely. Rather, the courts
have balanced a variety of factors in determining whether a particular prod-
uct is defective in design. See, e.g., "Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc.,"
supra; "Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering Co. Inc.," supra; "Schell v.
AMF, Inc.," 567 F.2D 1259 (3d Cir. 1977).
There are several possible ways to limit the unlimited liability potential
of design defect cases. One is to create a limited damage compensation sys-
tem-private or governmental-analogous to worker compensation. Another
is to continue to base liability on the individual's moral responsibility under
the tort system. Subdivision (B) takes the latter course and places the burden
on the claimant to show that in light of a balance of practical objective
factors, the product seller should bear the full cost of the injury and have the
responsibility for attempting to distribute that cost through product pricing.
Basic principles of tort law suggest that the claimant should carry the burden
of proof on this issue. See Kalven, Jr., "Torts: The Quest for Appropriate
Standards," 53 "Calif. L. Rev." 189 (1965). But see "Barker v. Lull Engineer-
ing Co., Inc.," supra.
The factors listed in this subdivision for the trier of fact to consider have
been derived from a very wide variety of sources. See, e.g., "Barker v. Lull
Engineering Co. Ltd.," supra. See also Vetri, "Products Liability: Developing
a Framework for Analysis," 54 "Ore. L. Rev." 293, 310 (1975); Henderson,
Jr., "Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Lim-
its of Adjudication," 73 "Colum. L. Rev." 1531 (1973); Keeton, "Product
Liability and the Meaning of Defect," 5 "St. Mary's L.J." 30 (1973); Wade,
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"On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products," 44 "Miss. L. J." 825
(1973). The factors selected also have been reviewed from an economic
perspective.
Factor (1) addresses the problem of judging design cases by hindsight, a
significant and justifiable concern of product sellers. By focusing on the time
of manufacture, Section 104(B) provides an incentive to product sellers to
reduce risks, both by design testing and by warning of potential hazards.
Factor (2) raises the possibility that if at the time of manufacture there
is the possibility of a very serious harm, the product seller's obligation to take
steps to avoid it increases.
Factor (3) overlaps the Act's consideration of the "state of the art" in
Section 106. The trier of fact should consider the scientific and technological
knowledge available to the product seller at the time of manufacture as well
as the custom in the industry.
Factor (4) recognizes that increased costs associated with an alternative
design may play a part in deciding whether it is feasible to pursue. Courts
occasionally have indicated that it is appropriate for the trier of fact to
consider whether because of increased costs of an alternative design, "it
would still be reasonable to market the product despite the danger." "Lynd
v. Rockwell Manufacturing Co.," 276 Or. 341, 554 P.2d 1000, 1006 (1976).
Factor (5) indicates that if a weighing of considerations, (1)-(4) suggests
that an alternative design should have been pursued, it still is appropriate
for the trier of fact to consider any new or additional harms that would arise
if this alternative design were chosen.
Thus, Subdivision (B) does not set out an algebraic formula as to how
each of these factors should be weighed. Certainly, as factors (1) and (2)
increase, the trier of fact is more likely to find that the product was defective.
On the other hand, it must balance these factors against (3), (4), and (5).
Two factors relied on by some courts in design cases were not included
in the Section 104(B) balancing process. First is the "utility" of the product
to the user or to society in general. Economic analysis suggests that this
element would render the balancing test totally subjective and unworkable.
Tested by its "utility," a whole-grain health food cereal conceivably might
be subject to a lower standard of responsibility than one that was heavily
sugar-coated (less "useful" to society as a whole). On the other hand, if the
trier of fact focused on the subjective "value to the user," it might come to
the opposite conclusion. The approach of Section 104(B) is to focus the trier
of fact on how the product was made and what its dangers are, rather than
making macro-economic judgments about its value to society or to certain
individuals.
The second factor not included in the Section 104(B) balancing process
is a "consumer expectation" test. The reasons for this are rooted in both
economics and practicality. As Professor Wade, Reporter for the
"Restatement (Second) of Torts," has stated:
[Tihe consumer would not know what to expect, because he would
have no idea how safe the product could be made.
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Wade, supra, 44 "Miss. L.J." at 829. Again, the notion of consumer expecta-
tions suffers from an "overkill" of subjectivity. Each trier of fact is likely to
have a different understanding of abstract consumer expectations. Section
104(B) leaves consumer expectations aside and focuses the trier of fact on
what design alternatives were possible as a practical matter.
Third:
(C) The Product Was Defective Because Appropriate Warnings or In-
structions Were Not Provided. A product seller may be held liable under this
subdivision even though the product was not found to be defective in design
or construction. Even where lack of scientific knowledge or cost factors pre-
cludes the use of an alternative design, the product seller still may be re-
quired to provide a warning about the product's hazards or to instruct about
the proudct's use. See "Brown v. North Am. Mfg. Co." 576 P.2d 711 (Mont.
1978).
As the Task Force Report noted, rules relating to a product seller's duty
to warn have changed drastically in recent years, and are unclear in some
jurisdictions. See Task Force Report, at VII-18. Product sellers want to be
informed about the scope of their duty. Nevertheless, practical problems
make it impossible to develop a general rule that will inform the product
seller-in advance of manufacture-precisely how to instruct or warn about
a particular product. On the other hand, some general guidelines can be
provided.
Subdivision (C)(1) lists practical factors that a trier of fact shall weigh
in determining whether a particular product warning or instruction was ade-
quate. The trier of fact should focus on both instructions and warnings; all
representations about a product must be considered in evaluating whether
the duty to warn has been discharged. See "McCormack v. Hankscraft Co.,"
278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967).
Factor (a) is similar to subsection (1) of subdivision (B). The trier of fact
is to consider the likelihood that the harm against which the warning is
directed will occur. Where the harm is more likely, the duty is greater.
Factor (B) is similar to subsection (2) of subdivision (B). The more
serious the anticipated harm, the greater the duty to warn. See "Davis v.
Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.," 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
Factor (c) is of special importance. It recognizes that warnings are not
made in a vacuum. The product seller must construct warnings and instruc-
tions in light of the training, experience, education and knowledge of those
who are likely to avail themselves of those warnings or instructions. See
"Halvorson v. American Hoist & Derrick Co.," 307 Minn. 48, 240 N.W.2d 303
(1976); compare "Ford Motor Co. v. Rodgers," 337 So.2d 736 (Ala. 1976); See
also "Greiner v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft," 429 F.Supp. 495
(E.D.Pa. 1977).
This factor also allows the trier of fact to judge whether the danger was
so obvious as not to require a warning. Some courts have followed the much
criticized "patent danger" rule that shields the product seller from an obliga-
tion to warn about obvious hazards. Numerous jurisdictions have rejected the
rule. See, e.g., "Byrns v. Riddell, Inc.," 113 Az. 264, 550 P.2d 1065 (1976);
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"Casey v. Gifford Wood Co.," 61 Mich. App. 208, 232 N.W.2d 360 (1975);
"Brown v. North Am. Mfg. Co.," supra. In situations where it is inexpensive
and easy to do so, it may be appropriate to warn about an obvious danger
that is highly likely to cause very serious injuries. See Marschall, "An Ob-
vious Wrong Does Not Make a Right: Manufacturers' Liability for Patently
Dangerous Products," 48 "N.Y.U.L. Rev." 1065 (1973).
A product seller should be able to assume that the ordinary product user
is familiar with obvious hazards-that knives cut, that alcohol burns, that it
is dangerous to drive automobiles at high speeds.
Factor (d), the technological feasibility and cost of a warning, may not
be significant in many cases because warnings are often relatively inexpen-
sive to provide. However, in some situations, it may not be feasible technolog-
ically to provide a warning, or at least the type of warning that claimant
suggests should have been provided.
Subsection (2) provides that a claimant must show that if adequate
warnings had been given, it is more probable than not that the injury would
not have occurred. In other words, a claimant must show that the failure to
provide an appropriate warning was a cause of his or her harm. In this regard
the claimant can show that if the warning had been given, either the product
would have been used without incident, or it would not have been used at
all. The later situation is likely to arise with pharmaceuticals. The test stated
in subsection (2) is an objective one which looks toward the conduct of the
reasonably prudent person. Cf. "Cobbs v. Grant," 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1,
104 Cal. Rptr. 505. (1972)(informed consent).
Subsection (3) indicates that the warnings or instructions should be
devised so as to communicate with the person best able to take suitable
precautions. The product seller's duty to warn does not go beyond the tech-
nological and other information available at the time of manufacture. This
is in accord with the overwhelming majority of court decisions. See "Robbins
v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Assn.," 552 F.2d 788 (8th Cir. 1977).
ANALYSIS
SEC. 105. UNAVOIDABLY UNSAFE ASPECTS
OF PRODUCTS
Section 105 follows the "Restatement (Second) of Torts" with respect to
"products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapa-
ble of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use." See
"Restatement (Second) of Torts" § 402A, Comment k; see also "N.H.Rev.
Stat. Ann." § 507-D:4 (1978).
With the exception of one Illinois decision ("Cunningham v. MacNeal
Memorial Hospital," 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970)), subsequently
overruled by "Ill. Ann. Stat." ch. 91 §§ 181-84 (1971 as amended), this ap-
proach has been followed by the common law courts throughout the United
States. See, e.g., "Moore v. Underwood Memorial Hospital," 147 N.J. Super.
252, 371 A.2d 105 (1977)(serum hepatitus contracted from blood supplied);
"Dalke v. Upjohn Co.," 555 F.2d 245, (9th Cir. 1977)(tooth discoloration from
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tetracycline); "Chambers v. G. D. Searle & Co.," 441 F. Supp. 377 (D. Md.
1975) (stroke allegedly from birth control pills); "Coffer v. Standard Brands,
Inc.," 30 N.C. App. 134, 226 S.E.2d 534 (1976)(shell in nuts); "Hines v. St.
Joseph's Hospital," 86 N.M. 763, 527 P.2d 1075 (1974)(blood transfusion).
Subsection (a) sets the time from which to judge the state of scientific
and technological knowledge as the point when the product leaves the manu-
facturer's control. See "Cochran v. Brooke," 243 Or. 89, 409 P.2d 904 (1966).
Subsection (b) makes clear that a product seller may be subject to liabil-
ity for failure to provide an adequate warning about an unavoidably unsafe
aspect of a product. There are certain hazards, particularly in the pharma-
ceutical field, which are known or can be discovered through the exercise of
reasonable care even though they cannot be avoided. See "Dalke v. Upjohn
Co.," supra; "Chambers v. G. D. Searle & Co.," supra; "Toole v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc.," 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
The factual question underlying the legal issue of whether warnings or
instructions were adequate is whether product sellers meet their duty to
promulgate warnings and instructions commensurate with their actual
knowledge gained from research and adverse reaction reports and their con-
structive knowledge as measured by scientific literature and other available
means of communication. See "Dalke v. Upjohn Co.," supra, at 248;
"McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.," 270 Or. 375, 528 P.2d 522, 528-
29 (1974). Contra, "Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp.," 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir.
1976).
Subsection (b) also supports the concept of continuing obligation to warn
and instruct based on new information about an unavoidably unsafe aspect
of a product, discovered after it has been manufactured. See "Love v. Wolf,"
226 Cal. App.2d 378, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1964); "Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yar-
row," 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969).
Finally, subsection (c) subjects a product seller to liability for an una-
voidably unsafe aspect of a product if the seller expressly warrants that a
product is free from such defects. For example, if the product seller states
that a product is "free and safe from all dangers of addiction" and the claim-
int becomes addicted to the drug, the seller would be subject to liability. See
"Crocker v. Winthrop Lab., Div. of Sterling Drug, Inc.," 514 S.W.2d 429
(Tex. 1974).
The approach taken in Section 105 recognizes that there may be circum-
stances where a seriously injured person is left without compensation for an
injury caused by an unavoidably unsafe aspect of a product. This is unlikely
to be a common occurrence, however, given the presence of other parties in
the distributive chain. See Willing, "The Commnet k Character: A Concep-
tual Barrier to Strict Liability," 29 "Mer. L. Rev." 545, 580-81 (1978). For
reasons of policy, Section 105 proposes that a product seller not be held
responsible for harms that are simply unavoidable. See A. Johnson,
"Products Liability 'Reform': A Hazard to Consumers," 56 "N. Carol. L.
Rev." 676, 690 (1978). If the costs of these harms are to be shifted from the
individual, they should be borne by society at large. Section 105 should help
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encourage the development of new products without unleashing on the public
unsafe products that are defective in construction or design under Section
104. It also makes clear to policy-makers that the tort-litigation system is not
the means for addressing injuries caused by this type of hazard.
ANALYSIS
SEC. 106. RELEVANCE OF THE STATE OF
THE ART AND INDUSTRY CUSTOM
Subsection (a) adopts a fundamental principle of evidence law for the
purposes of product liability cases. It excludes the showing of post-accident
changes in the design of a product, the "state of the art," or industry custom
when the evidence is offered to show that the product was defective at the
time of manufacture. See Federal Rule of Evidence 407 and Advisory Com-
mittee commentary.
The reasons underlying this rule are twofold: first, subsequent changes
are deemed irrelevant (all they show is as one gets older, one may get wiser);
and second, admission of such evidence may discourage the making of re-
pairs. While the latter rationale has been challenged, see "Ault v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co.," 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812
(1975), the relevance of such evidence on the issue of defectiveness is of very
limited value. On the other hand, the prejudicial effect of showing the subse-
quent change or repair-particularly one undertaken by the product seller
himself-is quite substantial. See "LaMonica v. Outboard Marine Corp.," 48
Ohio App.2d 43, 355 N.E.2d 533 (1976); "Haysom v. Coleman Lantern Co.,"
89 Wash.2d 474, 573 P.2d 785 (1978).
Subsection (a) does permit the introduction of evidence of changes in the
"state of the art" when it is relevant for purposes other than showing that
the product was defective at the time of manufacture. Thus, evidence of such
changes may be admissible to show that the product seller knew of the defect
at a certain point in time. It might also be admissible where the product seller
claimed the product hazard was impossible to avoid. In cases of this kind,
the court should balance the probative value of the evidence against its
prejudicial nature. Allowing the introduction of evidence in these cases
should not become a vehicle for avoiding the basic purpose of the rule.
Subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) address one of the major issues that
have divided product sellers and consumer groups concerned about product
liability. Product sellers have argued that when their products comply with
the "state of the art," it is unfair to deem them defective. They further
contend that industry custom is likely to incorporate all cost-justified product
safety features. See R. Posner, "Economic Analysis of Law," 71 (1972). Con-
sumers respond that it is inappropriate to permit product sellers to fix indi-
rectly their own standard of liability. See Johnson, "Products Liability
'Reform': A Hazard to Consumers," 56 "N. C. L. Rev." 677, 680-81 (1978).
In reality, there may be less of a dispute between product sellers and
consumers on this issue than appears on the surface. The approach taken in
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Section 106 attempts to clarify matters by distinguishing between "custom"
and "state of the art."
Subsection (a) defines "state of the art" to distinguish it from custom
in the industry. It was derived from a recently enacted section of Arizona law.
"Arix. Rev. Stat. Ann." § 12-681(6)(1978). The subsection (a) definition com-
prehends a level of safety that was possible as a practical matter at the time
of manufacture.
Under subsection (b), compliance with industry custom is merely evi-
dence that the trier of fact may consider in determining whether a product
was defective under subdivisions (B) and (C) of Section 104. See, e.g., "Bruce
v. Martin-Marietta Corp.," 544 F. 2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976); "Baker v. Chrysler
Corp.," 55 Cal. App. 3d 710, 127 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1976); "Maxted v. Pacific
Car & Foundry Co.," 527 P. 2d 832 (Wyo. 1974); "Roach v. Kononen," 269
Ore. 457, 525 P. 2d 125 (1974); "Olson v. Arctic Enterprises, Inc.," 349
F.Supp. 761 (D.N.D. 1972).
Subsection (c) also permits introduction of evidence of non-compliance
with custom-evidence likely to be introduced by a product liability claim-
ant. While it might be argued that non-compliance with custom should signal
that, in fact, the product was defective, situations may arise where the prod-
uct manufacturer followed an alternative procedure that was no less safe
(perhaps even safer) than custom in the industry. For that reason, non-
compliance with' custom is admissable, but does not create a situation where
the trier of fact would consider the product defective per se. See "Poches v.
J. J. Newbury Co.," 549 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1977).
Subsection (d) raises a presumption of nondefectiveness if a product
conformed to the "state of the art" at the time of manufacture. This follows
"Colo. Rev. Stat. ann." § 13-21-403 (1978), but does not go as far as "Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann." ch. 411, § 3(2)(1978), which creates a presumption for both
"state of the art" and custom in the industry. The overwhelming majority of
case law probably would direct a verdict for defendant in this instance. See,
e.g., "Olson v. Arctic Enterprises, Inc.," supra; "Wilson v. Piper Aircraft
Corp.," 282 Ore. 61, 577 P.2d 1322, 1326 (1978)(" . . . plaintiff's prima facie
case of a defect must show more than the technical possibility of a safer
design"); "Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp.," supra; "Maxted v. Pacific Car
and Foundry Co.," supra; "Roach v. Kononen," supra.
Only a few intermediate appellate court decisions, primarily from one
state, impose liability where the product was in accord with the technical,
mechanical, and scientific knowledge reasonably feasible for use at the time
of manufacture. See, e.g., "Gelsumino v. E. W. Bliss Co.," 10 Ill. App. 3d
604, 295 N.E.2d 110 (1973) and its progeny. But see "McClellan v. Chicago
Transit Authority," 34 Ill. App. 3d 151, 340 N.E.2d 61 (1975). Compare
"Olson v. A.W. Chesterton Co.," 256 N.W. 2d 530 (N. Dak. 1977).
Section 106 thus provides special protection for the interests of product
liability claimants in that it allows the trier of fact, in extraordinary situa-
tions, to find a manufacturer liable even though his product conformed to the
"state of the art."
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All presumptions aurhorized by this section can be rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence that, in light of the factors set forth in § 104(2) or (3),
that the product was defective. An example under § 104(2) where the pre-
sumption might be rebutted is where a product that conferred with a stan-
dard posed a very high probability of extremely serious injury and at the time
of manufacture there were inexpensive and safer alternative methods of de-
signing the product.
An example under § 104(3) where the presumption might be rebutted is
if a product seller learned about a product hazard after the product was
manufactured. In that instance, even though his product conformed with the
"state of the art", the trier of fact may find that he should have made a
reasonable effort to warn product users about such hazards. See Commentary
to section 105.
Subsection (e) acknowledges that non-governmental entities may de-
velop product standards that are both rigorous and sound. See Task Force
Report, at IV-13-17. The review of such standards is a complex matter, and
it is left to the court to decide whether a particular standard meets the
criteria of subsection (e). Qualifying standards are given a special sta-
tus-they create a presumption that the product was not defective in design
under Section 104, subdivision (B).
ANALYSIS
SEC. 107. RELEVANCE OF COMPLIANCE
WITH LEGISLATIVE OR ADMINISTRATIVE
STANDARDS
Product sellers have contended that it is unfair to call a product defective
when the challenged aspect of that product conformed to an applicable ad-
ministrative or legislative standard. Some product liability loss prevention
experts have suggested that making compliance with such standards a de-
fense might create incentives for manufacturers to comply with them. Intera-
gency Task Force on Product Liability, "Selected Papers," at 266 (Remarks
of Professor Alvin S. Weinstein).
On the other hand, consumer groups have criticized such standards,
claiming that many are formulated solely by and for industry. The approach
of the common law as well as that embodied in the Consumer Product Safety
Act, 15 "U.S.C." § 2074a (1976), is that most government safety standards
are merely minimum standards. They are not set at a level that would make
it appropriate to regard compliance with such standards as an absolute de-
fense in a product liability case. See "Roberts v. May," 583 P.2d 305, 308
(Colo. App. 1978). Even if the standards were set above minimum safety
criteria when formulated, keeping them up-to-date remains a problem.
Section 107(a) comports with this general approach by not treating com-
pliance with legislative and administrative standards as an absolute defense.
Nevertheless, it allows some "credit" for compliance with such standards in
appropriate circumstances. In sum, Section 107(b) creates a rebuttable pre-
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sumption of non-defectiveness if the product seller persuades the court that
the standard:
(1) Was developed as the result of careful, thorough product testing and
a formal product safety evaluation;
(2) Was developed through a procedure where both consumer and manu-
facturer interests were considered;
(3) Was more than a minimum safety standard; and
(4) Was up-to-date at the time the product was manufactured.
The section follows the existing case law that has made adjustment for
standards that are sound. See "Jones v. Hittle Service, Inc.;" 219 Kan. 627,
549 P.2d 1383 (1976) (universally accepted standards for odorizing LP gas
outweigh expert opinion); "McDaniel v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc.," 197
Neb. 190, 241 N.W. 2d 822 (1976) (determination of the FDA prevails in
absence of proof that the manufacturer furnished incomplete, misleading, or
fraudulent information); "Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp.," 484 F.2d 1025
(1st Cir., 1937)(standard promulgated under the Flammable Fabric Act was
outdated). Cf. "Restatement (Second) of Torts" § 288c (1975) (requiring
claimant in all cases of compliance to show that a reasonable person would
have taken additional precautions).
Section 107 does not speak to two topic relating to compliance with
governmental standards. First, it does not treat "failure to comply." This
area is left to common law development under the general principles of negli-
gence per se. See W. Prosser, "Torts," at 190, n.31. Second, the Act does not
cover the situation where the government has issued mandatory design and
installation specifications. See "Hunt v. Blasius," 55 Ill. App.3d 14, 370
N.E.2d 617 (1977) (holding that compliance is an absolute defense).
ANALYSIS
SEC. 108. NOTICE OF POSSIBLE CLAIM
REQUIRED
The purpose of this section is to inform product sellers at an early date
that the product they produce may be defective. Under present law, a claim-
ant may delay informing a product seller about a claim until the statute of
limitations nearly has expired. In most jurisdictions, this period is two or
three years. Although 77.8 percent of all bodily injury claims are reported
within six months, see ISO, "Closed Claim Survey," at 100 (1977), the 22.2
percent that are not reported during this period are of concern because they
represent about 68 percent of the claim payments.
A reasonable notice of claim requirement in product liability law pro-
motes the interests of product users because it is a low-cost means of assisting
product safety. Presumably, if informed about defective conditions at an
early stage, a product seller is more likely to take action to correct such
conditions and thus forestall future injuries. This is why notice of claim
provision have been utilized in other contexts. See, e.g., Uniform Commer-
cial Code § 2-607 (warranty breaches); 18 E. McQuillan, "Municipal Corpo-
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rations" § 53.154 (ed. rev. 1977) (suits against municipalities for injuries); 3
A. Larson, "Workmen's Compensation Law" § 78.00 et seq. (1976) (notice
of injury to employer). See also Comment, "Notice Requirement in War-
ranty Actions Involving Personal Injury," 51 "Calif. L. Rev.," 586 (1963);
Phillips, "Notice of Breach in Sales and Strict Tort Liability Law: Should
There Be a Difference?," 47 "Ind. L.J." 457, 468-69 (1972)(observing that
requiring notice of claims may encourage defendants to make reasonable
settlements).
This section is adapted from the recently enacted "Minn. Stat. Ann." §
604.04 (1978). It differs from analogous notice of claim provisions in that it
does not provide that a claim or defense will be barred by the failure to meet
its conditions. As the court noted in "Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc.," 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1962), such a
provision may "become a booby trap for the unwary. The injured consumer
is seldom 'steeped in the business practice which justifies the rule,' [James,
Product Liability, 34 Texas L. Rev. 192, 1971 and at least until he has had
legal advice it will not occur to him to give notice***"
Instead, Section 108 places a duty to give the notice of claim on the
attorney. It imposes a cost on the attorney for investigation and other expen-
ses that stem from the failure to give notice.
Section 108 also places a burden on product sellers, who are notified of
an anticipated claim, to provide the attorney with the names and addresses
of others known to be in the chain of distribution. Product sellers may also
be held liable under this section for costs that stem from the failure to provide
these names.
Section 108 assumes that claims arising under this section can be consoli-
dated with the principal product liability claim brought under this Act.
ANALYSIS
SEC. 109 LENGTH OF TIME PRODUCT SELLERS ARE SUBJECT TO
LIABILITY FOR HARM CAUSED BY THEIR PRODUCTS
Perhaps more than any other single factor alleged to be "the cause" of
the countrywide product liability problem are the rules governing the respon-
sibility of manufacturers for older products. Most product liability policies
not only include claims based on products manufactured or sold during the
given year, but also products manufactured or sold in the past. In the case
of sellers of durable goods, this creates an "open-ended" liability situation.
The Supreme Court of Oregon summarized the general common rule
with the statement: "Promonged use of a manufactured article is but one
factor, albeit an important one, in the determination of whether a defect in
the product made it unsafe***" See "Tucker v. United Crane & Shovel
Corp.," 256 Ore. 318, 473 P. 2d 862 (1970) (boom crane manufactured in 1956,
collapsed in 1965). See also "Gates v. Ford Motor Co.," 494 F. 2d 458 (10th
Cir. 1974) (24-year-old tractor); "Kaczmarek v. Mesta Machine Co.," 463 F.
2d 675 (3d Cir. 1972) (30-year-old pickling machine); "Mondshour v. General
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Motors Corp.," ' 298 F. Supp. 111 (D. Md. 1969) (17-year-old bus).
Partly in response to this open-ended liability potential, a number of
states have enacted statutes of repose that begin at the time a product is first
sold and distributed. See, e.g., "Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann." § 12-551 (1978) (12
years after product "first sold for use or consumption *** "); "Fla. Stat. Ann."
§ 95.031(2) (1978) ("12 years after the date of delivery of the completed
product"); "Ill. Ann. Stat." § 21.2(b) (1978) (12 years from date of first
sale-strict liability); "Ind. Stat. Ann. § 33-1-1.5-5 (1978) ("10 years after the
delivery *** to the initial user"); "Neb. Rev. Stat." 25-702(2) (1978) (10 years
after first sale); "Utah Code Ann." § 78-15-3(1) (1977) (6 years after date of
initial purchase; 10 years after date of manufacture).
The advantages of these statutes are that they: (1) establish an actuari-
ally certain date after which no liability can be assessed; and (2) eliminate
tenuous claims involving older products for which evidence of defective con-
dition may be difficult to produce. See "Telegraphers v. Ry. Express
Agency," 321 U.S. 342 (1944).
On the other hand, a fundamental problem with these statutes is that
they may deprive a person injured by a product of the right to sue even before
the injury has occurred. See Johnson, "Products Liability 'Reform': A Hazard
to Consumers," 56 "N.C.L. Rev." 677, 689-90 (1978); "Victorson v. Bock
Laundry Machine Co.," 37 N.Y. 2d 295, 335 N.E.2d 275 (1975).
The limited available data show that the concern about older products
may be exaggerated. See ISO, "Closed Claim Survey," at 105-108 (indicating
that over 97 percent of product-related accidents occur within six years of the
time the product was purchased and in the captive goods area 83.5 percent
of all bodily injury accidents have occured within ten years of manufacture).
Nevertheless, as the Task Force Report indicated, the underwriters' concern
about potential losses associated with older products may be an important
factor in the recent increase in liability insurance premiums for manufactur-
ers of durable goods. See Task Force Report, at VII-21.
Section 109 attempts to provide product sellers with some security
against stale claims, while preserving the claimant's right to obtain damages
for injuries caused by unsafely manufactured products. It accomplishes this
result through provisions on useful safe life, statutes of repose (with separate
provisions for workplace and non-workplace injuries), and a statute of limita-
tions.
(A) Useful Safe Life. The common law in most states is that "[tihe age
of an allegedly defective product must be considered in light of its expected
useful life and the stress to which it has been subjected." "Kuisis v. Baldwin-
Lima-Hamilton Corp.," 457 Pa. 321, 319 A.2d 914, 923 (1974) (brake-locking
mechanism on a crane fell after more than 20 years of use). The "Kuisis"
court noted further that in "certain situations the prolonged use factor may
loom so large as to obscure all others in the case." Id.
The bsic problem with most proposals to codify this rule into a useful
life limitation has been the vagueness of the concept. Thus, while the Task
Force Report noted that "if a useful life limitation were identified in statutory
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form, it might be expected that it would be given more serious attention by
both judge and jury," Task Force Report, at VII-27, it also observed that "the
concept would still lack specificity." Id.
Subdivision 109(A) was derived from "Minn. Stat. Ann." § 604.03
(1978). It serves to remind the court and the trier of fact that a product seller
may be held liable only for harms caused during the useful safe life of the
product. It does not attempt to apply fixed useful life standards for all prod-
ucts. See Phillips, "An Analysis of Proposed Reform of Products Liability
Statutes of Limitations," 56 "N.C.L. Rev." 663, 673 (1978). Rather, it identi-
fies factors that may help the trier of fact determine how long a product
reasonably can be expected to perform in a safe manner. Section 109 uses the
term "useful safe life" (as compared to "useful life") because the period in
which the product can have some utility may be well beyond the period in
which the product is safe. For example, some drivers may continue to use
tires that lack sufficient treads for safety.
Factors (a)-(e) are self-explanatory. Factor (d) refers to the useful safe
life stated by the product seller. Relying on this provision, a product seller
could indicate that a product should not be used beyond a certain period of
time. However, subdivision (A) does not give the product seller absolute
power to limit a product's useful safe life. While this was suggested in "Velez
v. Craine & Clark Lumber Corp.," 33 N.Y.2d 117, 305 N.E.2d 750 (1973),
subdivision (A) gives the trier of fact the power to determine whether the
product seller's limitation was a reasonable one. Cf. "Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc.," 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). Further, this subdivison
makes clear that a product seller's limitation on useful life cannot bind the
rights of a bystander. Nevertheless, where the product seller imposes a rea-
sonable limitation, the trier of fact should give very serious consideration to
this fact in determining whether the product was used beyond its useful life.
Factor (e), dealing with modifications of the product by users or third
parties, relates to conduct that might shorten the useful life of the product.
While the Act treats product modifications in a separate section, they are also
factors in determining whether a product has been used beyond its useful life.
(B) Statutes of Repose. Statutes of repose differ from statutes of limita-
tions in that they set a fixed limit after the time of the product seller's
allegedly wrongful conduct-a limit beyond which the product seller will not
be held liable. The rationale of such statutes is two-fold: First, if not aware
of a claim, the passing of time may make it extremely difficult for a product
seller to construct a good defense because of the obstacle of securing evidence.
Although the burden of proof on the issue of defectiveness remains on the
claimant under the Act, a jury, as a practical matter, may demand an explan-
ation from a product seller when the claimant has suffered a severe injury.
The second rationale is that persons ought to be allowed, as a matter of
policy, to plan their affairs with a reasonable degree of certainty. This goes
to the heart of the product liability insurance rate setting problem. Even
though past data show that 83.5 percent of bodily injury claims arise within
a ten-year period, there is no safeguard in the existing law that the past will
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portend the future. There is always the possibility that the number of claims
for older products will increase. See ISO, "Closed Claim Survey," at 107.
(1) Workplace injuries. In the context of workplace injuries, the product
seller's tort liability ends ten years from the date of the delivery of the com-
pleted product to its first purchaser or lessee who is not himself primarily
engaged in the business of selling such a product. According to ISO data, 97.4
percent of product liability incidents occur within 72 months of the time a
product is purchased. See ISO, "Closed Claim Survey, "at 108. Although the
number of claims that would be cut off by this statute is small, the potential
for such claims to arise has been a cause of the increase in product liability
premiums.
Although the data are limited, it appears in many instances that the
reason for an unsafe workplace product has less to do with conduct of the
product seller than it has to do with the party having direct responsibility
for the care and maintenance of the workplace product-the employer. See
ISO, "Closed Claim Survey," at 141. This is even more likely to be the case
with products that are more than ten years old.
Therefore, subsection (1)(b) grants a product liability claimant sub-
jected to an unsafe workplace product a claim against the workplace em-
ployer for lost wages and reasonable medical costs. As a practical matter, this
provision amends state worker compensation law. The same is true of subsec-
tion (1)(c), which grants beneficiaries under state wrongful death acts a right
to recover the pecuniary loss they suffered because an employer exposed the
decedent to an unsafe product.
For purposes of this subsection an "unsafe" product is not only one that
is defective within the meaning of Section 104, but also one that has been
improperly maintained, altered or modified by the employer. The term also
includes products that are no longer safe because they have simply worn out.
The Act places a strong incentive for accident prevention on the party
who is in the best position to accomplish that goal. When a product is more
than ten years old and is in an unsafe condition, the employer-not the
product seller-is in the best position to take action to prevent workplace
product injuries. This value of this incentive outweighs any new potential
cost that may arise in the worker compensation system.
In the very few cases where an employer may be subject to additional
liability, the product seller is not totally "off the hook." If the product seller
has produced an unsafe product that has failed after a ten-year period be-
cause of a defective condition inherent in the equipment at the time of manu-
facture, the employer who is liable under this subsection has the right in an
arbitration proceeding to bring a contribution claim against the product
seller. The employer will then be able to recover, on a comparative responsi-
bility. basis, the amount that is appropriate under the circumstances of the
accident.
As compared to ordiaary arbitration proceedings under this Act (which
are subject to a trial de novo), thd results of this arbitration proceeding are
treated as a final judgment.
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While product sellers may question the constitutionality of this arbitra-
tion provision, no serious constitutional issue can arise. The product seller
benefits from this provision compared to present law which subjects product
sellers to unlimited liability claims for full tort damages, including costs
arising from pain and suffering and the possibility of punitive damages.
(2) Non-workplace injuries. For the most part, this subsection deals with
consumer products. ISO data reflect that very few claims are for consumer
goods arise after a ten-year period. Most such claims are for durable goods
and would be handled under subsection (1) provisions relating to workplace
injuries. See ISO, "Closed Claim Survey," at 105-197 (1977). Nevertheless,
consumers justifiably are concerned about overly broad absolute cut-offs to
their right to sue. This provision recognizes consumer concerns in three basic
ways:
(1) The term of the statute is ten years-beyond the term enacted or
proposed in a number of states;
(2) The statute begins to run at the time of purchase, not the time of
manufacture; and
(3) The statute does not contain an absolute cut-off, but rather a pre-
sumption that the product has been used beyond its useful life. Colorado law
adopts this approach. "Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann." § 13-21-403(3) (1978); most
other state product liability statutes do not.
Consumer concerns are also addressed by three of the additional restric-
tions contained in the next section. These restrictions are applicable to both
consumer and workplace products.
(3) Limitations on statutes of repose. The statute contains four key limi-
tations on its scope of operation.
First, liability may result where a product seller has expressly warranted
or promised that a product can be safely for a period longer than ten (10)
years. See also Uniform Commercial Code § 2-725(2).
Second, the statute of repose provisions do not apply where product
sellers intentionally have misrepresented their products.
Third, subdivision (B) does not affect contribution and indemnity
claims. Thus, an interim seller will not have to absorb a liability loss that
was the true responsibility of the original manufacturer. See Defense Re-
search Institue (Monograph) "Products Liability Position Paper," at 22; See
also Phillips, "An Analysis of Proposed Reform of Products Liability Statutes
of Limitations," 56 "N.C.L. Rev." 663, 670-71 (1978).
Fourth, there is an exception for pharmaceuticals that cause harms that
take many years to manifest themselves, see, e.g., "Krug v. Sterling Drug,
Inc.," 416 S.W.2d 143 (Mo. 1967), and products that cause perceptible harm
only through prolonged exposure. See "Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Div.,
National Steel Corp.," 495 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1974). See also Johnson,
"Products Liability 'Reform': A Hazard to Conumers," supra, at 690-91
("slumbering defects").
(c) Statutes of Limitation. Tort statutes of limitations traditionally
begin at the time a person is injured. This subdivision follows that approach.
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Nevertheless, in accord with consumer concerns, subdivision (C) extends the
limitation period beyond the time of injury in situations where the claimant
would be unlikely to discover that he or she has been harmed, e.g., long-term
pharmaceutical harms. See Birnbaum, "First Breaths' Last Gasp: The Dis-
covery Rule in Products Liability Cases," 13 "The Forum" 279 (1977). 000
ANALYSIS
SEC. 110 RELEVANCE OF THIRD-PARTY ALTERATION OR MODIFI-
CATION OF A PRODUCT
This section deals with the situation where a third party-one other than
the product seller or the claimant-has altered or modified the product and
this has led to claimant's harm.
A few courts have imposed liability on the product seller in this situation
provided that the third party's conduct was in some manner "foreseeable."
See, e.g., "Blim v. Newbury Industries, Inc." 443 F.2d 1126 (10th Cir. 1971)
(machine safety guard removed by co-worker). Decisions that hold the origi-
nal product seller responsible in these instances border on absolute liability.
Thus, insurers appear to have a just concern about broad-scale imposition of
liability where third party intervention has been the principle cause of the
accident. As the American Insurance Association has noted:
It is difficult enough to calculate the risk associated with a given
product even where there is access to knowledge about its basic inherent
characteristics*** The task becomes impossible if the premium calcula-
tions must take into account not only the inherent properties of the ma-
chine, but also its transformation in the hands of others, and their neglect
of repair and maintenance.
AIA (monograph) "Products Liability Legislative Package," at 16 (1977).
Moreover, if the law ignores modification of products, it will fail to place the
incentive for risk prevention on the party or parties who have engaged in the
wrongful conduct.
The authors of the "Restatement (Second) of Torts" § 402A recognized
this fact and only subjected the product seller to liability when the seller's
product reached "the user or consumer without substantial change in the
condition in which it [was] sold." Comment g to this section stated the
matter more firmly:
The seller is not liable when he delivers the product in a safe condi-
tion, and subsequent mishandling or other causes make it harmful by the
time it is consumed. The burden of proof that the product was in a defec-
tive condition at the time that it left the hands of the particular seller is
upon the injured plaintiff, and unless evidence can be produced which will
support the conclusion that it was then defective, the burden is not sus-
tained.
Recently, a number of state legislatures have enacted the essence of this
comment into law. See "Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann." § 12-683(2) (1978); "Ind. Stat.
Ann." 33-1-1.5 § 4(b)(3) (1978); "Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann." ch. 411, § 4 (1978);
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"N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann." § 507-D:3 (1978); "R.I. Gen. Laws Ann." ch. 299, §
9-1-31 (1978); "Tenn. Code Ann." ch. 703, § 9 (1978); "Utah Code Ann." §
78-15-5 (1977).
According to ISO's statistics, product modification occurs only in ap-
proximately 13 percent of the cases. Of these cases, the largest number of
product modifications result from the conduct of employers (39 percent). See
ISO "Closed Claim Survey," at 140-41. This raises the main problem of rules
that limit a product seller's responsibility for subsequent product alterations
or modifications-often the injured worker cannot sue the one who is really
at fault because of the "exclusive remedy" provisions or worker compensation
statutes. However, it seems fair to suggest that the destruction of a tort
remedy against the employer
Should not of itself create a third-party remedy against the manufac-
turer or distributor of the product in question. If Worker Compensation
is regarded as the proper remedy in other cases of an exclusive employer's
wrong, then so too should it be where that wrong involves [a] product
acquired from third party defendants.
AIA (monograph) "Product Liability Legislative Package," at 15-16 (1977).
Nevertheless, Sction 110 takes account of the hardship that can result from
an overly broad liability limitation on product modification or alteration; the
provision is very narrowly drawn.
First, a product seller may avoid liability for a defective product only
where the harm would not have occurred "but for" the alteration or modifica-
tion. In contrast, the "Restatement" and the recently enacted state statutes
cited above would shield the manufacturer whenever the third party's con-
duct was a "substantial cause." A rule of this type, however, invites litigation
over what is "substantial," and also may diminish a product seller's responsi-
bility for otherwise culpable conduct.
Cases in accord with the approach taken in Section 110 include "Temple
v. Wean United, Inc.," 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977); "Santiago
v. Package Machinery Co.," 123 Ill. App. 2d 305, 260 N.E.2d 89 (Ill. App.
1970); "St. Pierre v. Gabel," 351 So. 2d 821 (La. App. 1977).
Second, as subsections (a)(1) and (2) indicate, the product seller can not
avoid responsibility for product alterations or modifications which the seller
suggested (per instructions) or which the seller expressly consented.
Third, the product seller has a djuty to anticipate certain modifications
or alterations of his product. As Section 102(6) (Definitions) indicated, this
refers to conduct that would be engaged in by a reasonably prudent person.
Subsection (a)(3) is not intended to encompass every type of act foreseeable
by virtue of hindsight or otherwise.
Finally, subsection (b), adapted from Rhode Island Gen. Law Annot. ch.
299, Sec. 1 (1978), makes clear that ordinary wear and tear in a product is
not the equivalent of a modification or alteration. However, a third party's
failure to observe routine care and maintenance is considered a modification.
In such instances, the third party is responsible for the injury. See "Ore. Rev.
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Stat." § 30.915 (1977); "N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann." § 507-D:3 (1978); "Utah Code
Ann." § 78-15-5 (1977).
ANALYSIS
SEC. 111. RELEVANCE OF CONDUCT ON THE PART OF PRODUCT
LIABILITY CLAIMANTS
Section 111 attempts to resolve existing uncertainty in the law about the
relevance of a product liability claimant's conduct. It does this in two ways:
First, it applies principles of comparative responsibility to situations where
claimant's conduct suggests that he or she has some responsibility for the
product-related incident. Second, it characterizes three basic kinds of such
conduct and provides rules for each of them, namely, failure to inspect for a
defective condition, use of a product with a known defective condition, and
misuse of a product.
Although there is no assurance that the use of comparative responsibility
principles will lower the cost of product liability claims, the inherent fairness
of such principles has led to their adoption by over 30 states, and also has
resulted in the adoption of a Uniform Comparative Fault Act (UCFA) by the
National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws. This Act
borrows freely from the UCFA and its accompanying commentary.
Some courts and commentators have voiced concern about the semanti-
cal and theoretical difficulties of mixing the "apples" of negligence with the
"oranges" of strict liability. See, e.g., "Kirkland v. General Motors Corp.,"
521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974); Robinson, "Square Pegs (Products Liability) in
Round Holes (Comparative Negligence)," 52 "Calif. St.' B.J." 16 (1977).
These concerns appear to be more theoretical than real, particularly under
this Act (as well as in common law product liability) where defendants are
held liable based on conduct which may reflect varying degrees of fault. The
utility of comparative responsibility for product liability cases has been ap-
preciated by both state legislatures, e.g., "Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-1763-1765)
(Supp. 1977); "Me. Rev. Stat. Ann." tit. 15 § 156 (Supp. 1978)), and courts
e.g., "Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.," 6 Prod. Saf. & Liab. Rep. 1000 (S.
Ct. N.H. 1978); "Daly v. General Motors Corp.," 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d
1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978); "Busch v. Busch Const., Inc.," 262 N.W.2d
377 (Minn. 1977); "Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sport. Goods, Inc.," 555
P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976). It has also been recommended by a congressional
subcommittee. See Report of the House Subcommittee on Capital, Invest-
ment and Business Opportunities at 76 (1978).
Section 111 places a strong incentive for risk prevention on the party who
is best able to accomplish that goal. It also avoids burdening the careful
product user with liability insurance costs assessed to persons who misuse or
are otherwise at fault in their handling of products. While some economical
analyses indicate that a comparative responsibility system creates a risk of
economic inefficiency because of an over-investment in safety, the Act makes
a value judgment that such an "over-investment" is a risk worth taking.
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(a) General Rule. This subsection describes the general principle of com-
parative responsibility that will be applied under this Act. It assumes that
the product seller has engaged in conduct that would lead to liability under
this Act. Where the claimant has engaged in subsection (c)-type conduct and
thus is at least partially responsible for the injury, such conduct will diminish
the amount of the claimant's award proportionately to that measure of re-
sponsibility.
Section 111 adopts the consumer-oriented fairness of pure comparative
negligence as compared with the "non-discriminating rough justice of the
modified type . . ." See "Prefatory Note," UCFA.
(b) Apportionment of Damages. In order to apply comparative responsi-
bility principles under this Act, it is necessary for the trier of fact to supply
certain information in written interrogatories. Subsection (b)(1) indicated
that the trier of fact should set forth the amount of damages a claimant would
receive if his comparative responsibility were disregarded. This helps assure
that the trier of fact does not inflate or deflate the amount of damages claim-
ant would deserve if he were free from responsibility.
Subsection (b)(2) requires the trier of fact to indicate the percentage of
responsibility allocated to each party, including the claimant. Persons not
before the court are not included, in part because of the extreme difficulty
of determining the fault of such parties. Also, a jury's determination of an
absent person's "fault" would not be binding on that person. In any event,
both claimants and product sellers will have a significant incentive for joining
available defendants since the greater the number of parties at fault, the
smaller the percentage of fault allocated to each, whether claimant or product
seller.Subsection (b)(3) provides a general guideline to assist the trier of fact
in comparing "fault" among the parties. The UCFA comments indicate that
in appropriate cases, the trier of fact may also consider:
(1) Whether the conduct was mere inadvertence or engaged in with an
awareness of the danger involved:
(2) The magnitude of the risk created by the conduct, including the
number of persons endangered and the potential seriousness of the injury;
(3) The significance of what the actor was seeking to attain by his con-
duct;
(4) The actor's superior or inferior capacity; and
(5) The particular circumstances, such as the existence of an emergency
requiring a hasty decision.
Section 111 departs from the UCFA in one respect-it does not consider
"the extent of the casual relationship between the conduct and the damages
claimed" as a factor in apportioning responsibility. While the distinction may
be a difficult one to draw, this Act is premised on apportioning responsibility
only-pure causation in terms of the physical cause of the particular injury
is irrelevant to that concept. See Malone, "Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact,"
9 "Stan. L. Rev." 60 (1956).
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Subsection (b)(4) helps to assure that the mathematics of comparative
responsibility will be correctly determined. The court must determine the
award for each claimant according to its findings made under this subsection.
The subsection also indicates that the common law rule of joint and several
liability of joint tortfeasors continues to apply under this Act. Claimant can
recover the total amount of his or her judgment against any product seller
who is liable under this Act.
However, as with the UCFA, the judgment for each claimant will also
show the share of each party's total obligation to the claimant. This should
save litigation costs and avoid the need for a special motion or a separate
action on the issue. In situations where an employer would be immune from
suit by the product claimant, the limitation of Section 113 applies.
Subsection (b)(5) follows the UCFA in providing for the reallocation of
damages among the parties at fault when one of the parties' share is uncol-
lectable. The reallocation procedure applies to a claimant who is contributo-
rily at fault. This approach avoids the unfairness of the common law rule of
joint and several liability, which would cast the total risk of uncollectibility
upon the solvent defendants, and of a rule abolishing joint and several liabil-
ity, which would cast the total risk of uncollectibility on the claimant.
(c) Conduct Affecting Claimant's Responsibility.
(1) Failure to Discover a Defective Condition. At common law the prod-
uct user had an obligation to inspect for defects; failure to do so could bar a
claim. See "Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc." 3 Wash. App. 508, 476 P.2d
713 (1970). However, under modern tort law, the product user is assured of a
product that is reasonably safe for its ordinary use. See "Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts" § 402A (1965); "Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng. Co.," 76 N.J. 152,
386 A. 2d 816 (1978). Section 111(c) follows these cases and does not require
the product user or consumer to inspect a product for a defect. See "Kassouf
v. Lee Bros. Inc.," 209 Cal. App. 2d 568, 26 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1962) (plaintiff
without inspection, ate a chocolate bar containing worms and maggots).
Cases can arise where a defect would be very apparent to an ordinary
prudent person. In such cases, it is appropriate to allow the trier of fact to
diminish claimant's damages according to the latter's responsibility for the
injury that occurred. Thus, in the example of the candy bar, if a claimant
with good eyesight ate a candy bar that had bright green worms crawling over
it, he or she should bear some responsibility for any ill effects suffered. If the
product seller was aware of the defect in the goods at the time of sale, the
punitive damages section of the Act (Section 120) would provide a strong
disincentive to not sell such a product.
(2) Using a Product With a Known Defect Condition. Where it is clear
that a claimant both voluntarily and unreasonably used a product with a
known defective condition, the product seller is not liable under this Act. To
allow a claim in such a situation would permit individuals, in effect, to create
their own product liability claim. In that regard, it should be noted that
consent is a defense to even intentional wrongs. See W. Prosser, "Torts,"
supra, at 101.
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However, there may be cases where an individual voluntarily uses a
product with a known defective condition, but the reasonableness of this
conduct becomes a matter of dispute. For example, if a person discovers a
welt in a tire, should that person be required to stop immediately and call
for assistance, or is it reasonable to proceed to a nearby gasoline station to
have the tire repaired? Many cases arise in this shadowy zone. See
"Henderson v. Ford Motor Co.," 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974) with "Ford Motor
Co. v. Lee," 237 Ga. 554, 229 S.E.2d 379 (1976). Subsection (c)(2) allows the
trier of fact to consider claimant's conduct and reduce damages where it is
appropriate to do so.
Subsections (c)(1) and (2) avoid a problem that existed under the
"Restatement," though through no fault of the "Restatement" drafters. Per-
sons who engaged in very similar conduct were treated in a very different
manner. For example, those who used a product after failing to discover a
defective condition were granted a full claim and those who used a product
after they had discovered that defective condition were barred. See
"Restatement (Second) of Torts" § 402A, Comment n. This dichotomy
caused litigation and appeals over the issue of whether or not plaintiff "knew"
of a particular defect at the time he utilized a product. See "Karabatsos v.
Spivey Co., 49 Ill. App. 3d 317, 364 N.E.2d 319 (Ill. App. 1977); "Teagle v.
Fischer & Porter Co.," 89 Wash. 2d 149, 570 P.2d 438 (1977); "Poches v. J.
J. Newberry Co.," 549 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1977).
(3) Misuse of a Product. Subsection (c)(3) imposes no liability on the
product seller where an injury occurs solely because claimant misused the
product in some way that the product seller could not reasonably anticipate.
Reasonably anticipated conduct is conduct which would be expected of an
ordinary and prudent person. See Section 102(6) and commentary. Misuse
by claimant in this context is equivalent to modification or alteration of the
product by a third party. See "Rogers v. Unimac Co., Inc.," 115 Ariz. 304,
565 P.2d 181 (1977); "General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins," 548 S.W.2d 344
(Tex. 1977); "Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.," 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir.
1975); see also Section 110.
In determining whether the product seller should have warned or in-
structed the claimant about potential misuses, the trier of fact should con-
sider the factors listed in Section 104(C).
Where misue of a product was a partial cause of an injury, claimant's
damages are subject to reduction. See "General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins,"
supra.
ANALYSIS
SEC. 112. MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS:
CONTRIBUTION AND IMPLIED INDEMNITY
Section 112 is based on sections 4 and 5 of the UCFA. Here, however,
contribution and implied indemnity are merged in one section. Express in-
demnity-where one party has agreed to hold the other harmless for damages
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arising out of product liability actions-is left to commercial and common
law. See Task Force Report, at VII-99. There is clear precedent for the merger
of contribution and implied indemnity. See "Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-
Kart," 21 Cal. 3d 322, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978); "Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.,"
30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288 (1972); "Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division,
Etc.," 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977); "Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc.,"
262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977). See also "N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law" § 1402
(McKinney Supp. 1976). This approach avoids the all-or-nothing aspect of
implied indemnity law. In most situations, fault will be apportioned among
product seller defendants. However, a situation could arise where the trier of
fact could find that one product seller in the distribution chain was responsi-
ble for a product injury. This section should be read in conjunction with
Section 113.
Subsection (a) establishes the basic rule that contribution will be deter-
mined by the proportionate responsibility of the defendants. Section 111
outlines the procedure for the trier of fact to make the appropriate determi-
nations.
Subsection (b) outlines a simplified procedure where a party. who has
paid more than a proportionate share can recover from one who has paid less.
Subsection (c) indicates that if the court has not determined the propor-
tionate responsibility of the parties, contribution may be obtained in a sepa-
rate action.
Subsection (d) indicates when a contribution action may be brought by
a joint tortfeasor who has settled with claimant.
Subsection (e) sets time limits for bringing a contribution action.
It should be noted that contribution is appropriate among joint tortfea-
sors; each defendant contributing to the same harm is liable to the claimant
for the whole amount of damages. If the defendants are liable for separate
harms, contribution is not appropriate. See UCFA, comment on section 4.
Finally, an important issue in the area of contribution is left to the states,
that is, the effect of a release of one tortfeasor but not the others. UCFA
section 6 suggests an appropriate approach to this issue; the commentary on
that section discusses the pros and cons of alternative approaches.
ANALYSIS
SEC. 113. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRODUCT LIABILITY AND
WORKER COMPENSATION
The relationship between product liability and worker compensation is
a major topic covered in depth in the Task Force Report. See VII-85-113.
Under current law in a number of states, the interaction of product liability
and worker compensation law may result in the manufacturer of a workplace
product paying the entire out-of-pocket cost of a product-related workplace
injury plus damages for pain and suffering. This result occurs because the
product manufacturer is unable to place a portion of the cost of that injury
on an employer whose negligence may have helped bring about the claimant's
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injury. See "Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Westerlind," 373 N.E.2d 957 (Mass.
1978); "Seaboard Coast Line R. Co. v. Smith," 359 So.2d 427 (Fla. 1978);
Task Force Report, at VII-89-99.
After weighing many considerations, the Task Force and the United
States Department of Commerce concluded that the development of worker
compensation as a sole source for recovery in product-related accidents would
be the best solution to the problem, but only if the worker received additional
benefits in the course of overall worker compensation reform. A model prod-
uct liability law is an inappropriate vehicle for making major alterations in
worker compensation law.
The search for the next solution is not an easy one. If full contribution
or indemnity by the product manufacturer against the employer is permitted,
the employer may be forced to pay an employee-through the conduit of the
third-party tortfeasor-an amount in excess of the employer's statutory
worker compensation liability. This, arguably, thwarts a central concept be-
hind worker compensation, i.e., that the employer and employee receive the
benefits of a guaranteed, fixed schedule, non-fault recovery system, which
constitutes the exclusive liability of the employer. On the other hand, if
contribution or indemnity is not allowed, the product manufacturer will bear
the burden of a full common law judgment, despite the possibly greater
responsibility of the employer. As the Supreme Court of Minnesota recently
noted, this "obvious inequity is further exacerbated by the right of the em-
ployer to recover directly or indirectly from the third party the amount he
has paid in compensation regardless of the employer's own negligence." See
"Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp.," 257 N.W.2d 679, 684 (Minn. 1977).
Equally troublesome is the fact that the present system appears to dull
employer incentives to keep workplace products safe. the ISO "Closed Claim
Survey" suggests that employer negligence is involved in 56 percent of prod-
uct liability workplace cases. See ISO "Closed Claim Survey," Report 10, at
81 (1978).
The solution adopted by Section 113 has the support of the Supreme
Court of Minnesota in "Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp.," supra. The product
manufacturer is allowed limited contribution up to the amount of the worker
compensation lien. This reduces the inequity against the product manufac-
turer, but preserves the employer's interest in not paying more than worker
compensation liability. Compare "Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division, Etc.,"
70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977)(full contribution allowed).
Admittedly, a shortcoming of Section 113's approach is that it does not
reduce transaction costs substantially. Compare the approach suggested by
the American Insurance Association, "Product Liability Legislative Pack-
age," supra, at 64. Also, the employer will not necessarily bear a full share of
the economic costs of the injury sustained by the claimant. Nevertheless,
considering all of the equities involved, Section 113 appears to offer the
soundest solution apart from totally modifying worker compensation law to
create a sole source remedy.
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ANALYSIS
SEC. 114. THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY OF PRODUCT SELL-
ERS OTHER THAN MANUFACTURERS
Section 114, derived in part from Tennessee law, see "Ten. Code Ann."
§ 23-3706 (Supp. 1978), addresses the problem of excessive product liability
costs for parties in the distribution chain other than manufacturers in a way
that does not compromise incentives for risk prevention. It also leaves the
claimaint with a viable defendant whenever he or she has been injured by a
defective product.
The ISO "Closed Claim Survey" shows that manufacturers account for
87 percent of the total product liability payment amount, while wholesalers
and retailers account for 4.6 percent. See ISO "Closed Claim Survey," Report
3, at 35 (1977). Case law suggests that distributors and retailers of products
often shift this cost on to the manufacturer through an indemnity suit. See
e.g., "Hales v. Monroe," 544 F.2d 331, 332 (8th Cir. 1976); "Anderson v.
Somberg," 158 N.J. Super. 384, 386 A.2d 413, 419-20 (1978); "Litton Systems,
Inc. v. Shaw's Sales & Serv. Ltd.," 119 Ariz. 10, 579 P.2d 48, 50 (1978).
Despite their relatively small role vis-a-vis manufacturers as product
liability defendants, retailers and distributors frequently are brought into a
product liability suit. See, e.g., "Tucson Industries, Inc., v. Schwartz," 108
Ariz. 464, 501 P.2d 936 (1976); "Vergott v. Deseret Pharmaceutical Co., Inc.,"
463 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1972); "Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co.," 320 F.2d 130
(3d Cir. 1963). In view of ISO data showing that for every dollar of claims
paid, at least 35 cents is spent in defense costs, see ISO, "Closed Claims
Survey." Report 14, at 118, the end result is that retailers and distributors
are subject to substantial product liability costs, both in terms of premiums
and defense costs. These costs are added to the price of products and waste
legal resources. See "Pender v. Skillcraft Industries, Inc.," 358 So.2d 45 (Fla.
App. 1978).
Under Section 114, product sellers other than manufacturers must exer-
cise reasonable care in their handling of products. This obligation includes
warning about discoverable hazards. The focus of judicial inquiry will be on
the opportunity the product seller (other than a manufacturer) had to dis-
cover the hazard and on whether circumstances put the seller on notice as to
the character of the product. See "Edwards v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co.," 183 F.2d 165, 167 (5th Cir. 1950).
Subsection (a) provides that non-manufacturer product sellers are not
subject to liability when they had no reasonable opportunity for product
inspection which would or should, in the exercise of the defective condition.
For example, if a defective product is in a sealed container and there is no
way for a retailer to be aware of the condition, the retailer is not liable. In
general, Section 114 does not impose liability on non-manufacturer product
sellers where there are defects in construction or defects in design that a
reasonable person would have had no opportunity to discover. The manufac-
turer can avoid many of these defects; the distributor or retailer cannot.
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However, a non-manufacturer product seller can waive the benefits of subsec-
tion (a) through an express warranty. Cf. "Ky. Rev. Stat." § 411.340 (1978).
For the purposes of this section, the term manufacturer is defined in Section
102(5).
Subsection (b) addresses the justifiable concern of Justice Traynor in
"Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.," 61 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899,
(1964) that:
In some cases the retailer may be the only member of that enterprise
reasonably available to the injured plaintiff. In other cases the retailer
himself may play a substantial part in ensuring that the product is safe
or may be in a position to exert pressure on the manufacture to that end.
It should be noted that a number of courts have extended strict liability
to retailers. See, e.g., "McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc.," 416 S.W.2d 787
(Tex. 1967); "Houseman v. C. A. Dawson & Co.," 106 Ill. App. 2d 225, 245
N.E.2d 886 (1969). See also U.C.C. § 2-315.
If the manufacturer is not subject to service of process or has been judi-
cially declared insolvent, or where a court determines that the claimant
would have appreciable difficulty in enforcing a judgment against the prod-
uct manufacturer, the retailer or distributor has the same strict liability
obligations as a manufacturer. Thus, subsection (b) only operates where a
member of the enterprise is reasonably available to the injured plaintiff.
Some economists may criticize the thrust of Section 114 to the extent
that it makes compensation of the victim paramount to the structuring of
incentives that would optimize product safety. Another approach is that of a
recently enacted Nebraska statute which flatly exempts non-manufacturer
product sellers from liability unless they have been negligent. See Neb. Legis.
Bill No. 665(3)(1978). See also "Sam Shainberg Company of Jackson v. Bar-
low," 258 So.2d 242, 244 (Miss. 1972) (same result under case law). However,
the Nebraska approach can leave a person injured by a defective product (as
defined by Section 104) without compensation. While this would be the unu-
sual case, the law makes clear that in these situations the party who actually
sold the product should bear the loss.
From another perspective on incentives for risk prevention, the obliga-
tion under Section 114 to make a reasonable examination of the product
should ensure that the retailer or distributor will exert pressure on the manu-
facturer to make the product safe. Also, retailers or distributors can become
manufacturers for the purposes of this Act if they design, assemble, fabricate,
or otherwise prepare a product or component part of a product prior to sale,
as well as if they hold themselves out as the manufacturer. See Section 102(5)
(Definitions) and accompanying commentary.
ANALYSIS
SEC. 115. SANCTIONS AGAINST THE BRINGING OF FRIVOLOUS
CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
The ISO data indicate that a substantial amount of product liaiblity
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costs are incurred in the defense of product liability claims and lawsuits. See
ISO, "Closed Claim Survey," Report No. 14 (1977) (defense costs equal about
35 percent of claim payments. Some have placed the blame for unnecessary
defense costs and needless litigation on the contingent fee system. Neverthe-
less, as the plaintiffs bar properly observes, the contingent fee brings no
return to a claimant's attorney where he or she is unsuccessful. On the other
hand, some have argued that the contingent fee system has a negative impact
in certain product liability cases to the extent that it causes insurers to settle
even non-meritorious cases because the cost of defending such cases may be
greater than the amount of settlement.
Analysis of the countervailing argumetts suggests that the best solution
to reducing unnecessary litigation costs is to address the heart of the prob-
lem-in short, discourage frivolous claims and defenses.
Section 115 is based, in part, on § 41 of the "Illinois Civil Practice Act"
(as amended, 1976). It is also predicated on a proposal of the California
Citizens' Commission on Tort Reform advocating sanctions against
"frivolous" claims or defenses. See Report of the California Citizens' Com-
mission on Tort Reform, "Righting the Liability Balance," at 146-47, 153-54
(1977).
The underlying purpose of Section 115 has broad support in existing
statutes and court rules. Support comes from Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which subjects an attorney to disciplinary action if he or she
knowingly files a pleading or defense where no grounds support it. See
"Barnett v. Laborers's Inter. U. of North America," 75 F.R.D. 544 (W.D. Pa.
1977). Similarly, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 permits a court to
award "just damages and single or double costs" to a party who has been
subject to a "frivolous" appeal. Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
37(c) provides sanctions for an unreasonable failure to admit averments of
fact or the genuineness of documents. In the Federal courts, the above rules
are supplemented by 28 "U.S.C." § 1927 (1976) (imposing costs on an attor-
ney who "multiplies the proceedings***). See "A.L.R." 3d 209 (1976).
Under subsection (a), the statute may be invoked by either a product
liability claimant or seller. Recovery is limited to reasonable attorney's fees
and other costs that would not have been been expended but for the fact that
the opposing party pursued a claim or defense that was frivolous.
Under subsection (b), to make a finding that the claim was frivolous, the
court must make a finding that the claim was without any reasonable legal
or factual basis. This standard allows full room for bringing claims under
novel legal theories.
Subsection (c) provides additional assurances that only frivolous claims
will be sanctioned. First, the court may only impose damages under Section
115 on the basis of clear and convincing evidence, not merely the preponder-
ance, of evidence. See "State of West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.," 440
F.2d 1079, 1092 (2d Cir. 1971). Second, the court must set forth its findings
of fact.
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Subsection (d) gives the court latitude to impose costs on either attorney
or client. As the Task Force Report noted, it is unlikely that many plaintiffs
will be financially able to respond to such a claim. Task Force Report, at VII-
61. It must be remembered that the attorney is in the best position to make
a judgment about the reasonableness of bringing a claim or raising a defense.
See ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-102(A)(1)(2).
Subsection (e) protects a claimant's attorney who has expended time
opposing a frivolous defense. This section can be invoked even where the
claimant has lost a case.
Subsection (f) makes clear that tecovery under this section is limited to
expenses invoked by plaintiff or defendant and not those of parties outside
the lawsuit.
ANALYSIS
SEC. 116. ARBITRATION
The Task Force Report suggested that compulsory non-binding arbitra-
tion may result in more accurate decisions, reduce overall litigation costs, and
expedite the decision process. See Task Froce Report, at VII-229-39.
Other reasons offered in support of arbitration procedures in product
liability cases include: (1) Cases would be decided more accurately because
a small group, with a member who is an expert in the field, should be able
to comprehend the esoteric details of product liability cases; (2) Overtime, a
resource bank of relatively neutral experts less easily misled (in technical
areas) than a jury of laypersons could be developed: (3) Arbitrators should
be less affected by the emotional aspects of the case or by the artistry of
counsel; and (4) The privacy of arbitration proceedings (as compared to
judicial proceedings) should prompt more complete revelation of special
manufacturing designs or processes. This, in turn, would permit more accur-
ate judgments. See Task Force Report, at VII-235.
The ISO "Closed Claim Survey" suggests further that arbitration should
also reduce accident reparation transaction costs. Even allowing for the fact
that more substantial product liability claims are litigated to a verdict than
are handled by arbitration, ISO data indicate that the average expense for
lawyers as well as other allocated loss adjustments costs is considerably less
when the case is handled by binding arbitration as compared with a court
verdict. See ISO "Closed Claim Survey," Report 14, at 120.
On the other hand, costs may increase under arbitration if there are
numerous appeals for trials de novo. This potential problem may not be as
serious, however, as once thought. Data collected by the Department of Jus-
tice show that appeal rates at the state level for a trial de novo have ranged
from 5 to no more than 15 percent of all cases arbitrated. See Hearings before
the Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery, United States Senate, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., April 14, 1978.
(Statement of Attorney General, Griffin B. Bell). See also Report of the
California Citizens Commission on Tort reform. "Righting the Liability Bal-
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ance," at 143 (1977) citing rejection of arbitration should expedite the repara-
tions process. The Task Force Report showed that in the medical malpractice
area, for example, the arbitration process had achieved a more expeditious
resolution of claims than those operating under the jury system. See Task
Force Report, at VII-238.
Indeed, the benefits of arbitration have prompted the Department of
Justice to recommend that mandatory non-binding arbitration be used in
federal courts in all tort and contract cases. The Department of Justice
reached this conclusion after its Office of Judicial Improvements made a
thorough analysis of the matter in a study conducted wholly independently
of the Task Force Report. These concurrent efforts appear to have reached
the same conclusion.
Section 1-6 draws on portions of the Department of Justice's proposed
bill on mandatory, non-binding arbitration, see S. 2253, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.;
H.R. 9778, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., the Statement of Attorney General Griffin
B. Bell, supra, as well as state legislation on the topic of arbitration.
(a) Applicability. The Act provides for mandatory arbitration where the
amount in dispute is less than $30,000, exclusive of interest and cost. While
the figure is $20,000 less than the Department of Justice Bill's $50,000 level,
it should cover the bulk of product liability claims. In that regard, the ISO
closed claim data, trended for severity, show that the average paid claim in
bodily injury cases is $26,004. While some have suggested limiting arbitration
to smaller claims, it is the larger claims that have been the greater cost items
in product liability cases, See ISO, "Closed Claim Survey," at 113.
While there has been no state experience with cases at the $30,000 level,
Attorney General Bell has noted that when Pennsylvania increased the juris-
dictional amount for the state's arbitration program from $3,000 to $10,000,
there was no increase in the appeal rate. See Statement of Attorney General
Griffin B. Bell, supra.
It seems relatively certain that an arbitration procedure will help expe-
dite and reduce costs connected with smaller claims. ISO closed claim data
show that the large majority of product liability payments are relatively small
(more than two-thirds are under $1,000-even when trended for severity). See
ISO, "Closed Claim Survey," at 113.
(b) Rules Governing. Subsection (1) indicates that arbitrators should
apply the product liability substantive law rules of this Act. Where the Act
does not provide a rule of decision, relevant state law would be applied.
Subsection (2) indicates that where a procedure is not covered, e.g., when
a court can vacate a judgment, the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) (enacted
in a number of states) is to be used as a resource.
The Act also permits the state to designate an alternative source of rules
in subsection (3).
(c) Arbitrators. The rules provide latitude for the parties to select a single
arbitrator. Otherwise, the arbitration is to be conducted by three persons, one
who is a lawyer or retired judge, one who has expertise in the subject matter
area that is in dispute, and one who is a layperson. This provision differs
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slightly from the Department of Justice proposal in light of the needs of
product liability. Having an individual who is familiar with the esoteric na-
ture of the subject matter involved will help expedite the case and serve as a
deterrent to the presentation of biased expert testimony. In addition, this
subsection provides for a layperson to be included to help assure that the
consumer perspective regarding product safety is represented. The process of
selecting a layperson may be complicated, but is is suggested that either
normal jury rolls be utilized or a list of laypersons be compiled for this pur-
pose.
Aside from general guidelines regarding fairness and lack of bias, the Act
does not outline the method of choosing arbitrators, but leaves that matter
to the individual states. A state can help implement the general guidelines
by requiring each arbitration panel candidate to disclose any personal ac-
quaintance with the parties or their counsel and allow a voir dire examina-
tion. see Mich. "Comp. Laws Ann." § 600.5045(1) (2) (Supp. 1978). Some of
the better procedures include:
(1) Having the American Arbitration Association select a pool of candi-
dates according to its established selection procedures. Each party is allowed
to reject certain candidates and rate the remainder in order of preference.
Additional provisions take effect if this procedure fails to produce a panel.
See "Mich. Comp. Laws Ann." § 600.5044(4)(5) (Supp. 1978);
(2) Having the court appoint arbitrators. "Mass. Gen. Laws Ann." ch.
231, § 60B (1978).
(3) Having an arbitration administrator appoint arbitrators. "Wis. Stat.
Ann." § 655.02 (1978).
(4) Having the parties and court combine to appoint arbitrators. "Neb.
Rev. Stat." § 44-2840, 2841 (1976); "Ohio Rev. Code Ann." § 21(A) (1977).
(d) Arbitrators' Powers. These provisions are taken from the Department
of Justice proposal on arbitration. They grant the arbitrators jurisdiction and
also give them powers of subpoena.
(e) Commencement. This provision is also derived from the Department
of Justice proposal. Its purpose is to help expedite the proceeding. The Act
contains a slight modification of the Justice proposal in order to allow an
extension for "good cause shown." This seems appropriate in light of the fact
that some product liability cases are very complex. Cf. "Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann." § 12-567(C) (Supp. 1978)(medical malpractice).
(f) Evidence. One method of expediting the process is to use informal
means of proof. Nevertheless, some guidelines are needed. The Act follows
the department of Justice proposal in referring to the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence as general guidelines. Strict adherence to rules of evidence is not re-
quired. See "Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann." § 12-567-(D) (Supp. 1978).
(g) Transcript of Proceeding. With respect to the provision of a transcript
of proceeding, the Act generally follows the Department of Justice draft.
(h) Arbitration Award and Judgment. The Act follows the Department
of Justice proposal provisions on award and judgment. The parties may re-
quest a trial de novo on issues of law or fact. If they do not so request in a
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timely manner, the action is at an end-there is no appeal.
(i) Trial De Novo. The Act follows the Department of Justice proposal
provisions on trial de novo. Additional guidance on this topic may be found
in the Uniform Arbitration Act § 8-131. The Act excludes evidence about the
existence of a prior arbitration proceeding, the nature or amount of the
award, and matters concerning the conduct of the arbitration (with the ex-
ception of the admissson of testimony for impeachment purposes) at the trial
de novo. A number of state medical manpractice arbitration statutes have
taken the opposite view, i.e., they admit the results of the arbitration pro-
ceeding on the premise that this will be a deterrent against persons seeking
retrials of the proceeding. See, e.g., "Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann." § 12-567(M)
(Supp. 1978); "Mass. Gen. Laws Ann." ch. 231 § 60B (Supp. 1978). Cf. "Wis.
Stat. Ann." § 655 19(2) (1978) (excluding findings and order of arbitration
panel). See also Volume VI, "Legal Study," at 155-56.
The approach of Section 116 would appear to be in accord with the
Federal Constitution. Cf. "ExParte Peterson," 253 U.S. 300, 309 (1920).
Moreover, with the exception of two Ohio lower court decisions, state courts
have upheld the constitutionality of provisions that do admit panel findings
before the jury. See "Eastin v. Broomfield." 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744, 750
(1977); "Attorney General v. Johnson," 282 Md. 168, 385 A.2d 57, 67-68
(1978); "Paro v. Longwood Hospital," 369 N.E.2d 985 (Mass. 1977);
"Prendegast v. Nelson," 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977); "State ex rel.
Strykowski, v. Wilkie," 81 Wis.2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978). Contra
"Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center," 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903,
907-909 (C.P. 1976); "Graley v. Satayatham," 74 Ohio Op.2d 316, 343 N.E.2d
832 (C.P. 1976). See generally, Redish, "Legislative Response to the Medical
Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional Implications," 55 "Tex. L.
Rev." 759, 793 (1977); Lenore, "Mandatory Medical Malpractice Mediation
Panels-A Constitutional Examination," 44 "Ins. Counsel J." 416, 422
(1977).
Nevertheless, a jury may have difficulty evaluating the conclusions of
another fact finder where the jury was not privy to the prior fact finder's
qualifications and mode of operation. Even if these matters could be ex-
plained to the jury, it might get sidetracked from the actual evidence in the
case. See the observations of Judge Hinton in a classic comment, 27 "Ill. L.
Rev." 195 (1932); 18 "A.L.R." 2d 1287 (1951). But see Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 803 (22) (admitting felony convictions in a cognate civil case). For these
reasons, the Act has followed the Department of Justice proposal on the issue.
Section 116(i)(iv)(aa) chooses an alternative deterrent against ill-
considered appeals for trials de novo that does not interfere with the trial de
novo, if a party fails to obtain a judgment more favorable than the arbitration
award, the court will assess the cost of the arbitration proceeding, including
the amount of arbitration fees, plus interest, against that party.
In light of the fact that the present product liability system has created
serious problems and the fact that compulsory binding arbitration has the
potential for dealing with some of those problems, this slight incentive for
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retaining a sound arbitration award should not run afoul of constitutions in
most states. See Task Force Report, at VII-233. The Act does not enumerate
grounds upon which a court may vacate an arbitration award. Guidance on
this issue may be obtained from section 12 of the Uniform Arbitration Act.
ANALYSIS
SEC. 117. EXPERT TESTIMONY
In General. The Task Force's "Legal Study" demonstrated that product
liability cases often are compromised because of the lack of standards with
regard to selecting and presenting expert testimony See Volume IV, "Legal
Study," supra at 153-155. One part of the problem is the biased expert:
another is the unqualified expert.
Even if experts are properly qualified and objective, a jury of laypersons
is often in a poor position to determine which expert is correct. For this
reason, this Act gives the court power to make greater use of pre-trial arbitra-
tion where an unbiased, qualified expert will serve on the panel. See Section
116. Where arbitration is not used, however, this section should promote the
goal of presenting objectives and sound expert testimony to the jury.
(a) Appointment of Experts. Subsection (a) is based on Rule 706 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence and similar state rules. It indicates that courts
have the power to appoint experts on their own authority. A number of courts
have utilized this power even without the benefit of Federal Rule of Evidence
706 or a similar state rule. See 95 "A.L.R." 2d 390 (1964). As the Task Force
Report noted, the presence of a court-appointed expert "has a cautionary
impact on the expert for hire whose theories at trial are subject to dispute
not only by an adversary expert, but also by a neutral-court-appointed one."
Task Force Report, at VII-43, citing, Mitchell, "The Proposed Federal Rules
of Evidence: How They Affect Product Liability Practice," 12 "Duquesne L.
Rev." 551, 557-58 (1974). See also 2 J. Wigmore, "Evidence" § 563, at 648
(3d ed. 1940) ("*** this expedient would remove most *** abuses").
One problem with court-appointed experts is that the trier of fact may
give them an aura of infallibility they do not deserve. Under Section 117, this
possibility is diminished because the experts are subject to cross-examination
by both parties. Also, the section allows the court in its descretion to decline
to disclose to the jury that the expert witness is, in fact, court-appointed.
(b) Compensation. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 706 and similar state
rules, compensation of experts is left to the judge's discretion. This subsection
goes a step further and provides two guidelines for compensating experts.
Both guidelines should serve as an added inducement for attorneys to present
objective expert testimony. The guidelines suggest that the court may impose
the cost of the court-appointed expert on losing parties as well as on parties
the court finds have been wrong in their estimation of damages.
(c) Disclosure of Appointment. This section follows Federal Rules of
Evidence 706. In most instances, it is important for the trier of fact to appre-
ciate that the witness is court-appointed. However, circumstances may arise
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where the court believes that disclosure of that fact will give the witness too
much credence with the jury. Therefore, the court has discretion to withhold
the information when it is appropriate to do so.
(d) Parties' Experts of Own Selection. This section also allows Federal
Rule of Evidence 706. Precluding the parties from introducing their own
experts would best too much power in court-appointed experts.
(e) Pre-Trial Evaluation of Experts. A rule authorizing a court-appointed
expert does not, in and of itself, provide guidance about who is properly
qualified to testify in product liability cases. There are many approaches to
that issue. One approach, used in some medical malpractice statutes, would
require that an expert witness "spend a substantial portion of his professional
time in the actual practice of his area of expertise. This was not followed
because a person may be well-versed in technical product liability matters
even if he does devote substantial time to testifying in cases. See Task Force
Report, at VII-44. Unfortunately, it is impractical to utilize a "standard test"
for all experts in product liability cases. See Donaher, Pichler, Twerski, and
Weinstein, "The Technological Expert in Products Liability Litigation," 52
"Tex. L. Rev." 1303, 1325 (1974).
(1) Need for Pre-Trial Evaluation. It is not necessary or cost-efficient to
utilize the procedure outlined by Donaher et. al., supra. in all cases. This rule
gives some guidance to the trial court in deciding whether to conduct a pre-
trial hearing on the qualifications of expert witneses. It is appropriate to do
so in more complex cases and also where the pre-trial hearing would serve as
a deterrent to the presentation of witnesses who were not qualified. Either
party may bring this matter before the court by motion.
(2) Factors in Evaluation. The factors in evaluation are drawn from
Donaher et. al., supra.
The court should inquire into the expert witness' background and skills
and determine whether they are appropriate for the purpose of the case. The
court should not only examine the witness' formal education, but also
whether he or she had undertaken specific preparation for the litigation be-
fore the court. Finally, the court should examine a witness for bias. A witness
with marginal expert skills, but who also had a strong bias should be consid-
ered unqualified.
(3) Findings of Fact. If it seems clear to the court that the expert's
background and experience do not qualify the expert to testify, it should state
this conclusion in its findings of fact under section (h).
ANALYSIS
SEC. 118. NON-PECUNIARY DAMAGES
Non-pecuniary damages include awards for pain and mental suffering.
They are to be contrasted with pecuniary damages which compensate victims
for lost wages, medical costs, and other expenditures brought about by a
product-related accident.
According to the ISO Closed Claim Survey, 70 percent of claims clssed
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with payment include amounts in addition to a claimant's pecuniary loss. See
ISO, "Closed Claim Survey," at 54 (1978). Moreover, the average amount of
payment above pecuniary loss increases significantly in the higher payment
ranges. Id., at 54-55. A most important reason for the difficulty in setting
product liability rates is the "open-endedness" of damages for pain and suf-
fering. See Task Force Report, a VII-64-65.
The Task Force Report suggested that limits on awards for pain and
suffering "would reduce uncertainty and thereby mitigate the 'apprehension
factor' that has contributed to the rise in product liability insurance rates."
Id., at VII-65. Nevertheless, such awards have deep historical roots and
should not be limited in a manner that unreasonably curtails the rights of
injured parties.
Section 118 addresses each of the major rationales offered in support of
award for non-pecuniary damages. First, in proposing to limit such awards,
this section implicitly takes the position that the common law rationale for
pain and suffering awards generally does not apply under this Act. The award
for non-pecuniary damages arose in early common law cases as a substitute
for an injured plaintiff seeking personal "vengeful retaliation." See Task
Force Report, Id. In those cases, the defendant usually committed an inten-
tional wrong. This rationale has little application to cases arising under strict
product liability. Under this Act, a manufacturer is liable for harm caused
by products found to be defective in construction regardless of fault. In cases
of harm caused by products found to be defective in design or defective
because of the absence of adequate warnings, the trier of fact must consider
more sophisticated matters than whether the defendant "acted as a reasona-
ble person under all the circumstances"-the general negligence standard.
A second rationale to support awarding damages for pain and suffering
is that they have an important deterrent function. The Task Force Report
found evidence tha the general product liability problem caused manufactur-
ers to devote more attention to product liability loss prevention techniques.
See Task Force Report, at VI-50. Section 117 retains this deterrent function
while placing some reasonable limits on awards for pain and suffering.
A third rationale, supported by members of the plaintiffs bar and some
economic legal scholars, is that awards for pain and suffering are a reasonable
attempt to provide some compensation for the serious discomfort that a
plaintiff endures. See R. Prosner, "Economic Analysis of the Law," 82 (1972).
Other studies have questioned whether monetary awards for pain and suffer-
ing do anything to alleviate the symptoms they are alleged to address. See J.
O'Connell and R. Simon, "Payment for Pain & Suffering" (1972); Peck,
"Compensation for Pain: A Reappraisal in Light of New Medical Evidence,"
72 "Mich. L. Rev." 1355 (1974). Section 117 ahderes to the former assumption
to this degree: When a claiment has suffered permanent serious disfigure-
ment or serious mental illness, the amount of damages for pain and suffering
are left to the sound discretion of the trier of fact with appropriate review by
the court in cases of abuse of that discretion.
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However, where the claimant has not suffered permanent serious disfig-
urement or permanent mental illness as a result of the product-related harm,
damages for pain and suffering are limited to $25,000.
An ample body of case law in the area of worker compensation and more
recently automobile injury reparation statutes serve as guidance for courts in
determining "permanent serious disfigurements." See, e.g., "Falcone v.
Branker," 135 N.J. Super. 137, 342 A.2 875 (1975) (collecting cases). That
term has been held to provide a sufficient basis for legal interpretation. See
"In Re Requests of Governor and Senate, Etc.," 389 Mich. 411, 208 N.W.2d
469, 480 (1973).
Courts also have defined and explained the term "mental illness" in a
number of contexts. See "Carroll v. Cobb," 139 N.J. Super. 439, 354 A.2d 355
(1976) (voter registration requirements); "Sachs v. Commercial Insurance Co.
of Newark, N.J." 119 N.J. Super. 226, 290 A.2d 760 (1972) (insurance policy);
"In re Humphrey," 236 N.C. 141, 71 S.E.2d 915 (1952)(incompetency pro-
ceedings); "Commonwealth v. Moon," 383 Pa. 18, 117 A.2d 96 (1955) (com-
mittal proceedings); "Interstate Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Houston,"
50 Tenn. App. 172, 360 S.W.2d 71 (1962) (insanity exclusion provision).
Objections to limits on awards for non-pecuniary damages take several
forms: One is that such limits may violate due process or equal protection
clauses of some state constitutions. Cf. "Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp.
Assoc.," 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736, 743 (1976) (restriction of amount of
general damages in medical malpractice); "Graley v. Satayatham," 74 Ohio
Op. 2d 316, 343 N.E.2d 832, 836 (C.P. 1976) (requiring list of collateral source
benefits in medical malpractice). Another is state consitutional prohibitions
on damage limitations. See, e.g., "Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.," Const. Art. 18, § 6
(1956); "Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.," Const. § 54 (1963); "Penn. Stat. Ann.," Const.
Art. 3, § 18 (1969). An argument that § 117 does not violate such prohibitions-
is that a strict product liability cause of action did not exist at the time the
constitution was adopted and is theefore exempt from its interdictions. See
"Rail N Ranch Corp. v. State," 7 Ariz. App. 558, 441 P.2d 786, 788 (1968).
These objections notwithstanding, Section 118 can be supported by three
basic rationales. First, the common law reason for the rule does not support
the application of damages for pain and suffering in strict liability cases.
Second, the common law rule will continue to operate where injuries are
serious. Cf. "Rybeck v. Rybeck," 141 N.J. Super. 481, 358 A.2d 828, 836
(1976), appeal dism'd, 150 N.J. Super, 151, 375 A.2d 269 (1977)(limited court
access for pain and suffering in no-fault-"the law is permitted to treat large
problems differently from small problems if there is a rational basis for the
difference"). Finally, some ceiling or limit on damages for pain and suffering
will reduce uncertainty in one of the greatest liability insurance rate-making
problem areas.
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ANALYSIS
SEC. 119. THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE
The collateral source rule is a principle of tort law under which the
defendant is not permitted to take "credit" for any money that an injured
plaintiff received from another (collateral) source. The rule embraces both
payments for loss of wages and medical expenditures.
The rule may permit double recovery by the plaintiff and also increase
transaction costs. Section 119 recognizes these possibilities and provides for
a limited modification of the collateral source rule where the claimant has
received compensation for the same damages from a public source. Its ap-
proach is similar to that followed in medical malpractice by the states of
Tennessee and Pennsylvania. See Task Force, "Legal Study," Vol. V, at 146.
There are two significant arguments against proposals to modify the
existing rule. The first is that the "wrongdoer" should not have the benefit
of a windfall. Proponents contend that it is better that the plaintiff have the
benefit of a windfall than the defendant.
This argument can be rebutted in the context of product liability. Under
Section 104 of this Act and the law of most states, product sellers may be held
responsible for damages on a strict liability basis not merely because the
defendant has engaged in negligent or intentionally wrongful conduct. There-
fore, a selective modification of the collateral source rule in the context of
product liability, as compared with medical malpractice, may be justified.
Cf. "Graley v. Satayatham," 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 343 N.E.2d 832 (C. P. 1976);
"Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center," 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N. E. 2d
903 (C. P. 1976) (holding unconstitutional selective abolition in medical mal-
practice context). Other sates, however, have upheld such selective abolition,
or modification. See "Eastin v. Broomfield," 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744, 751-
752 (1977).
The second argument against modifying the collateral source rule is that
a manufacturer should not be permitted to "externalize" the cost of an injury
caused by its products. This argument is very strong where the injured plain-
tiff has purchased health and accident coverage. In that instance, the defen-
dant product seller should not be able to benefit from the claimant's prior
prudence. Nevertheless, some proposals have modified the rule in that situa-
tion. See "Neb. Rev. Sta." § 44-2819 (Supp. 1976); "Prendergast v. Nelson,"
190 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657, 669 (1977); National Product Liability Council,
"Proposed Uniform State Product Liability Act," § 207 (undated). See also
Comment, "An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Mal-
practice Crisis," 1975 "Duke L. J." 1417, 1447-59.
On the other hand, where the claimant has received damages from a
public source, the argument is less persuasive. The benefits received were not
through the claimant's pre-accident financial planning or made a part or
one's remuneration from employment; rather they were derived from public
tax funds that accumulated in part by contributions from the product seller.
Since the product seller would be able to distribute the same cost again
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among consumers through product pricing, the public may be subjected to
excessive costs.
A probable effect of Section 119 will be to reduce double expenditures
in the context of medical costs. The ISO "Closed Claim Survey" suggests that
medical costs represent approximately 19.7 percent of product liability
claims. See ISO, "Closed Claim Survey," at 57 (1977). Nevertheless, the cost
savings generated by this section probably will be modest. The ISO closed
claim data, which were quite limited on this point, show that approximately
6.4 percent of claimants have been reimbursed by public collateral sources.
See ISO, "Closed Claim Survey," at 181 (1977). Collateral sources paid for
19.8 percent of the claims in those cases. (This closely parallels the general
percentage of medical benefits.) Although generating only modest savings,
Section 119 should help reduce overall insurance costs. Liability insurers
should take this matter into account when the formulate rates and premiums.
Section 119 also takes account of existing legislation that may authorize
subrogation by public collateral sources. In order to reduce transaction costs
and duplicative distribution costs, this section precludes subrogation.
Finally, Section 119 does not alter existing law that prohibits the defen-
dant from introducing in evidence the fact that the plaintiff has been indem-
nified by a collateral source. That approach was rejected because it would
leave the trier of fact in the role of balancing the delicate policy elements that
surround proposals calling for abolition of the collateral source rule. Also,
that approach would reduce the potential benefit of collateral source rule
modifications in that it would increase transaction costs and lower predicta-
bility and consistency in the allocation of collateral benefits. See Task Force
Report, at VII-74-75. Cf. Defense Research Institute, "Products Liability Pos-
ition Paper," at 44-45 (1976) (advocating modification of evidentiary rules to
allow trier of fact to consider all collateral benefits).
ANALYsIs
SEC. 120 PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Some product sellers and others have called for the abolition of punitive
damages on the ground that they serve no proper "tort law" purpose, see
Proposed Uniform State Product Liability Act § 206 (National Product Lia-
bility Council) (undated); see generally the Defense Research Institute Mon-
ograph, "The Case Against Punitive Damages" (1969) (marshalling argu-
ments) and at least one court has accepted these arguments in the area of
product liability. See "Walbrun v. Berkel, Inc.," 433 F. Supp. 384-85 (E.D.
Wis. 1976); "Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.," 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir.
1967) (dictum).
Nevertheless, as Section 120 acknowledges, punitive damages serve an
important function in deterring product sellers from producing, distributing,
or selling dangerous products. See "Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.," 251
Cal. App. 2d 630, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967); "Gillham v. Admiral Corp.," 523
F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975). At the same time, this section recognizes and ad-
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dresses problems that the concept has caused in the context of product liabil-
ity.
While many product sellers have expressed great concern about the eco-
nomic impact of punitive damages, the ISO Closed Claim Survey suggests
that the number of cases in which such damages are imposed is insubstantial.
See ISO, "Closed Claim Survey," at 183 (1977). Nevertheless, concern about
punitive damages has caused some insurers to decline insurance coverage for
these damages. Also, a number of states and some insurers have declined to
do so for the policy reason that a product seller should not be permitted to
pass this cost on to an insurer. Transcending all concerns is the total lack of
structure surrounding punitive damages.
Subsection (a) addresses a basic argument against putitive damages,
namely that they apply a criminal law sanction to a civil law case. The
defendant does not have the benefit of constitutional protections that would
be available to him under the criminal law. Section 120(a) moves away from
the ordinary "preponderance of evidence" test of civil cases and toward the
criminal standard, but does not turn completely to a pure criminal law stan-
dard of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." Instead, the Act requires the
plaintiff to show by "clear and convincing" evidence that punitive damages
are justified. See Section 102(7) (Definitions).
Section 120(a) also requires that the claimant show that the product
seller's conduct demonstrated reckless disregard for the safety of others. By
"reckless disregard" the provision means a conscious indifference to the
safety of persons who might be injured by the product, the traditional barrier
that the plaintiff must cross in order to obtain punitive damages. See W.
Prosser, "Torts," at 9-10 (4th Ed. 1971). The reckless disregard standard is
identified in statutory form to avoid any possible misinterpretation of this
basic area of law-it should be clear that a product seller does not have to
pay punitive damages under ordinary strict liability or negligence standards.
Subsection (b) follows the current common law system in allowing the
jury to determine in its discretion whether punitive damages should be
awarded. See Prosser, "Torts," supra, at 9. On the other hand, this subsec-
tion draws upon a newly enacted Minnesota statute (Minn. Stat Ann. 549.21
(1978)) in having the court, rather than the jury, determine the amount of
those damages. This approach is in accord with the general pattern of the
criminal law where the jury determines "guilt or innocence" and the court
imposes sentence. This is particularly appropriate in product liability cases
where, under current law, product sellers are potentially subject to repeated
imposition of punitive damages for harm caused by a particular product.
Subsection (b) provides guidelines for the court to determine the amount
of punitive damages. The guidelines offered are based on "Minn. Stat. Ann."
549.21(3) (1978). The drafters of that statute relied on a very thorough analy-
sis of product liability and punitive damages. See Owen, "Punitive Damages
in Products Liability Litigation," 74 "Mich. L. REv." 1257, 1299-1319 (1976).
Factors (1) and (2) are self-evident. If the facts show that the product
seller actually was aware of the specific hazard and its seriousness, and mar-
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keted it anyway, a higher award is in order.
Factor (3), profitability, recognizes that punitive damages may be used
to directly attack the profit incentive that generated the misconduct.
Factor (4) is important regardless of the basic requirement that the prod-
uct seller must have reckless disregard for the safety of others. If the product
seller consciously concealed its activities, this augurs for a higher award.
Factor (5) acknowledges that a product seller who was reckless in produc-
ing the product, but who acted quickly to remove the product from the
market upon discovery of the hazard, should not be subject to as harsh a
sanction as one who failed to act. Some have suggested that punitive damages
should be awarded only where corporate management has either authorized,
participated in, or ratified conduct that shows a conscious or reckless disre-
gard for public safety. See Task Force Report, at VII-79. Section 120 rejects
that approach because it could foster legal disputes as to whether an individ-
ual stood "high enough" in the corporate structure to cause that individual
to bear responsibility for punitive damages. Nevertheless, in circumstances
where a non-management employee caused the harm and management acted
quickly to undo that harm once it was discovered, a lower award may be
appropriate.
Factor (6) is traditional under the common law. It is one that has been
subject to criticism from product sellers and economists. Nevertheless, in
light of the fact that deterrence of wrongful conduct is the principal reason
behind punitive damages, it is appropriate to consider the impact an award
will have on a particular product seller.
Factor (7) is more important in product liability cases than in others
because it addresses the problem of multiple exposure to punitive damages.
This factor directs the court to consider both criminal and civil liability to
which the product seller has been or may be subjected.
This Act takes the position that the award of punitive damages should
go to the claimant and not the state. While the argument that since the
damages are non-compensatory they should go to the state has some merit
the approach was rejected because of constitutional problems and the fact
that it might place a claimant's attorney in a potential conflict of interest
situation (is he trying the case for hs client or the state?). See Task Force
Report at VII-79.
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